Thus one should define, in a double way, name and form in all phenomena of the three realms... 

Visuddhimagga XVIII.24

In this essay, we want to bring together two issues for their mutual illumination: (1) the particular use of that hoary Indian dyad, “na-ma-rūpa,” literally, “name-and-form,” by Buddhaghosa, the influential fifth-century Theravāda writer, to organize the categories of the abhidhamma, the canonical classification of phenomenal factors (dhāmas) and their formulaic ordering,1 and (2) an interpretation of phenomenology as a methodology. We argue that Buddhaghosa does not use abhidhamma as a reductive ontological division of the human being into mind and body, but rather as the contemplative structuring of human phenomenology. This phenomenological methodology expressed in his application of nāmarūpa is expressed as a set of contemplative practices; we compare this approach to some of the processes explicates within the twentieth-century Western Phenomenological tradition’s predominantly metaphysical teleology. We suggest that Buddhaghosa’s use of nāmarūpa should be seen as the analytic by which he understands how experience is undergone, and not his account of how reality is structured. We can learn from Buddhaghosa something about how experience is to be analyzed, and how that analysis has a clarificatory purpose not tied to the espousal of any particular “view” of reality.

Phenomenology and Metaphysics

This essay is not about metaphysics, although it draws attention to how it depends on what one says metaphysics is not. Modern Western philosophy has tended to proceed through claims to break with the entire history of
philosophy. As Kant pointed out, Hume said both that “metaphysics couldn’t possibly exist” and that metaphysics and morals are the most important branches of learning. Kant himself asked whether “metaphysics was possible at all” (§4); he answered in the affirmative but only after re-defining what it could possibly be. In the Phenomenological tradition, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Derrida, and Levinas all battle with the relationship between metaphysics and phenomenology, their understanding of each shifting with their argument for an original understanding of metaphysics. We do not intend to engage with that history and the validity of successive judgments (is metaphysics about “presence” and was Husserl committed to it, while Derrida broke free of it as he claims? and so on), let alone with the even more complex question of how to read “metaphysics” in the context of Indian thought. But we start with what we hope is a plausible if diffuse stipulation: metaphysics is about how things are and come to be what they are (on whatever construal of “things” and “is”); in short, it is concerned with questions of existence, while a metaphysical argument is one directed toward determining how those things are what they are. By “ontology,” we mean the articulation of the structure of entities such as objects and relations. An ontology is, in this sense, part of a metaphysical enterprise, whereas there can be metaphysical questions that are not ontological. In that sense, a dominant strain of twentieth-century Phenomenology does preserve a fundamental metaphysical reflex, for its purpose is in some way to determine the nature of the subject of experience of the world. By way of contrast, on our reading of Buddhaghosa, he is not oriented to such a determination at all, but rather seeks to train attention toward experience in such a way as to make the perfection of such attention itself the purpose of the training.

The Phenomenological tradition is in a fundamental sense a response to Kant: as Dan Zahavi observes from Michel Henry’s perspective at the end of the twentieth century, “[T]here is a common leitmotif in Kant’s, Husserl’s and Heidegger’s philosophy. All of these philosophers have, despite all the other differences that might prevail, had a common aim, namely to analyse the conditions of possibility for appearance or manifestation. . . .” Manifestation being the appearance of something for someone, the condition for its possibility must lie in the subject for which there is manifestation. It is, in Kant’s term, “transcendental” because it is the condition for that possibility. But then there is a problem:

The (transcendental) subject that must be taken into account if we are to speak of an appearance that does not itself appear, is not itself a phenomenon. But although this option might have been available to Kant, it is not available to the phenomenologists. To deny that transcendental subjectivity manifests itself, is to deny the possibility of a phenomenological analysis of transcendental subjectivity. And to deny that, is to deny the possibility of transcendental phenomenology altogether.
So, on Henry’s analysis, phenomenology must go beyond its study of manifestation to the subjectivity that renders manifestation possible: “[A]ll of the major phenomenological thinkers eventually realized that it would be necessary to transcend a mere analysis of act-intentionality and object-manifestation if they were to approach and clarify the phenomenological question concerning the condition of possibility for manifestation.”

