Still Missing[2]
U.S. Air Force Major John Francis Overlock of Springfield, Massachusetts,
was assigned to the 309th Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS) at Tuy Hoa
Airbase, South Vietnam . His temporary duty assignment was with the 37th
Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) at Phu Cat Airbase, South Vietnam .[3]
On August 16, 1968 , Major
Overlock departed Phu Cat at 0608 on a single-plane, forward air controller (FAC)
mission over North Vietnam . The intended target was RP-1. He was the front seat
pilot in a camouflaged, North American F-100F Super Sabre--tail number 56-3865.
Occupying the back seat position was Major Michael D. McElhanon of Bonham , Texas
. Although McElhanon was the senior officer and a pilot, he performed as the
co-pilot on this mission.[4]
The F-100 was the first
fighter to fly faster than sound. Nicknamed the 'Hun' after its numerical designation,
the first production model flew on October 29, 1953 . From 1957, the Hun equipped
sixteen USAF wings, and in Vietnam various models flew with such intensity that
by 1969, just four wings (the 3rd TFW, 31st TFW, 35th TFW and 37th TFW) had exceeded
the number of missions flown by the 15,000-plus Mustangs in World War II.[5] The
'F' model, the sixth and final model of the F-100, changed the single-seat aircraft
into a two-seater. The fuselage was extended to accommodate tandem dual-control
cockpits with a one-piece clamshell canopy. Lost in the design was some fuel
capacity and two of the four M-39 20mm guns in the nose.[6]
All tactical strike aircraft
operating in Southeast Asia had to be under the control of a FAC, who was familiar
with the locale and the tactical situation. It was the FAC who would find the
target, order up fighter/bomber aircraft from a command and control station based
in the air or on the ground, mark the target, and then remain on station throughout
the operation and make a bomb damage assessment upon its completion. FAC missions
were flown in several aircraft types, including slower Cessna models. When FAC
missions were flown in faster aircraft, such as the F-100, they were called the "Misty" FAC.[7]
On this mission, Major Overlock's call sign was Misty 11 and the airborne command
and control station was called Cricket Control.[8]
There were scattered clouds
in the area at 2,000 feet and broken clouds to 9,000 feet; visibility was unrestricted.
At 0845, Misty 11 reported its position to Cricket Control as 106 degrees 50
minutes east, 17 degrees 31 minutes north. At 0858 they reported to Cricket Control
that they were leaving the area to rendezvous with a tanker over the Gulf of
Tonkin, but they did not give their position nor indicate they were experiencing
any difficulty. This was their last radio transmission, as their next scheduled
report at 0925 was not received.[9]
At 0950, another FAC arrived
in the area and attempted to contact Misty 11 for possible target information.
When contact could not be established, the FAC initiated a check with other airfields
to determine if Misty 11 had diverted, but received negative replies. He then
contacted the refueling tanker and learned that the aircraft had not arrived
to refuel. Misty 11 was presumed to be down in the area along a line from the
point of last contact east to the tanker. At approximately 1035, the FAC and
other search aircraft initiated a visual and electronic search over the intended
flight path and continued to search until dusk with negative results. The search
area was varied, consisting of rugged, forested mountains, a highly populated
flat coastal plain containing small villages, and a portion of the Gulf of Tonkin
. The search was resumed at dawn, but was formally terminated on the evening
of August 17 due to negative results.[10]
The 37th TFW was informed
at 1045 on August 16 that Misty 11 was presumed down and the status of the pilots
was unknown. The 37th Combat Support Group (CSG) at Phu Cat Air Base initiated
a Casualty Report (Initial, Missing in Action, Battle ), which stated that a
visual and electronic search was initiated at 1105 and was continuing.[11] The
report also indicated that the parents––Theresa M. Overlock, Francis J. Overlock,
Dorothy T. McElhanon and Samuel O. McElhanon––and the wives––Theresa M. Overlock
and Naomi Frances McElhanon––would be notified by Headquarters Staff, USAF. On
August 17 the 37th CSG initiated a Casualty Report (Supplemental, Missing in
Action, Battle), which stated that a change in the missing status was determined
to be unwarranted based on the fact that the area was extremely hostile, and
parts of it were heavily forested, hampering an air search. It was considered
possible that the pilots had landed safely and were captured or were evading.[12]
