Spring 2009

Seminar: Reason, Experience and Reflection

Listed in: Philosophy, as PHIL-60


Jonathan M. Vogel (Section 01)


We have various ways of knowing: reason, perception, and introspection. When we perceive, things around us seem to be directly present to our minds. Is this picture compatible with the fact that perception involves a complicated causal process? And if perception is the immediate grasp of objects in the world, how can we be subject to illusion and hallucination? We say that seeing is believing. Is it really? Or, if not, what is the relation between perception and belief? Can the contents of perceptual experience be captured completely by conceptual thought? Reason is the source of our knowledge of logic and mathematics. But what is reason, and how does it work? Is it something like perception? Do we somehow “see” that there is no greatest number, or that the conclusion of a proof follows from its premises? Is reason subject to illusion and error? How could we ever tell? What do reason and understanding language have to do with each other? Finally, we have some way of knowing what we’re thinking and feeling, which can be called introspection or reflection. Should we think of introspection as some sort of inward perception? What else could it be? What is the relation between having an experience and knowing that you have that experience? To what extent do we know our own minds better than anyone else can? These questions are the subject of great interest and intense controversy in contemporary philosophy. We will try to get clear about them by reading some of the best work in field, from authors such as Grice, McDowell, Quine, BonJour, Peacocke, Burge, and Shoemaker. Requisite: Two courses in Philosophy or consent of the instructor. Spring semester. Professor Vogel.