And that is exactly the point at which we make a contrast with Buddhaghosa’s purpose in analyzing experience. Phenomenologists have frequently taken “the question” to be the determination of a transcendental subject, and because of that do not wish to remain focused on manifestation itself. “The task of phenomenology is not to describe the objects as precisely and meticulously as possible, nor should it occupy itself with an investigation of the phenomena in all their ontic diversity. No, its true task is to examine their very appearance or manifestation and to disclose its condition of possibility.” Buddhaghosa, however, does seek to “describe the objects [of experience] as precisely and meticulously as possible,” but not to determine either objects in their “ontic diversity” or a transcendental subject that makes experience possible.

In effect, our task is threefold when it comes to outlining a Buddhaghosa phenomenology. First, we must show that he does occupy himself with a close, analytic description of phenomena. Second, we need to argue that that description is not ontological, that it is not concerned to determine the nature of the objects of experience, since that would be irrelevant to his project of “purification” (visuddhi). Finally, and building on the previous two points, we have to show that the absence of a phenomenological quest for transcendental subjectivity in Buddhaghosa does not mean either that he lacks a phenomenological methodology or that he offers an alternative metaphysics of subjectivity (while it is true that he has a Buddhist commitment to the denial of a unitary subject).

There is doubtless a separate argument to be had whether his doctrinal commitments as a Buddhist imply a metaphysics—a question perhaps better directed at the Buddha’s own teachings, which criticize the holding of “views” but may be taken as ultimately holding a view of reality. As a Buddhist, then, Buddhaghosa has doctrinal commitments, about whose nature there can be a debate. But even if these commitments are held to be metaphysical for reason of being about how things truly are, they frame but do not enter the content of Buddhaghosa’s project. The purificatory consequence of these practices is anti-metaphysical, in that they enable the meditator to discern no need for adherence to a metaphysical subject (“no being, a person, a god, or a brahmā” [XVIII.24]), but this consequence is nothing like a metaphysical argument; it is a transformation of attitude. The monk “arrives at the conclusion” (nittham gacchati) that there is no such person. This general program of guiding the meditator through a carefully elaborated series of contemplative practices so that he is corrected in the
way he sees the world is evident throughout the Visuddhimagga,⁸ and
to it demonstrates that Buddhaghosa should not be seen as
developing specific metaphysical arguments about the nature of the subject
(as non-self).

Perhaps one particular interpretive contrast should be pointed out. Dan
Zahavi stresses that Phenomenology’s “reflective exploration” is an investiga-
tion of “the significance and appearance of the real world, not of some
otherworldly mental realm.”⁹ This is an unavoidable line to take given the
birth of Phenomenology as a response to early modern Western metaphy-
sics. We seek to show that the question of the ontological status of the “real
world” in contrast to a “mental real” does not arise in Buddhaghosa’s
program at all. He clearly engages with the world in which the monk
finds himself, as we will see; but its status is not a problem. His phenomenologi-
cal methodology is not then a descriptive psychology that requires thinking
of the elements of analysis and description as “mental” in contrast to “the
world”—in precise point of fact, our aim is to demonstrate that such an
assumption would be misleading.

Buddhaghosa should therefore be read thus: he is anti-metaphysical in
the sense that (as we will see) he follows the Buddha’s teaching that one
should not hold “views” (the sixty-two that the Buddha criticized), and offers
a process to therapeutize the practitioner away from such commitments. At
the same time, and consonant with this, since his thoroughgoing phenomen-
ological methodology means his project is given over to the contemplation
of an analysis of experience, he offers nothing positive or negative on what
an ontology might be that was consistent with his phenomenological
methodology (as perhaps later writers in his tradition developed). It might be
that, in this, he is somewhat comparable to the earlier Husserl (of the
Logical Investigations), who takes himself to be committed to a descriptive
phenomenology that is “neutral” to metaphysics. But only somewhat:
Buddhaghosa does not articulate his rejection of “views” of reality as being
for the development of a methodology neutral to them but as a therapeutic
response. How this difference in motivation might inform their philosophical
practices is a question for another day.

