Research Papers

Auction Design without Quasilinear Preferences (Forthcoming at Theoretical Economics)

Overbidding and Inefficiencies in Multi-unit Vickrey Auctions for Normal Goods (Forthcoming at Games and Economic Behavior)

A Detail-Free and Efficient Auction for Budget Constrained Bidders (Revisions requested at Journal of Economic Theory)

Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Budgets, 2016, Economics Letters, vol. 141,  pages 162-165, with Stanislav Rabinovich

The Welfare Cost of Unreliable Water Service, 2010, Journal of Development Economics, 92 (1), pages 1-12,  with Lucas DavisStephen Salant, and William Wilcox.


Research in Progress

Multi-unit Auctions with One Large Bidder (w/ Justin Burkett)

Efficient Multi-unit auctions with Non-quasilinear preferences 

Probability Weighting and Auction Design

Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria of the Stackelberg Duopoly with Imperfectly Observed Demand