On September 23, 1968, the 37th CSG sent a message to the Air Force Military
Personnel Center (USAFMPC) at Randolph AFB, Texas , indicating that the position
of Misty 11 had been established at 325 degrees, 58 nautical miles from Dong
Ha TACAN at 0845. This position would have placed them at 17 degrees 39 minutes
north, 106 degrees 2 minutes east. On September 25, USAFMPC sent a message to
the 37th CSG requesting that they confirm the figures provided in their message
of the previous day, and provide an estimated position of Misty 11 at 0858. On
September 27, the 37th CSG replied, confirming the coordinates and stating the
Unit Commander's assertion that during the period from 0845 to 0858, Misty 11
was probably continuing to search for targets while flying at a level below which
radar could observe him. The Unit Commander stated that Misty 11's radio contact
at 0858, indicating he was going out to refuel, would normally have been made
at about the time he approached the coastline heading for the tanker. However,
there was no way to confirm that he was over land or water at the time of the
last radio contact. The best estimate of Misty 11's position at the time of last
radio contact was somewhere between his position at 0845 and the coast.[13]
A year later, in August
1969, an investigation and review of the case of the officers missing since August
16, 1968 was completed. Pursuant to Section 555, Title 37, USC, an official determination
was made to continue the MIA status of Lieutenant Colonels McElhanon and Overlock––both
men were promoted on August 17, 1969 , a year and a day since they went missing.
Official reports announcing the continuation of MIA status were issued and next
of kin were notified.[14]
Six years later, on September
16, 1975 , Colonel A.W. Gratch of the Air Force Military Personnel Center, Randolph
AFB, Texas , conducted a status review hearing in the case of Lieutenant Colonel
John Francis Overlock. The review hearing, conducted pursuant to Chapter 10,
Title 37, USC, and Air Force Regulation 35-43, convened at 0900. Mrs. Beverly
J. Overlock requested to appear at the hearing without counsel and was present.
Mr. and Mrs. Francis J. Overlock were notified of the hearing but chose not to
appear. Major Ed Silverbush, Chief, Missing Persons, briefed Mrs. Overlock on
the facts and circumstances of the incident, after the case file, including previously
classified information, was made available to her. He told her that no accounting
for either officer was ever received from the North Vietnamese government or
their allies, and their names never appeared in the prisoner communication channels,
which have proven reliable. In addition, no information pertaining to them has
ever been obtained from any official or unofficial source. Mrs. Overlock raised
no objections nor offered anything further concerning the issue of whether Colonel
Overlock may be reasonably presumed to be alive. Upon completion of the hearing,
Colonel Hatch advised Mrs. Overlock he would recommend her husband be terminated
by a finding of death under Title 37, Section 555, USC.[15]
The following day, Colonel
Gratch submitted his recommendation to the Secretary of the Air Force. He referenced
a memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated August 17, 1973, regarding "Changes
Of Status Of Servicemen Who Did Not Return From Southeast Asia." This memorandum
requested that the Service Secretaries make each proposed status change a matter
for their personal attention, and it was the desire of the Secretary of the Air
Force to personally review each case.[16] Colonel
Gratch referenced the status review hearing of the previous day, and attached
a memorandum that proposed a change of status from “missing in action” to “killed
in action” for Lieutenant Colonel Overlock.[17]
On October 9, 1975, Colonel
Gratch received a letter from Major General Walter D. Druen Jr., Assistant Deputy
Chief of Staff, Personnel. The letter stated,
Pursuant to authority delegated to me by the Secretary of the Air
Force under the provisions of Chapter 10, Title 37, United States Code,
and following a full review of the case, I find that Lieutenant John
F. Overlock, 125-28-2195FR, can no longer reasonably be presumed to
be living. His missing in action status is therefore terminated by
a finding of death pursuant to the authority contained in Section 555,
Chapter 10, Title 37, United States Code, and an official casualty
report will be issued to include a statement that this finding was
made following a subsequent review of all available information and,
as provided by and for the purposes of the cited law, the date death
is presumed to have occurred is the date I have signed this action.
