2. Auction Design without Quasilinear Preferences, 2017, Theoretical Economics.
3. Overbidding and Inefficiencies in Multi-unit Vickrey Auctions for Normal Goods, 2016, Games and Economic Behavior.
6. Optimal Quantity Caps in Discriminatory Price Auctions with Resale, with Justin Burkett (Revisions requested at Theoretical Economics).
8. Ex Post Efficient Auctions and English Auctions for Bidders with Non-Quasilinear Preferences, with Justin Burkett (Revisions requested at the Journal of Mathematical Economics).
Research in Progress
Robust Bounds on the Inefficiency of Multi-unit Auctions for Normal Goods, with Simon Essig Aberg.
The Efficiency of Large Multi-Unit Auctions for Normal Goods with Aggregate Demand Uncertainty.
Dominant Strategy Implementable Social Choice Functions in Non-quasilinear Settings.
Probability Weighting and Auction Design.
Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria of the Stackelberg Duopoly with Imperfectly Observed Demand.