Research Papers

Auction Design without Quasilinear Preferences (Forthcoming at Theoretical Economics)

Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Budgetsw/ Stanislav Rabinovich, (Forthcoming at Economics Letters)

A Detail-Free and Efficient Auction for Budget Constrained Bidders (Revisions requested at Journal of Economic Theory)

Overbidding and Inefficiencies in Multi-unit Vickrey Auctions for Normal Goods (Revisions requested at Games and Economic Behavior)


Research in Progress

Multi-unit Auctions with One Large Bidder (w/ Justin Burkett)

Efficient Multi-unit auctions with Non-quasilinear preferences 

Probability Weighting and Auction Design

Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria of the Stackelberg Duopoly with Imperfectly Observed Demand


The Welfare Cost of Unreliable Water Service, 2010, Journal of Development Economics, 92 (1), 1-12,  with Lucas DavisStephen Salant, and William Wilcox.