In the United States, the answer varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. A few states allow felons to vote even while in prison; many allow felons who have served their sentences to vote. There is a chart in this essay from the Sentencing Project.

We might look at the issue from two points of view: justice, and broader pragmatic considerations. At least in the case of convicted felons who have served their sentences, it's hard to see the argument for denying them the vote. That's especially true if we're moved by the idea that by spending time in prison, they "paid their debt to society." But some people also point out that it's generally better for people to see themselves as part of the poltical process. If extending the vote to felons who have served their time makes it more likely that they will see themselves as stakeholders who have an interest in an orderly, democratic society, that's one more reason in favor of the practice.

It's no doubt true that Zionism as such doesn't necessarily insist that Jews are "unique" and so deserve "overriding rights". That said, there's a case to be made that "national ideologies" are intrinsically racist, on the ground that the very notion of a "nation" that is being deployed here is intrinsically racist. It is certainly true, for example, that there are people who regard the French as constituting a "nation" that deserves its own homeland, but most of those people would generally be regarded as extremists, and the same goes for British and German nationalists. If so, then nationalism is fundamentally inconsistent with the Enlightenment values the questioner mentions.

Whether any of what I've just said is true, however, is hotly debated. In particular, the question to what extent "shared community values" might inform the basic structure of a political system has been much discussed over the last few decades. As good a place to start as any is Michael Walzer's Spheres of Justice.

Don't believe everything you read. In my experience atheists are fine in the US, although as you say might not be advised to be frank about their views if they are standing as candidates for election in some parts of the country. A recent survey showed that atheists are the fastest growing group of believers in the US, in their case believers in nothing I suppose, and along with the pious enthusiasms that flourish here, a great deal of religious scepticism exists also, and always has. Dawkins has an axe to grind, and does it very well, and clearly it is currently fashionable to poke fun at the Americans from the standpoint of cynical and intelligent Europe, but like all fashions this will one day come to an end and a more realistic view of the diversity of American religious and non-religious life will emerge.

I take a more pessimistic view than Professor Leaman. I think that an avowed atheist would have absolutely no hope of election to President or likely to any major office in any (or almost any) state, regardless of his or her other attributes or views, and that an avowed agnostic would have no hope of election to President or most major offices in most states, and that a candidate who did not strongly avow being a Christian (or perhaps Jew) would have almost no hope of being elected President. And I think that these facts are causes for concern for a number of reasons. For instance, it indicates a specific type of intolerance, one that I think is largely based on a failure to understand what atheists do (and can) believe. Though Professor Leaman's is correct when he says atheists are "believers in nothing" if he is referring only to supernatural deities, atheists can and usually do believe (often strongly):

• that life has meaning and purpose
  
• that there are moral truths or at least better and worse ways of living and acting
• and that it is moral to care for others, be open to others' belief systems (when theirs do not harm others), work to improve the world, etc.
  
• that humans are free and morally responsible to a uniquely well-developed degree
• that humans have minds with important capacities for consciousness, self-awareness, love, and spirituality (of a certain sort)
• that humans are special (even if not specially created) and each human is unique and of value
  
• and so on

Once one recognizes that atheists can and do believe these things, it is difficult to see why choosing not to believe in a God with supernatural powers (and perhaps who has the ability to lessen suffering but chooses not to) or in special creation or in immaterial souls or in life after bodily death--why not believing such improbable and often unprovable things--should count against one's ability to be an effective political leader or most anything else.

Western Europeans in general seem to me to be more enlightened about these issues than many Americans. And while Dawkins rhetoric may hurt more than it helps, he is right that America is religious in a way that includes too many people being too intolerant of atheists (even though "atheists are fine in the US" in that, like most Americans, they have more freedoms than they have had in most places in the world during most of history). He is also right that beliefs based on faith should not get a free pass and should be subject to open discussion and debate.

I can't be sure whether the pronouns in Richard's second sentence are supposed to refer to me or to Dawkins. If he (Richard H.) is referring to me, I'm not sure why. I don't see anything in what I said that suggests I believe all religious people share the same beliefs or that I am "ignorant of the varieties of religious belief." To clarify, there are some religious people in this country--I would say, too many--who act as though atheism (or perhaps any other failure to share their own faith-based beliefs) is a sign of moral terpitude (e.g., of the sort that disqualifies you for public office). Of course, it works the other way too. I certainly hold it against a political candidate if he or she avows certain religious doctrines (e.g., intelligent design).

