- Auction Design without Quasilinear Preferences (Forthcoming at Theoretical Economics).
- Overbidding and Inefficiencies in Multi-unit Vickrey Auctions for Normal Goods (Forthcoming at Games and Economic Behavior).
- Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Budgets, 2016, Economics Letters, vol. 141, pages 162-165, with Stanislav Rabinovich.
- A Detail-Free and Efficient Auction for Budget Constrained Bidders (Revisions requested at Journal of Economic Theory).
- The Welfare Cost of Unreliable Water Service, 2010, Journal of Development Economics, 92 (1), pages 1-12, with Lucas Davis, Stephen Salant, and William Wilcox.
Research in Progress
The Efficiency of Large Multi-Unit Auctions for Normal Goods with Aggregate Demand Uncertainty.
The English Auction when Bidders have Interdependent Values and Non-quasilinear Preferences.
Probability Weighting and Auction Design.
Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria of the Stackelberg Duopoly with Imperfectly Observed Demand.
|Baisa TE Revision.pdf||1.26 MB|
|Baisa Efficient w Budgets.pdf||970.12 KB|
|Baisa Vickrey Overbid.pdf||862.76 KB|
|Baisa-Burkett- Large Auctions w a Large Bidder.pdf||1021.39 KB|
|Baisa - Eff Multi-unit Auctions for Normals Goods.pdf||1020.55 KB|