2. Auction Design without Quasilinear Preferences, 2017, Theoretical Economics.
3. Overbidding and Inefficiencies in Multi-unit Vickrey Auctions for Normal Goods, 2016, Games and Economic Behavior.
6. Optimal Quantity Caps in Discriminatory Price Auctions with Resale, with Justin Burkett (Revisions requested at Theoretical Economics).
9. Ex Post Efficient Auctions and English Auctions for Bidders with Non-Quasilinear Preferences, with Justin Burkett.
Research in Progress
The Efficiency of Large Multi-Unit Auctions for Normal Goods with Aggregate Demand Uncertainty.
Dominant Strategy Implementable Social Choice Functions in Non-quasilinear Settings.
Probability Weighting and Auction Design.
Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria of the Stackelberg Duopoly with Imperfectly Observed Demand.
|Baisa Vickrey Overbid.pdf||862.76 KB|
|Baisa - Detail Free Budgets.pdf||970.12 KB|
|Baisa-Burkett - Large Auction + Large Bidder.pdf||539.22 KB|
|Baisa-Rabinovich - Auction w Endo Bud.pdf||547.93 KB|
|Baisa - Auction Design w-o ql.pdf||1.26 MB|
|Baisa - Burkett - Eff Ex Post Auctions wo Q-L.pdf||854.47 KB|
|Baisa - Eff Auctions for Normal Goods.pdf||935.6 KB|
|Baisa - Eff Auctions for Normal Goods Appendix.pdf||863.92 KB|
|Baisa-Burkett - Large Auctions with a Large Bidder.pdf||557.19 KB|
|Baisa-Burkett - Discrim Auction with Resale and Quantity Caps.pdf||224.27 KB|