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Andreas Georgiou ’83

Andreas Georgiou ’83

This fall’s Amherst College catalogue introduced students to “Econ 108: Statistical Ethics and Institutions,” a course designed to “discuss standards for relationships between statisticians and policy makers” and “explore how the interplay of institutions and the broader sociopolitical culture affects the production of reliable, high-quality statistics.” That might sound dry to some. But behind the neutral academic prose lies a harrowing personal drama, one in which those textbookish topics turn out to denote bullet points—the phrase is darkly ironic—in the life of the course’s instructor, Visiting Lecturer Andreas Georgiou ’83.

In 2010, after two decades as an economist at the International Monetary Fund, Georgiou accepted the post of president of the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT), the national statistical office of Greece. The office had been repeatedly criticized by European authorities for misreporting the country’s economic statistics, but under Georgiou’s leadership, it reversed course, producing data that garnered 10 straight biannual European Commission approvals. Yet his efforts sparked controversy. As Greek politicians sought to assign blame for the country’s fiscal calamity, which broke out in 2009, and the severe austerity measures that followed its bailout by the European Union, they took aim at Georgiou, accusing him of having intentionally inflated ELSTAT’s measurements of the government deficit and debt.

A series of Greek criminal charges ensued, launching a court battle that has stretched over five years. In July 2017, convicted on a misdemeanor charge of breach of duty for having failed to submit deficit figures for approval by the ELSTAT board, Georgiou was given a two-year suspended sentence. And in May 2018, Greece’s Supreme Court—for the second time—annulled his prior acquittal on felony charges of inflating the 2009 fiscal deficit and causing damages of 171 billion euros to the Greek state. It is a charge Georgiou continues to fight—and one that carries a potential sentence of life imprisonment.

How does a statistician become so reviled, so allegedly dangerous, that he fears he’ll be murdered?

In discussing his legal troubles, Georgiou insists he “unswervingly followed the rules” in running ELSTAT, citing an array of EU laws and statistical rules that he pledged his office to follow. Many Greeks, however, viewed these laws and rules as tools of the lender-creditor nations and institutions that had Greece over a barrel. And Georgiou—a longtime employee of the IMF, who moreover had not lived in Greece since childhood—was portrayed as their agent. Such views, inflamed by Greek leaders across the political spectrum, exposed the statistician to almost unimaginable pressures. He was heckled in Parliamentary hearings and hauled into intense criminal interrogations. Threats were made on his life. “By the time he stepped down in 2015,” Politico wrote last year, “Georgiou had become public enemy No. 1.” The Economist has likened his experience to “the tale of Sisyphus ... retold by Kafka.”

Throughout, Georgiou has held fast to his belief in the independent reporting of official statistics. “Andreas is one of the most principled people I know,” says Geoffrey Woglom, Richard S. Volpert ’56 Professor of Economics, who taught Georgiou at Amherst and helped bring him back to teach this semester. “He has never wavered, despite vehement and vicious political attacks. His continuing persecution by the Greek government is a travesty.”

How does a straight-and-narrow, by-the-book statistician become so reviled, so allegedly dangerous, that he fears he’ll be murdered? There seems little doubt that the technocratic, EU-centric perspective Georgiou brought to the job did not play well. Facing unprecedented hardship, Greeks were eager to believe that the EU institutions and countries bailing out Greece were actually extracting blood from the nation. Any Greek seen as siding with the EU became a target of populist invective—and of politicians only too happy to play into it.

“The economy was faltering,” a Greek source told me. “People didn’t know if they would have a job tomorrow. Inevitably there was political animosity, and Georgiou was an easy scapegoat. The fact that he came from the IMF didn’t help. Both the right and the left see them as the bad guys.” Some people found Georgiou inflexible, this source continued. “He was not very political. But that was also what made him able to do a good job. Statistics are not supposed to have flexibility. Georgiou is a person of integrity who loves Greece. He’s being targeted because he exposed the malpractice of people who came before him.”

Defenders have rallied to Georgiou’s side. An American Statistical Association petition was co-signed by nine Nobel laureates in economics, 45 statistical and other professional organizations, and more than 1,000 statisticians, economists, researchers and others. The international press has been all but unanimous in its support. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung published an op-ed titled “Convicted of Truth.” The Financial Times reported that his case “has sparked outrage from economists and statisticians worldwide who believe Mr. Georgiou has become a scapegoat.” The Wall Street Journal pointed toward a governing class in Greece that “has denied responsibility and instead fallen back on conspiracy theories.”

