- Auction Design without Quasilinear Preferences, (Forthcoming at Theoretical Economics).
- Overbidding and Inefficiencies in Multi-unit Vickrey Auctions for Normal Goods, 2016, Games and Economic Behavior.
- The Welfare Cost of Unreliable Water Service, 2010, Journal of Development Economics, with Lucas Davis, Stephen Salant, and William Wilcox.
- Efficient Multi-Unit Auctions for Normal Goods, (Revisions requested at Econometrica).
- Large Multi-Unit Auctions with a Large Bidder, with Justin Burkett (Revisions requested at Journal of Economic Theory).
Research in Progress
Ex Post Efficient Auctions and English Auctions for Bidders with Non-Quasilinear Preferences (with Justin Burkett).
Optimal Quantity Caps in Discriminatory Price Auctions with Resale (with Justin Burkett).
The Efficiency of Large Multi-Unit Auctions for Normal Goods with Aggregate Demand Uncertainty.
Probability Weighting and Auction Design.
Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria of the Stackelberg Duopoly with Imperfectly Observed Demand.