Research interests: New Institutional Economics; History of Insurance; Applied Game Theory; Economics of Corruption.
Most of my current research explores how the institutions governing marine insurance evolved during the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Over time, two different kinds of institutions emerged: in Britain, a marketplace for private underwriting by individuals (Lloyd's of London); and elsewhere, joint-stock corporations. I use a combination of archival evidence and game theory to explore how these institutions functioned and how they changed over time. A common theme is that by disrupting information flows and increasing risk, the wars of the eighteenth century created the stimulus which drove institutional change in the marine insurance industry.
Related to this, I have also coauthored several papers about theories of institutions and institutional change.
My early work derived from my PhD dissertation (Stanford, 2001) used game-theoretic models (especially linked games) and to study corruption, with a particular focus on India.
Finally, I have a broad interest in game-theoretic models of institutions, and in this vein I have coauthored papers about dueling, and about military coups in Pakistan.
See the links to the left to download my papers, and please feel free to email me with any comments or questions.