Those theories have been florid. A former board member of ELSTAT, Nikos Logothetis, accused Georgiou of joining “a treacherous plan” to make Greece a guinea pig for EU planners and give the IMF a foothold in Europe —“the greatest national betrayal,” he said in a radio interview, “since the Thermopylae treason” of 480 B.C. Georgiou vehemently denies all such accusations, noting that the EU statistical authorities and international statistical community have validated his statistical work—and pointing out that Logothetis was criminally charged with hacking Georgiou’s ELSTAT emails.

In person, Georgiou is decorous but emphatic. He provided me a thick file of documents—briefs, EU reports, PowerPoint presentations, timelines of his prosecutions and more—all generated as part of the effort to bolster his precarious legal status. His talk about his work bristles with the formidable terminology of economics. Yet he is also a single father who speaks with poignant tenderness about raising his 8-year-old daughter, Maria Olympia.

Our conversation stretched over two two-hour sessions in his office in Converse Hall, where every week he arrives from Washington, D.C., for a jam-packed 24 hours, in what he wryly calls “one of the longest commutes in academic practice.” Georgiou occasionally flexed a knee that was bothering him—the result of a motorcycle accident some years back—as we discussed a range of topics, from his work running ELSTAT and the status of the charges against him, to his love of Greek culture and the ancient combat sport known as pankration, to the joys and challenges of single fatherhood.


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Andreas Georgiou ’83
What motivated you, in 2010, to take the position of running ELSTAT, Greece’s national statistics
office?

I wanted to correct a perennial problem. You may have heard of the term “Greek statistics.” This was a derogatory term that reflected the nearly continuous eruption of problems with Greece’s official statistics prior to 2010. This was fundamentally an issue of not following clearly stated rules. When you compile statistics, no nonstatistical considerations can come into play. I used to tell my staff, “We do not care if the deficit is 10 billion up or 10 billion down. You’re supposed to be completely cool and cold about that.” The best way for official statisticians to serve the national interest is to compile the most accurate statistics possible. This enables any analysis or policy decision to be made on the basis of evidence. To serve his country, an official statistician must never be political!

Is this comparable to a physician needing relevant and accurate information about a patient? If we only tell our physician things that make us sound healthy, what if there’s a real problem?

Then you’re going to die, and the physician will not have a chance to take any action. This is exactly what happened in Greece.

Was it really that bad?

Absolutely. I’ll give you an example: In 2008, before the crisis broke out, the Greek national statistics office published statistics putting the government deficit at 5 percent of GDP—hefty, but not catastrophic. The real number, however, was not 5 percent, but 9.9 percent. It was double what they published! With a 9.9 percent deficit, the bottom has fallen out, from a macroeconomic policy point of view. It was hidden, and thus no policy action was taken to address the problem. And then, in 2009, the deficit went to 15.4 percent.

15.4 percent? Did they publish that number?

No, I published that number. Before I arrived, the statistical estimate for 2009 was 13.6 percent, but that estimate was not accepted by Eurostat [the statistical office of the European Commission, tasked by EU law with validating statistics for every EU country]. The 15.4 was what ELSTAT produced under my supervision as a revision to the 13.6. Ever since then, my detractors and accusers have said that, through this revision, I was the cause of the agreements that Greece signed with their European partners and with the IMF—that effectively I singlehandedly brought this program of bailouts and austerity to Greece and even created this whole crisis. Of course, this is absurd, as the revision in the deficit figures was made more than a year after the Greek debt crisis broke out—and five months after Greece had signed onto the adjustment program.

How did you get the job at ELSTAT?

I had a newborn baby at that time—I’m a single father, raising her by myself—and Greece was not in my plans. The plan was for me to keep my stable, good job in D.C. My daughter was born in February 2010. I took a month off to care for her, and my mother came to visit and help. Two weeks after my daughter’s birth, there was a lunch at the IMF for the visiting Greek finance minister. I was invited along with other Greek IMF staff, and my mom said, “Why don’t you go, just to get out of the house?” So I went. At the lunch, the finance minister mentioned they were looking for somebody, looking to make a new start. I applied on the very last day because I had some ambivalence. I was aware of the problems.

