Published Articles and Working Papers
1. Auction Design without Quasilinear Preferences, 2017, Theoretical Economics.
2. Overbidding and Inefficiencies in Multi-unit Vickrey Auctions for Normal Goods, 2016, Games and Economic Behavior.
8. Ex Post Efficient Auctions and English Auctions for Bidders with Non-Quasilinear Preferences (with Justin Burkett).
9. Optimal Quantity Caps in Discriminatory Price Auctions with Resale (with Justin Burkett).
Research in Progress
The Efficiency of Large Multi-Unit Auctions for Normal Goods with Aggregate Demand Uncertainty.
Dominant Strategy Implementable Social Choice Functions in Non-quasilinear Settings.
Probability Weighting and Auction Design.
Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria of the Stackelberg Duopoly with Imperfectly Observed Demand.
|Baisa Vickrey Overbid.pdf||862.76 KB|
|Baisa - Detail Free Budgets.pdf||970.12 KB|
|Baisa-Burkett - Large Auction + Large Bidder.pdf||539.22 KB|
|Baisa-Rabinovich - Auction w Endo Bud.pdf||547.93 KB|
|Baisa - Auction Design w-o ql.pdf||1.26 MB|
|Baisa - Burkett - Eff Ex Post Auctions wo Q-L.pdf||854.47 KB|
|Baisa - Eff Auctions for Normal Goods.pdf||935.6 KB|
|Baisa - Eff Auctions for Normal Goods Appendix.pdf||863.92 KB|
|Baisa-Burkett - Large Auctions with a Large Bidder.pdf||557.19 KB|
|Baisa-Burkett - Discrim Auction with Resale and Quantity Caps.pdf||224.27 KB|