Published Articles 

1. Efficient Multi-Unit Auctions for Normal Goods,  2019, Accepted by Theoretical Economics.

2. Optimal Quantity Caps in Discriminatory Price Auctions with Resale, 2019, Accepted by Theoretical Economics, with Justin Burkett.

3. Ex Post Efficient Auctions and English Auctions for Bidders with Non-Quasilinear Preferences, 2019, Journal of Mathematical Economics, with Justin Burkett.

4. Large Multi-Unit Auctions with a Large Bidder, 2018, Journal of Economic Theory, with Justin Burkett. (Older Version with some additional results).

5. Auction Design without Quasilinear Preferences, 2017, Theoretical Economics.

6. Overbidding and Inefficiencies in Multi-unit Vickrey Auctions for Normal Goods, 2016, Games and Economic Behavior.

7. Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Budgets, 2016, Economics Letters, with Stanislav Rabinovich

8. The Welfare Cost of Unreliable Water Service, 2010, Journal of Development Economics, with Lucas DavisStephen Salant, and William Wilcox.

Working Papers 

9. A Detail-Free and Efficient Auction for Budget Constrained Bidders (Revisions requested at the Review of Economic Design).

Research in Progress

Robust Bounds on the Inefficiency of Multi-unit Auctions for Normal Goods, with Simon Essig Aberg.

The Efficiency of Large Multi-Unit Auctions for Normal Goods with Aggregate Demand Uncertainty.

Dominant Strategy Implementable Social Choice Functions in Non-quasilinear Settings.

Probability Weighting and Auction Design.

Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria of the Stackelberg Duopoly with Imperfectly Observed Demand.