On that note, I think another potential concern of the influence of fundamentalist religious organizations and individuals on politics in America is their ability to undermine scientific research and science education.

It's hard to give a good general answer, but let's start with an analogy. I've been a faculty member for many years and I have some administrative experience. However, if someone came to me and said "Allen, the Dean is stepping down, and we need you to fill in as Interim Dean of Arts and Humanities," I would feel obliged to say no on the grounds that I understand my limitations and am quite sure that I am not well-qualified. (We'll leave the sorry catalog of my shortcomings to your imagination.) My becoming Interim Dean would be a bad thing for the faculty and students in my College. I would not be able to do the job well (reasons supplied on request!), and so I should refuse to be drafted -- even if Deans were elected by the faculty, and even if there was some reason to think that my colleagues might vote me in.

The generalization is obvious: if someone really thinks s/he is ill-qualified for a certain office, and, let's add, if there are stateable reasons that go beyond possible false modesty, then there's an awfully strong case for saying that the person should decline. Unless the alternatives are even worse, it's hard to see what could justifying saying yes.

Unfortunately, there seem to be people who are not capable of recognizing when they aren't qualified. Some of these people, as it turns out, also have personal qualities that make them attractive to certain parts of the electorate. And so they end up running and sometimes even getting elected.

How culpable are they for not recognizing their own lack of qualifications? That's a tough question, but it seems reasonable to say that the higher the office and the greater the potential responsibility, the greater the obligation to think really hard about one's readiness. Saying "I didn't blink" is almost a sure sign that blinking would have been a good idea.

In a society where this faith is shared and influences political decisions in the direction of peace, justice, humanity, and equal citizenship, I see no problem.

Problems arise when either of these two conditions are not satisfied. Faith can lead people to do terrible things, for instance torture and murder those with different religious beliefs. No one should let his or her faith exert such an influence. Rather, when one's religion seems to require conduct that seems wrong, then one ought to re-examine one's religion. This does not mean that one should abandon one's faith, though it may come to that in some cases. Another possible outcome is a reinterpretation of one's religion (for example, many Christian now understand that their faith did not really require the Inquisition). And one may also conclude, on reflection, that one's religion was right, after all, to require the conduct in question (as when Christians in Nazi Germany came to endorse their religious duty to engage in treasonable resistance). These remarks about the second condition apply to political leaders and ordinary people alike.

You are probably more interested in cases where the first condition is not satisfied: where the political leader's faith is not shared and some political decisions this faith favors are controversial. Here a political leader may still allow himself to be influenced by his faith insofar as this faith favors good policies that have a solid secular justification -- as when his faith requires religious toleration, for example, or forbids torture. He should clearly not use state power to obstruct the practice of other religions or to require conformity to his own -- even if his faith suggests that those who practice another religion are doing wrong thereby.

The hard cases are those where the political leader's faith may influence him to endorse, and then to follow, one secular (freestanding) morality in preference to another. For example, quite apart from any religion, it is controversial among moralists whether it is wrong (absent special circumstances such as rape or genetic defect) to have or perform an abortion. A person of Catholic faith will feel drawn to a morality that deems abortion wrong (a crime against an as yet unborn human being) and may then favor some legislation against it as appropriate. Can we fault her for this? I think we cannot, so long as her morality, though supported by her religion, is also independent of it as shown by the fact that many non-Catholics also endorse it.

It is of great importance that political leaders act well, morally, because the decisions they make have such momentous consequences. (By the end of a President's or Prime Minister's term of office, millions have typically died prematurely as a result of decisions he has made.) Most political leaders do not act well, morally, and in most cases this is because they are not moral persons, not serious about morality. To be serious about morality, one must try to integrate one’s considered moral judgments through more general moral principles into a coherent account of morally acceptable conduct; one must work out what this unified system of beliefs and commitments implies for one’s own life; and one must make a serious effort to honour these implications in one’s own conduct and judgments. Those who are not serious about morality typically do not act well, morally, and when they are political leaders, then this can lead to a great deal of harm.

When a political leaders is committed to a religion that has implications for human conduct, and when he is serious about morality in the sense defined, then his understanding of his religion will invariably influence the coherent account of morally acceptable conduct he will develop. And his faith will then, via his morality, influence his decisions. If we voters want to avoid this, we can vote for non-religious politicians. But this may make it even harder to find ones who are morally serious about the momentous decisions they make in our names.