Death is held to have occurred while in a pay, flying pay, and duty
status.[18]
Major General Druen then sent letters to Mrs. Beverly J. Overlock[19] and
to Mr. and Mrs. Francis J. Overlock.[20] The
letters announced the official change of status, and explained that October
9, 1975 was not considered to be the actual or probable date of death,
but is established in accordance with the cited law for the purpose of
terminating pay and settling accounts. Beverly Overlock's letter encouraged
her contact base assistance personnel for assistance in obtaining allowable
benefits. It also offered the assistance of the Mortuary Branch at USAF
Headquarters in Washington , DC, in arranging a Memorial Service. Francis
and Theresa Overlock's letter was slightly longer and contained a summary
of facts that Beverly Overlock had received at the status review hearing
the previous month. The only new information presented in these letters
was related to the position of Misty 11 at 0845 on August 16, 1968 .
It stated that the position of 325 degrees, 58 nautical miles from Dong
Ha, South Vietnam would have placed them at about ten nautical miles
northwest of Dong Hoi, North Vietnam . Both letters were very thoughtful
and sincere in their extension of condolences. They iterated that the
Air Force was continuing its efforts to secure the necessary fact "which
may lead to the recovery and identification of the remains of all our
personnel lost in Southeast Asia ." The Overlocks were assured that they
would be notified immediately if any information was received about the
remains of John F. Overlock.
Another thirteen
years had passed before hope was raised of finding Colonel Overlock or
his remains, and a report of the search made its way to the Whitehouse
National Security Council, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State,
Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense Intelligence Agency.[21] From
January 18-20, 1989, a joint United States-Vietnam investigation team
investigated incidents involving the loss of American aircraft in Nhan
Trach Village, Bo Trach District, Binh Tri Thien Province. The American
team leaders were: James M. Coyle, Team Leader; MSGT Richard L. John,
JCRC Analyst; and MSG Richard B. Huston, Search and Recovery Specialist.
Vietnamese team members were: Lai Xuan Chieu, Team Leader; Luu Van Tho,
and Nguyen Hong Dung. Major Ha Hien Luong of the Binh Tri Thien Province
Military Command accompanied the team.[22]
On January 20, 1989,
the team returned to Ly Nhon Bac (pronounced LYS NHOWN BAWCS) Hamlet, on the
northern band of the Song Dinh River, to investigate the reported crash of an
American aircraft. Ly Nhon Bac is the part of Nhan Trach in which burial sites
had been reported. There the team once again met Ngo Xe (pronounced NGOO XEE),
former leader of the Nhan Trach Village Militia, who had previously provided
the team with information on burial sites not related to RefNo 1250. Xe led the
team to an open sandy area lying on the northern edge of the hamlet, saying that
an A-6A aircraft had crashed there at about 0300 hours on August 16, 1968. The
team conducted a survey that yielded results as follows:
The reported crash site is located at XE676418, in an open area of sand
which slopes slightly to the east, at the northern edge of Ly Nhon Bac
Hamlet. The soil shows evidence of recent disturbance (it is both darker
in color than the surrounding sand, and its surface is rougher. A number
of small pieces of plastic, rubber, and fabric lie scattered about the
area. Use of the metal detector produced numerous readings indicating
the presence of a substantial amount of sub-surface metal. The team took
photographs of the site and fixed its location by compass readings.