This combination of practice and purpose is clear in the chapter in
which Buddhaghosa details his use of the nāma-rūpa dyad as a hermeneutic
framing of the compositional phenomenal factors (dhammas) of the human
being as evident in various contemplative exercises. It would be thoroughly
misleading to approach his treatment as if it were part of a homogeneous
“abhidhamma,” and interpret him from the perspective of (contemporary or
later) Sanskrit Mahāyāna sources, or indeed of later Theravāda; so the often
explicit metaphysical contention of these other sources should not determine
our understanding of Buddhaghosa’s treatment of the Pali sources on
abhidhamma.
Modern scholars have offered contrasting readings of the canonical Abhidhamma, with some assuming it describes a metaphysics of ultimate reals, and others challenging this reading; sometimes the issue is unclear even in the work of the same scholar. Sue Hamilton, in a 1996 work, offers an ontological reading of naṃarūpa that we will refer to in the next section; but in a subsequent work of 2000, she suggests that when working with dependent origination at least, questions of ontology become irrelevant: “understanding dependent origination, in the sense that subjectivity and objectivity are mutually conditioned, one will no longer ask questions about existence”—a position we readily endorse.

Rupert Gethin has been on different sides of this issue, stating of the Abhidharma tradition (lumping together the Pali Abhidhamma in this assessment) that dharmas are the “physical and mental events” that “are the ultimate building blocks of the way things are.” But in an earlier work on the five khandhas, he suggests that “the khandhas do not exactly take on the character of a formal theory of man. The concern is not so much the presentation of an analysis of man as object, but rather the understanding of the nature of conditioned existence from the point of view of the experiencing subject.” In other words, these categories describe subjectivity, not the objects of experience in a manner that has, as he puts it, any “metaphysical significance.”

Y. Karunadasa, in an influential book, argues that the canonical Abhidhamma did not succumb to the “error of conceiving the dharmas as ultimate unities or discrete entities.” He suggests that dharmas be interpreted as “phenomena,” with “the proviso that they are phenomena with no corresponding noumena, no hidden underlying ground. For they are not manifestations of some mysterious metaphysical substratum, but processes taking place due to the interplay of a multitude of conditions.” But he argues that as the postcanonical tradition developed, the Theravādins took the “dharmas as the final limits of the Abhidhammic analysis of empirical existence,” making them “not further reducible to any other entity,” a position that made them susceptible to charges of reifying them. Yet he finds it possible to speak of given instances of “mind or matter,” as though these may be posited independently of dharmas.

Noa Ronkin shares Karunadasa’s view that the canonical Abhidhamma system did not draw metaphysical conclusions, but she argues that a robustly ontological interpretation of dharmas developed in the postcanonical tradition. Ronkin holds that the postcanonical tradition became more ontological in its interpretations of dharmas by their associating them with the idea of sabhāva, a term that bore significant ontological weight in some of the Indian traditions, as is well known. Ronkin notes that sabhāva in the
canonical tradition was associated with salakkhaṇa, and that both terms were used to determine “epistemological and linguistic” characteristics of things, rather than naming ontological existents or reals. And she notes that the Visuddhimagga also does not necessarily endow sabhāva with “ontological significance,” although she suggests that its commentary heads in a metaphysical direction. Focusing on the layer of the Mahāṭīkā, she argues that sabhāva refers to “an ontological determinant” that may “accordingly be rendered as individual essence at the level of ontology.” This yields a reading of dhammas as “ultimately real existents,” and makes the whole Abhidhamma project a matter of ontology.

While she allows that, for his part, Buddhaghosa may not have used sabhāva in an ontologically loaded way, she translates a passage from the Atthasālinī (a text attributed to Buddhaghosa) in a way that begs the question, translating dhammas as “ultimate constituents” and sabhāva as “self-existents.” In another passage she translates sabhāva as “particular nature,” and proceeds rhetorically: “does not the very use of the term sabhāva overstate the reality of the dhammas and imply that a dhamma is a discrete entity, a “thing” existing in its own right?” But these terms can easily be translated as “phenomena” or “factors” in the case of dhamma, and “particularity” or “particular way of being” in the case of sabhāva. In fact, sabhāva, like salakkhaṇa, is often used in the Visuddhimagga to denote the particular definition that distinguishes a dhamma (as well as other things), and so it is a thing’s particularity. Therefore, it is not self-evident or indisputable that Buddhaghosa’s use of sabhāva commits him to a notion of dhammas as “self-existents” or “discrete things existing in their own right.” After all, Buddhaghosa applies sabhāva to the ten different types of corpses in the corpse meditations (as Ronkin herself notes), as a contemplative tool to note the distinctions among them. In this usage it requires no ontological commitments—nobody seems to want to insist that bloated corpses are irreducible ontological reals.

