Published Articles and Working Papers

1. Auction Design without Quasilinear Preferences, 2017, Theoretical Economics.

2. Overbidding and Inefficiencies in Multi-unit Vickrey Auctions for Normal Goods2016, Games and Economic Behavior.

3. Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Budgets, 2016, Economics Letters, with Stanislav Rabinovich

4. The Welfare Cost of Unreliable Water Service, 2010, Journal of Development Economics, with Lucas DavisStephen Salant, and William Wilcox.

5. Efficient Multi-Unit Auctions for Normal Goods(Revisions requested at Econometrica).  Online Appendix.

6. Large Multi-Unit Auctions with a Large Bidder, with Justin Burkett (Revisions requested at Journal of Economic Theory). Older Version

7. Optimal Quantity Caps in Discriminatory Price Auctions with Resalewith Justin Burkett (Revisions requested at Theoretical Economics). 

8. A Detail-Free and Efficient Auction for Budget Constrained Bidders.

9. Ex Post Efficient Auctions and English Auctions for Bidders with Non-Quasilinear Preferenceswith Justin Burkett.


Research in Progress

The Efficiency of Large Multi-Unit Auctions for Normal Goods with Aggregate Demand Uncertainty.

Dominant Strategy Implementable Social Choice Functions in Non-quasilinear Settings.

Probability Weighting and Auction Design.

Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria of the Stackelberg Duopoly with Imperfectly Observed Demand.