Published Articles 

1. Large Multi-Unit Auctions with a Large Bidder, 2018, Journal of Economic Theory, with Justin Burkett. (Older Version with some additional results).

2. Auction Design without Quasilinear Preferences, 2017, Theoretical Economics.

3. Overbidding and Inefficiencies in Multi-unit Vickrey Auctions for Normal Goods2016, Games and Economic Behavior.

4. Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Budgets, 2016, Economics Letters, with Stanislav Rabinovich

5. The Welfare Cost of Unreliable Water Service, 2010, Journal of Development Economics, with Lucas DavisStephen Salant, and William Wilcox.

Working Papers 

6. Optimal Quantity Caps in Discriminatory Price Auctions with Resalewith Justin Burkett (Revisions requested at Theoretical Economics). 

7. Efficient Multi-Unit Auctions for Normal Goods,  Online Appendix (Revisions requested at Theoretical Economics).

8. Ex Post Efficient Auctions and English Auctions for Bidders with Non-Quasilinear Preferenceswith Justin Burkett (Revisions requested at the Journal of Mathematical Economics).

9. A Detail-Free and Efficient Auction for Budget Constrained Bidders.


Research in Progress

Robust Bounds on the Inefficiency of Multi-unit Auctions for Normal Goods, with Simon Essig Aberg.

The Efficiency of Large Multi-Unit Auctions for Normal Goods with Aggregate Demand Uncertainty.

Dominant Strategy Implementable Social Choice Functions in Non-quasilinear Settings.

Probability Weighting and Auction Design.

Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria of the Stackelberg Duopoly with Imperfectly Observed Demand.