Finally, Nāṇamoli’s translation of sabhāva as “individual essence,” is not given without significant misgivings on his part, and he insists that he uses it “principally on exegetical grounds,” by which we think he means that the translation is as open to interpretation as the original text. He also says that “essence” is an “admittedly slippery customer” that “must be understood from the contexts in which it is used and not prejudged.”

In Buddhaghosa’s use of it, sabhāva itself can be further broken down, which suggests that efforts to make sabhāva indicate an irreducible, ultimate essence will meet with inconvenient textual passages in the Visuddhimagga. We can take feeling (vedanā) as an example. There are numerous schemas for analyzing feeling (according to its role in dependent origination, as a khandha, as a dhamma, etc.); let us look at two, feeling analyzed as aggregate and feeling analyzed as dhamma. Feeling, according to one analysis, is a cetasika, that is, one of the dhammas that occur on the lists
breaking down moments of experience, but it is also an aggregate or composite entity (khandha) that together with the other four aggregates can be used to describe human experience. As a khandha or composite entity, it is of course, by definition, further reducible (this, of course, raises the question of how and in what sense vedanā when appearing as a dhamma could be a final irreducible entity). Buddhaghosa says that as one of the five aggregates, feeling can be defined variously:

But though it is singlefold according to its particular way of being (sabhāva) because of its characteristic of being felt, it is also threefold by its type: good, bad, and indeterminate. . . . And it is fivefold by dividing its particular way of being (sabhāva) thus: pleasure, pain, joy, sadness, and equanimity.28

Here, feeling itself is further reducible into one, three, or five (elsewhere there are even more ways of dividing it, and even at the canonical layer there is resistance to any single, final listing of feeling29). And its sabhāva can be further divided into five. As such it is hard to insist that either sabhāva or dhamma must refer to a final irreducible existent or essence arrived at through reductive analysis. Rather, for Buddhaghosa sabhāva refers to the particularity that distinguishes feeling from other dharmas and other khandhas, which in the case of feeling is the phenomenological experience of being felt (the sabhāva, like the lakkhaṇa, of a phenomenon is usually the verbal form of it); and there are many ways of feeling—pleasurable, painful, et cetera. If either vedanā or sabhāva were primary existents arrived at through final analysis, why are they here further reducible?

Nānamoli is well aware of the same problem as we have discussed, and crisply makes the point about dualism. Perhaps once more for “exegetical” reasons—to keep a translational choice that had already hardened, yet needed interpretive challenging—he explains that he reluctantly chose to keep the translation of rūpa as “materiality” (and nāma as “mentality”). He says in the Introduction to the translation:

“[M]entality-materiality” for nāmarūpa is inadequate and “name-and-form” in some ways preferable. “Name” (see Ch. XVIII, n.4) still suggests nāma’s function of “naming”; and “form” for the rūpa of the rūpakkhandha (“materiality aggregate”) can preserve the link with the rūpa of the rūpāyatana (“visible-object base”), by rendering them respectively with “material form aggregate” and “visible form base”—a point not without philosophical importance. A compromise has been made at Chapter X.13. “Materiality” or “matter” wherever used should not be taken as implying any hypostasis, any “permanent or semipermanent substance behind appearances” (the objective counterpart of the subjective ego), which would find no support in the Pali.30

He himself does not expand here on what this “point not without philosophical importance” might be; but we suggest that the present essay develops just such a case.
We thus see a mixed recent history of interpretations of the Abhidhamma and its commentaries. While in some quarters the question of a metaphysical reading of Abhidhamma is assumed to be settled, we also find compelling and interesting suggestions of a phenomenological reading to be widespread and, strangely enough, in the thoughts of the authoritative translator of the *Visuddhimagga* itself. For our purposes, we must also note the absence of any systematic and close study of Buddhaghosa’s work on this question in recent scholarship. None of the above-mentioned scholars on whose work some of the received wisdom on this question is based treat the *Visuddhimagga* or the other works attributed to Buddhaghosa systematically, and what they do say about him leaves much room for further investigation. We suggest that in light of this cloudy scholarly history of interpretation of the Pali Abhidhamma, and the absence of any systematic study of Buddhaghosa’s particular interpretation of it, it is time for a reassessment of the question. Taking up the foundational ideas of *nāmarūpa*, which Buddhaghosa takes to be the hallmark of Abhidhamma analysis, is one pathway to do this.

