Working Papers 

Quantifying the Inefficiency of Multi-unit Auctions for Normal Goods, with Simon Essig Aberg (revisions requested at the Journal of Economic Theory).

A Detail-Free and Efficient Auction for Budget Constrained Bidders 

Published Articles 

Efficient Multi-Unit Auctions for Normal Goods,  2020, Theoretical Economics.

Optimal Quantity Caps in Discriminatory Price Auctions with Resale, 2020, Theoretical Economics, with Justin Burkett.

Ex Post Efficient Auctions and English Auctions for Bidders with Non-Quasilinear Preferences, 2019, Journal of Mathematical Economics, with Justin Burkett.

Large Multi-Unit Auctions with a Large Bidder, 2018, Journal of Economic Theory, with Justin Burkett. (Older Version with some additional results).

Auction Design without Quasilinear Preferences, 2017, Theoretical Economics.

Overbidding and Inefficiencies in Multi-unit Vickrey Auctions for Normal Goods, 2016, Games and Economic Behavior.

Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Budgets, 2016, Economics Letters, with Stanislav Rabinovich

The Welfare Cost of Unreliable Water Service, 2010, Journal of Development Economics, with Lucas DavisStephen Salant, and William Wilcox.


Research in Progress

The Efficiency of Large Multi-Unit Auctions for Normal Goods with Aggregate Demand Uncertainty.

Dominant Strategy Implementable Social Choice Functions in Non-quasilinear Settings.

Probability Weighting and Auction Design.

Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria of the Stackelberg Duopoly with Imperfectly Observed Demand.