Major Publications
“Tracking, Closure, and Inductive Knowledge,” The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics, ed. S. Luper-Foy (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987).
“Are There Counterexamples to the Closure Principle?” in Doubting Contemporary Perspectives on Skepticism, ed. G. Ross and M. Roth (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1990). Reprinted in Epistemology, 2nd edition, ed. E. Sosa, et al. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008).
“Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation,” The Journal of Philosophy 87 (November, 1990). Reprinted in Skepticism, ed. M. Williams (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1993), Epistemology: The Big Questions, ed. L.M. Alcoff (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), and in The Elements of Philosophy: Readings from Past and Present, ed. T. Gendler, S. Siegel, and S. Cahn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
“Sklar On Methodological Conservatism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1992).
“The Exorcist’s Nightmare: A Reply To Crispin Wright” (with Thomas Tymoczko), Mind 101 (1992).
“Dismissing Skeptical Possibilities,” Philosophical Studies, 70 (1993).
“The Problem of Self-Knowledge in Kant’s ‘Refutation of Idealism’: Two Recent Views,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (December 1993).
“Foundationalism and Skepticism: A Reply to Michael Williams,” The Journal of Philosophical Research, 23 (1997).
“The New Relevant Alternatives Theory,” Philosophical Perspectives, 13 (1999).
“Causation and Subjectivity,” Transcendental Arguments, ed. Robert Stern (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
“Reliabilism Leveled,” The Journal of Philosophy, 97 (2000). Reprinted in Epistemology, 2nd edition, ed. E. Sosa, et al. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008).
“Notes on Knowledge and Truth,” in The Legitimacy of Truth: Proceedings of the Third Italian-American Philosophy Conference, ed. Riccardo Dottori, (Hamburg and London: Lit Verlag, 2003).
“Skeptical Arguments,” Philosophical Issues, 14, Epistemology (2004)
“Speaking of Knowledge,” in a symposium on Knowledge and Lotteries, by John Hawthorne, in Philosophical Issues, 14, Epistemology (2004).
“The Refutation of Skepticism,” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, ed. Ernest Sosa and Mathias Steup, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005).
“Externalism Resisted”, in a symposium on Epistemic Justification, by Laurence Bonjour and Ernest Sosa, Philosophical Studies, 131 (2006).
“Subjunctivitis,” Philosophical Studies, 134 (2007).
“Internalist Responses to Skepticism” in The Oxford Companion to Skepticism, ed. John Greco (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
“Epistemic Bootstrapping,” The Journal of Philosophy, 105 (2008).
“Bonjour on Explanation and Skepticism”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 41 (2010)
“Luminosity and Indiscriminability”, Philosophical Perspectives, 24 (2011)
“The Enduring Trouble With Tracking”, in Modal Epistemology: New Essays on Sensitivity and its Descendants, ed. Kelly Becker & Tim Black (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
“E & -H”, in Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, ed. Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
“Counting Minds and Mental States: Some Remarks”, in preparation. To appear in a volume on Consciousness and Sensory Integration, ed. David Bennet and Christopher Hill.
“Explanation, Truth and the External World”, in preparation.
“Kant’s ‘Refutation of Idealism’ Reconsidered,” under revision.
“Simulating the World”, in preparation.
Skepticism and Knowledge of the External World (under contract to Oxford University Press).
Contributions and Reviews
Review of Alan Goldman, Empirical Knowledge in The Philosophical Review 101 (April 1992).
Articles on “Paradox” and Lottery Paradox” in A Companion to Epistemology, ed. J. Dancy and E. Sosa (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
Review of William Lycan, Judgment and Justification in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53 (March, 1993).
Review of Peter Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation in The Philosophical Review, 102 (July, 1993).
Review of Susan Haack, Evidence and Inquiry in The Philosophical Review, 104 (1995).
Article on “Inference to the Best Explanation” in The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Craig (London: Routledge, 1998).
“Bertrand Russell,” in Classics of Western Philosophy, ed. Stephen Cahn, (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1999).
Review of James Van Cleve, Problems from Kant, Philosophical Quarterly, 52 (2002).
Review of John Greco, Putting Skeptics in Their Place, Mind, 113 (2004).
Article on “Lottery Paradox” (revised and expanded) in A Companion to Epistemology, new edition, ed. J. Dancy, E. Sosa, and M. Steup (Oxford: Blackwell, 2010).
Article on “Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation” in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, ed. A. Byrne et al. (New York: Norton, forthcoming).
Submitted by Dee J. Brace
on Wednesday, 4/4/2012, at 10:16 AM