At a private home in Ly Nhon Bac Hamlet, local residents displayed for
the team two small pieces of wreckage which they claimed to have removed
from the crash site as souvenirs. The team examined the pieces, photographed
them, and recorded identification numbers from them as follows:
359901AE (with the A circled)
99193A (with the A circled)
0001 and 71613
Then, in order to escape the large and unruly crowd which had been hindering
the survey, the team led Xe away to interview him in a more private location.[23]
Xe told the team that
at 0300 on August 16, 1968, he had been taking his shift in his fighting position
when an American aircraft, either an A-6A or an A-37, came streaking over the
village toward the sea at a very low level (Xe estimated 300 - 500 meters altitude).
The aircraft was struck by 12.7mm anti-aircraft fire, burst into flames, and
crashed into the dunes almost immediately. There were no other aircraft in the
area at the time. At about 0500 Xe went out to examine the crash site. The aircraft
wreckage was deeply embedded in the sand, with only its tail visible. Xe saw
the numbers "A-37" on the tail of the aircraft, which is why he believed it to
be an A-37. When asked to describe the aircraft, Xe could only say that it was "BIG" (the
word accompanied by a sudden and dramatic spread of the arms, and that it had
a delta wing configuration. He did not see it clearly in the air because everything
happened so quickly. At the crash site Xe saw no trace of the pilot, and as the
aircraft was no longer burning and appeared to pose to threat to the village,
he went back to his bunker. Since that time he has neither seen nor heard of
anyone discovering remains at or removing them from that site. Xe knew of no
additional incidents, other than those previously reported that were not related
to RefNo 1250.[24]
On the way back to Dong
Hoi, Major Luong told James Coyle that while the team had been conducting their
survey of the crash site, he had heard from local residents that a number of
them had recently uncovered the wreckage of the crashed aircraft, intending to
sell it to a scrap dealer in Hue . When the Bo Trach District authorities learned
of this arrangement, however, they ordered those people to fill in the pit they
had dug. The locals invested a substantial amount of money in this abortive excavation,
and they were concerned that the U.S. now wanted to take the wreckage away. Luong
added that before the pit was filled in, some local children found a piece of
silk in the wreckage. On the silk was some writing and a picture of the American
flag. Unfortunately, the silk was torn apart when the children quarreled over
the possession of it.[25]
The investigation team
recommended that a full-sized recovery team with special equipment be moved into
Nhan Trach Village to excavate the crash site and an isolated burial located
400 meters away. MSGT John commented that the only aircraft lost over North Vietnam
on August 16, 1968 was an F-100 involved in the RefNo 1250 incident, which was
heading out to the Gulf of Tonkin to refuel when it disappeared. He stated that
the information provided by Xe suggests a possible correlation. James Coyle commented
that the interference of large numbers of curious and disorderly onlookers was,
“ a serious problem during the site survey, more so than at any other
site investigated by this team during the entire joint search effort.
The crowd simply did not respond to the feeble efforts of the local
officials and Vietnamese members of the joint team to restrict their
encroachment on the site. There was no apparent threat to the physical
security of team members, but it was extremely difficult for the team
to work in such conditions. If this site is to be the subject of a
future excavation, the U.S. must insist that Vietnamese authorities
provide better security. The hearsay information provided by Major
Luong, if reliable, strongly suggests that there may still be remains
at this site.”[26]
On August 31,
1990, the JCRC, Casualty Data Division, generated a biographic/site
report on RefNo 1250-0-02, John Francis Overlock.[27] In
this report, new information not presented in earlier documents included:
Blood Chit No: 06398
Military Region: 4
Mission Province : Quang Binh
Engine Type: Pratt & Whitney J57-21A
Engine Serial Number: F603786
Major Coordinate Change:
January 19, 1977 - Incident/last known location
changed from XE 945375(OW) to XE 590445 based on AF FM 484 with witness
statements and MFR, USAFMPC, September 12, 1975.