What’s one area of change that you had to bring about?

There was massive rebuilding of the national statistics office in virtually all areas. However, I will mention an example from the flashpoint area: the deficit and debt statistics. Before I arrived, a lot of the data provided by government ministries and other institutions to the statistics office was inaccurate or outright manipulated. Many times the data would be provided anonymously. It would be provided by phone. People would not write it down. They would not sign their name to it. These are all red flags for low-quality information. So we—the statistics office—signed memoranda of cooperation with every ministry in Greece, and with the Central Bank and the General Accounting Office, stipulating exactly when we expected data, and what quality this data should fulfill, and that we needed signatures and specific processes to be followed.

Had you had any idea of the level of disarray when you arrived?

In April 2010 the government deficit and debt statistics had received “reservations” from Eurostat—
that’s a technical term for doubt about their quality and accuracy. This had been the norm for many years. Between 2005 and 2009, in 10 semiannual validations by Eurostat, these statistics had received reservations five times. And when they had not, Eurostat had gone in and corrected the figures itself, always increasing the deficit. So it was important to start putting the statistics in order. The Greek government and its European and international partners needed to know how much was the deficit and how much was the debt.

That would seem to be a noncontroversial point.

You mean, to want to know the truth about that? One would think so!

Did you welcome those visits from Eurostat?

Absolutely. But not everybody did. Some people cast me as a representative of the EU and international institutions and took a position of resistance. The employees’ union put out a press release saying ELSTAT needs to be “abaton” for Eurostat and EU institution staff. Abaton is an ancient Greek word that refers to the inner sanctum, where the uninitiated may not enter. My philosophy was exactly the opposite. From the beginning, representatives from Eurostat would come, and we would go to various Greek government agencies that provide data. And some official would take me aside and say, “Maybe we should’ve met before to discuss what to tell them.” I said, “Why? Tell them everything.”

Did you lack a full understanding of how far animosity toward creditor nations was driving sentiment in Greece? You made it clear that you wanted to work closely with Eurostat. But that got you in trouble.

It is a necessary trouble, if you would like. If it played into a certain political narrative, well, so be it. I have no regrets about following this approach. It helped bring reliability and credibility to Greece’s official statistics. It had huge benefits both for ELSTAT and the country itself.

The Greek government has continued to rely on your statistics even as it allows you to be prosecuted for them.

You can’t have your cake and eat it too. But they are trying just that. In my tenure at ELSTAT, I supervised the production of official statistics accepted by four different governments in Greece, which used those statistics to conduct the business of the country, and by the different parliaments of Greece that voted on budgets that explicitly relied upon these statistics. And yet in 2013, Mr. [Prokopis] Pavlopoulos—now president of Greece, then a senior MP of the center-right New Democracy party that was in power in 2004–09, leading up to the crisis—gave a radio interview saying that I “weakened the board of ELSTAT” and did not allow it “to decide collectively on the deficit.” I “did not object” to what Eurostat wanted; I “did not negotiate” the matter and thus “did not defend the interests of the land.”

Doesn’t his comment make clear that statistics are being viewed in a wholly instrumental way?

Exactly. It’s the political weaponization of official statistics—which, needless to say, is also the destruction of those statistics. It is disconcerting that in a country of the European Union, leaders can say things like this, repeatedly, and somebody suffers the consequences through prosecution—and gets convicted. I have actually been convicted for not allowing voting on the statistics!1

Your conviction was on a charge of violation of duty.

Yes. The EU and Greek legal framework is crystal clear about this: you cannot put up the figures for a vote! When the case arrived at the Supreme Court, I supplied, among many testimonies of senior European statisticians and officials, letters to this effect from five current heads of national statistical offices in Europe: France, Italy, Austria, Ireland and Finland. They were ignored. All this has important implications about the rule of law in general, within Greece and the EU. It also means that an EU member state can follow a “national approach” toward professional independence for European official statistics, as well as other issues, negating what is provided for in EU law. The consequences can be dire. As history has painfully shown us, a country as small as Greece can, through its manipulation of statistics, not only create a huge problem for itself—a Great Depression, with a more than 25 percent reduction of its real income—but also set off, through contagion, a massive European crisis. This has global reverberations.

“If it played into a certain political narrative, so be it. I have no regrets about following this approach.”

Let’s review how the legal cases against you developed. In September 2011, the president of the Athens bar submitted a complaint to the Supreme Court charging that you and your ELSTAT colleagues “inflated the deficit [and] lied to the Greek people in order to trap them in the IMF with a program of tough austerity,” despite knowing that such actions “would harm our national sovereignty.” What allegedly was your motive?

I’m often represented as an agent of the creditors, working for some nebulous benefit. The most recent prosecutor’s proposal to refer me to open trial embraces the conspiracy theory that I inflated the deficit statistics in order to trigger unnecessary measures to ensure that foreign creditors—whose interests I was allegedly representing—would get paid. It’s obviously false on many grounds, including logic. If measures such as raising taxes and cutting spending were unnecessary, then large amounts of extra cash would have accumulated in the government coffers. There is no such extra cash lying around. In the case in which I was convicted for violation of duty for not putting up the numbers for voting, the alleged benefit was that I did it in order to claim sole authority. But taking sole responsibility for the statistics was not a choice for me. It was the law.

I’m struck by the extravagant metaphors of betrayal that have been applied to you—and not by online trolls but by public figures. You have placed the country “in the eye of a hurricane.” You are a “Trojan Horse.” You’re part of “the new German occupation.” You’re an “executioner.”

Yes, and that sends a message to official statisticians: If you do your job, follow the rules and don’t succumb to political pressures, you are going to be persecuted. If you do the opposite, you are going to be fine. To the outside person, the market participants, the investor, the message is that maybe statistics will be accurate, maybe they will not be. This will reduce economic activity within Greece. It will reduce investment from abroad. It will reduce the capacity of Greece to borrow and will increase its costs when it does borrow. These are costly things, but are they taken into account by the people who make the statements that you read to me? No.

Was there no Greek politician of consequence who defended you publicly?

There have been occasional expressions of support from a couple of small political parties. And I should mention that Prime Minister [Alexis] Tsipras, when pressed in a June 2018 interview in a German newspaper about whether I was being scapegoated for the Greek crisis, acknowledged, “We recognize his figures,” and added, “If the court asks us to testify in his defense, we will do it.” Since 2011, when the prosecution began, the major political parties have acted to serve only what they saw as their own political interests at the moment. The main opposition party, the center-right New Democracy, made my alleged inflation of the deficit one of its flagship issues, actually helping to launch the prosecution with the public comments of the party’s leadership in 2011. And the left-wing SYRIZA party is responsible for that quotation about my having placed the country in the eye of the hurricane. 2

It seems that you represent one of the few unifying elements in Greek politics.

I had a friend who used to tell me I should run for president because I’m the only thing that unites the Greeks! More seriously, the political system has found in me a convenient type of a person. I’m a Greek of the diaspora; I was educated abroad; I worked for the international institutions that they like to bash. And I came to Greece to try to do things differently. This can rub people in positions of power the wrong way. They can then sell conspiracy theories about me, especially when a big part of the public in Greece believes that everybody manipulates the figures, everybody succumbs to political pressures or uses connections to get favors. “Everyone does it”: this view is the scourge of Greece. It is not how I operated.

I’d like to talk more personally about what you’ve gone through. When did you start to understand that you were facing serious opposition?

In August 2010, the ELSTAT board told me they wanted to negotiate with Eurostat. Eventually they said they wanted to bring the statistics for a vote at the board. I tried to explain to them that we needed to follow the very explicit EU rules on compiling these statistics—that there was nothing to negotiate, and that voting on the numbers would be contrary to EU statistical principles. It was very difficult. Then one day the union came in. They showed me a document. The moment I saw it, I realized somebody was hacking my emails.

I submitted a complaint to the police. The police found the hacker was the vice chair of the board, [Nikos] Logothetis. They went to his home and found my emails on his computers. Logothetis had criminal and misdemeanor charges pressed against him for the hacking, but he never went to open trial—in one instance because the statute of limitations expired, and in the other because a 20-euro processing fee could not be found in the court file. In their document, the judges said while they believed he had done the hacking, his motive had been to defend the interests of ELSTAT, and therefore of Greece. Interesting.

Meanwhile, the cases against you were piling up. These seem like zombie cases—no matter how often they get killed, they rise again from the dead.