On June 17, 1992, the
Commander, JTF-FA, Honolulu, Hawaii, sent a message to USAFMPC with copies to
Bureau of Personnel; CJTFFA Det One, Bangkok, Thailand; Joint Chiefs of Staff;
Secretary of Defense; Defense Intelligence Agency; White House National Security
Council; Secretary of State; et al. The subject line was "EVALUATION OF ITEMS
EXAMINED AT THE QUANG BINH PROVINCIAL MUSUEM". Information provided in this message
indicated a correlation to 12 case reference numbers including RefNo 1250. Among
the items examined and analyzed were photographs with captions, aircraft data
plates, flight helmets, and nametags. Pertinent to RefNo 1250 was a data plate
from an F100 aircraft, bearing museum reference numbers BTQB 883/KL.95. It was
identified with the following: "ORIGIN: Data plate from the pilot's seat of an
American aircraft. HISTORY: The seat of an American air pirate shot down on this
spot by our troops at 0830 18.8.1968." Team members transcribed information from
the data plate as closely as possible to the manner in which it appeared on the
plate:
North American Aviation Inc.
-Part Name
-Seat Assembly
Part No. Model
243-53009-21 F100F
Order No. Serial No.
AF 33 (600) 31863 380 143
Inspect. Date
(Stamp) 9-20-57
IF 100-7888 (Blank)
1018 (Blank)
(Blank) (Blank)
Property of U.S. Government
The JTFFA stated that this item possibly correlates to RefNo 1250 based
on date, time, and aircraft type.[28] During
the entirety of the investigation, conclusive evidence was not found
that linked Misty 11 to this crash site. The case of John Francis Overlock
is still unresolved.
[2] Source of reel and page
citations used throughout this story:
Uncorrelated Information Related to Missing Americans in Southeast
Asia
United States Library of Congress, Washington , DC
POW/MIA Database on Microfilm
Reference Number 1250-0-02, John Francis Overlock
[3] Reference Number 1250-0-02,
Reel 159, pages 9.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Aerospace Publishing, Ltd.
1997-2000, "North American F-100 Super Sabre", (http://www.airpower.co.uk/ency/F/F-100.asp,
on September 18, 2000 ).
[6] Drendel, Lou, Century Series
in Color , (Carrollton, Texas: Squadron/Signal Publications, Inc.,
1980).
[7] Compiled by Homecoming II Project,
April 31, 1990 , from one or more of the following sources: raw data
from U.S. Government agency sources, correspondence with POW/MIA families,
published sources, interviews. Updated by the P.O.W. Network in 1998.
[8] Reference Number 1250-0-02,
Reel 159, page 9.
[9] Reference Number 1250-0-02,
Reel 159, pages 29.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Reference Number 1250-0-02,
Reel 159, pages 12.
[12] Reference Number 1250-0-02,
Reel 159, pages 20-21.
[13] Reference Number 1250-0-02,
Reel 159, pages xx-yy.
[14] Reference Number 1250-0-02,
Reel 159, pages 25.
[15] Reference Number 1250-0-02,
Reel 159, pages 28.
[16] Reference Number 1250-0-02,
Reel 159, pages 32.
[17] Reference Number 1250-0-02,
Reel 159, pages 31.
[18] Reference Number 1250-0-02,
Reel 159, pages 33.
[19] Reference Number 1250-0-02,
Reel 159, pages 35-36.
[20] Reference Number 1250-0-02,
Reel 159, pages 37-38.
[21] Reference Number 1250-0-02,
Reel 159, page 39.
[22] Reference Number 1250-0-02,
Reel 159, page 40.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Reference Number 1250-0-02,
Reel 159, page 41.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Reference Number 1250-0-02,
Reel 159, page 42.
[27] Reference Number 1250-0-02,
Reel 159, page 45.
[28] Reference Number 1250-0-02,
Reel 159, page xx. |