Yes. The current chief prosecutor in Greece has already managed—for a second time—to reverse the decision of the Appeals Court Council that my two colleagues and I should be acquitted. And the Supreme Court Council has agreed. The Sisyphean rock rolls down the hill again, and we start again.

Is there no double jeopardy law? What’s to prevent them from bringing this charge again and again?

There is nothing that prevents them from doing it ad infinitum until I get referred to open trial and irreversibly convicted. In the other case, of alleged violation of duty, I was subjected to open trial. 3  In the open trial in December 2016 I was found innocent, but just 10 days later, my acquittal was annulled by an outside prosecutor and I had to be tried again at the Appeals Court level, where I was finally found guilty—and given the maximum allowable sentence!

In the felony charge of inflating the deficit and damaging the state by 171 billion euros, how did the prosecution derive that value?

Basically, 171 billion euros is the amount of gross borrowing by Greece between December 2010 and November 2012 plus the interest that it paid. In effect, this means that if we had not revised the 2009 deficit from 13.6 percent to 15.4 percent of GDP in November 2010, Greece would not have had any deficit at all in the next two years. It is laughable. But it is on this basis that my two colleagues and I are facing possible life imprisonment.

It seems patently absurd that you could face life in prison for a difference of 1.8 percentage points of GDP in Greece’s deficit measurement. What are you really being persecuted for?

I’m being persecuted for the benefit of the political narratives that have to be maintained in Greece—narratives of those who were in power leading up to the crisis, but also those who came afterwards and need to justify the very tough measures they had to take. I think a lot of people would like to believe that everything was basically OK before the economic crisis. They want to believe that Greece suffered unnecessarily, and that by prosecuting people like me they’re taking a little bit of their blood back. I am also being prosecuted because official statisticians need to be taught a good lesson: obey your political masters.

An article in The Economist describes your life as the tale of Sisyphus told by Kafka. Another commentator refers to “a sinister drama.” What have been the most difficult moments for you?

Probably the most difficult was being interrogated in April 2015. This took place in a small room of the criminal court in Athens, where I sat for hours in a chair in front of the desk of the interrogator, answering questions while somebody typed in the corner. I was in my fifth year as the head of an independent authority in Greece. I had supervised the production of these specific official statistics already nine times, with full acceptance by the European Union and the international community. And there I was, being interrogated like a common criminal, with life in prison at stake. I remember saying goodbye to my 5-year-old girl in the morning and wondering whether I would be coming back that night. They had the capacity to put me in pre-trial detention if they felt I was a flight risk.

Were you treated with deference?

I was treated neutrally by the interrogator, who was the investigating judge. Following that—a very long interrogation—I had to wait in the corridor to speak to the prosecutor on duty. There were people sitting next to me in handcuffs, suspects brought in from the street. I remember finally going into the room to see the prosecutor. She was sitting at her desk, and I had to stand before her. She asked me, “Why did you inflate the statistics of Greece?” I had spent years already answering this charge. Still, I politely answered to her that I did not inflate the statistics, and explained how I did my work. I was asked again to wait outside. Eventually, as the sun was setting, the interrogator came out and said, “It was a very difficult decision for us, but you can go home.”

What did you do when you got home?

I went and gave a kiss to my daughter, who was asleep.

One news account says that you feared for your life. Is that true?

Security was a fundamental risk. I had been depicted as a traitor, as somebody working with sinister outside forces to subjugate Greece and deprive its people of their welfare. There were pictures circulating on the Internet of me with nooses around my neck. I remember coming home one night from work, around 11 p.m.—I used to work long days—and sitting on my bed to take my shirt off. I had the TV on, a late-night talk show. They were talking about the economic crisis, and who was responsible, and they mentioned my name. They said, “People like that should be executed.”

Did you have a security detail?

There was some protection for a few months, after the prosecution started in 2011. Then, when the New Democracy party won the 2012 elections, even this meager police protection was removed, despite my repeated appeals to the government. I had to watch for myself. I actually carried a gun. Every day to work.

Is that unusual for a government official in Greece?

I don’t know what the others were doing, but it’s definitely unusual for heads of statistical offices.

What gun was it?

A Walther PPQ. It probably wouldn’t have actually protected me. I lived quite far from the office, and I had a small official car and a driver. If they want to kill you, somebody drives up with a motorcycle, shoots you and drives off. You probably cannot do anything. But it gave me a sense of security in some situations. I felt I could go to the beach alone with my child.

The charges against you come close to treason. The implicit suggestion is that you sold your country out to foreign masters.

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Andreas Georgiou ’83
It’s not implicit—it is explicit. And that I have taken away a whole year’s worth of income for an entire country. But I never wavered about my patriotism. If you asked me what are the big loves of my life, as top three I would put my country, my daughter and my mother. So for me this was very painful.

Tell me about your life as a father. What do you like to do with your daughter?

I spend a lot of time with her, exploring all kinds of things. We study a lot together. She’s also quite athletic. She’s an all-star swimmer and trains hard. She also does martial arts. Last summer, we spent a few weeks in China. During the stay there, I decided to learn a new style of tai chi. It was two hours of training a day, for three weeks, and she did every single session with me. She’s a tough cookie! She also loves art. She paints very well, but right now she’s in the slime period. Our kitchen is a slime factory, and there’s slime everywhere in the house. It’s on the dog, it’s on the carpets, it’s everywhere. She also does ballet. I take her to ballet, and I take her to piano lessons.

Have you shielded her from what’s been going on in your life?

It is impossible to shield her, because I spend huge amounts of time every day dealing with it. She understands that Daddy’s defending himself because he actually counted right.

“Reliable official statistics, statistics trusted by the public, are essential for democracy.”

You spoke to the European Parliament in May, commenting that “We do not vote on statistical figures in Europe.” I’m sure you know the saying that one is entitled to one’s own interpretations but not one’s own facts. Yet it seems to me that we’ve entered an epistemological hall of mirrors where people now do feel entitled to their own facts—where partisanship has dismissed objective reality in favor of political ends and strategies. Do you share this impression? What are the implications for statistics?

The interest of those in power in controlling the understanding of reality has existed for a very long time. The emergence of official statistics provided a tool to hold up a mirror to society—but also an opportunity for those who want to manipulate that mirror. If the mirror is not showing what they want to show, they can follow various approaches. It can be outright violence: for example, Joseph Stalin executing the head of the census bureau in Russia, Olimpiy Kvitkin, and suppressing the census results. Or it can be the kind of attack you see in my case. When you undermine official statistics, it comes back to haunt you. Reliable official statistics, statistics that are trusted by the public, are essential for democracy—for democratic accountability, for checks and balances—and for economic and social welfare and progress more broadly.

I want to hear about your time as an undergraduate. You went to Athens College, a Greek-American high school that traditionally sends many graduates abroad. Was coming to a place like Amherst always in the cards for you?

No, it was a decision. My father was a doctor, and my mother also studied medicine, so the natural thing for me was to follow in that path. Medicine is a beautiful field. But I felt there was a lot more out there, and I was right. I really wanted what I would call a classical Greek education. So I decided to get that classical Greek education at Amherst.

How did that work out?

Tremendously well. The nicest moment for me was the time each semester when I would ask myself, What am I interested in? What would I like to know? I would pile on all these interesting courses. Economics, political science, sociology, linguistics. I had a ball at Amherst.

Last question: Given all that you’ve gone through in the past eight years, do you ever wish that you had never gone to that luncheon, never taken the job?

No. I have paid my dues to my country. Hopefully, good things can happen because my colleagues and I have suffered.


1He was convicted even though, according to the European Statistics Code of Practice (to which EU and Greek law refer), the head of the statistics has “sole responsibility” for final decisions on statistics.

2 “The narratives of the different political parties have often made strange bedfellows,” Georgiou says. “Just as an example, in August 2016, an opposition MP and former minister of the New Democracy government from the 2004–09 period tweeted a claim that the ‘ELSTAT scandal cost Greece 210 billion euro,’ and said something about how ‘the truth catches up with those who scorn the homeland.’ And then the hard-left foreign minister retweeted the conservative politician’s tweet— with the logo of the Ministry of Foreign A airs in the back!”

3 This trial took place after the court rejected three separate proposals for acquittal from prosecutors and investigating judges between 2013 and 2015. Each time there was an acquittal proposal, a political uproar ensued.


Rand Richards Cooper ’80 is a contributing editor at Commonweal and a frequent contributor to Amherst magazine.

Photo Credit: Jared Soares/Redux