Nāmarūpa: Outline of the Standard Interpretation

We therefore wish to consider how we might move away from the tendency to see *nāmarūpa* in terms of a dualistic ontology of “mind-and-body,” or its various affiliates (“mental and material,” “sentience and body,” “the psychophysical complex,” and so on), that flows from a generally metaphysical interpretation of the abhidhamma categories. Even scholars careful to keep to the more accurate translations of *nāmarūpa* as “name and form” have sometimes worked these into a metaphysical account of the human being where the disaggregative project of analyses for dismantling selfhood produces an account of smaller constituent parts, which are then affirmed as reals. Steven Collins, for example, states that “Buddhist doctrine continues the style of analysis into non-valued impersonal constituents: it is precisely the point of not-self that this is all that there is to human individuals,” and he specifies that the impersonal constituents that remain to the human individual are such things as “the two-fold ‘name-and-form’ (*nāmarūpa*).” Sue Hamilton argues that *nāmarūpa* is “the individualising, or abstract identity, of the human being.” It indicates the “comprehensive designation of the individuality of a human being,” that is, “the point at which that individual, having become associated with the potential for being conscious, acquires identity in terms of name and form.” *Nāmarūpa* is the seat of an individual’s identity.

By contrast, for Buddhaghosa (and the interpretation of the canonical sources that he urges), *nāmarūpa* is one analytical distinction (among many) that can be used to observe experience, but it does not identify a metaphysical reality or basis of an individual. One of the prominent roles of
nāmarūpa is its functioning as the fourth link in the twelfold chain of
dependent origination (the twelve links are: ignorance, intentional construc-
tions, awareness [or, in various contexts, more specifically, “directed
cognition,” viññāna], name and form, the six senses, contact, feeling,
craving, grasping, becoming, birth, aging-and-death). Buddhaghosa claims
that the teaching of dependent origination is “a profound teaching that
should be given in various ways for various purposes, and none but those
with the knowing of omniscience can be established in this knowledge”36
certainly, the scope of his treatment of the topic in Visuddhimagga XVII is
far beyond our concern here. But one of the uses of dependent origination
that he describes at length is to teach an “explanation of the round” (vatṭa-
kathā), and here the issue of how nāmarūpa has been conceived in the
sequence of events of rebirth has been cited by some of these scholars as
evidence of nāmarūpa referring to a composite entity or identity of the
human person. They cite Buddhaghosa’s account of the rebirth process as
support for the notion that nāmarūpa is an entity that appears in the womb.
Within the midst of a much larger discussion of these processes, Buddha-
ghosa says:

Therein the “rebirth which is awareness” means that awareness is said to be
rebirth because of the arising of the next being to be reborn. “Name and form
develop (or ‘descend’)” means that there is the entering, as it were, of the form
and formless dhāmas which have approached the womb—this is name and
form. The “actualities that are sensitivity” refer to the five actualities of eye,
etc.37

On the basis of this passage in a reading that emphasizes the idea of
the “descent” of a new being in the womb, Collins suggests that “it is at the
moment when these elements have already been conjoined, and the
psycho-physical unity of the embryo (‘name-and-form’) is thus formed, that
there is said to be descent.”38 For those scholars who would see nāmarūpa
signifying the entity or identity of an individual, this passage appears to
describe its beginning and gestation.

We propose instead that the passage is describing the processes of
rebirth in the womb as a development, in the mutually conditioning formula
that is dependent origination, of the particular processes this formula
describes: here we learn of the development of awareness, the beginnings of
the phenomenal factors (dhāmas) that can be described as name and form,
and the sense actualities as they begin to emerge. Nāmarūpa is a way of
describing dhāmas by classifying those that have form and those that are
formless; we can observe that the embryo has dhāmas (such as feeling)
that can be described as nāma, and aspects of form and formation that we
can refer to as rūpa. This does not entail that name and form here identify,
over and above the processes structuring human life in the womb or out of
it, the twofold unity or identity of the embryo. Nāmarūpa is used in the
dependent origination formula as an analytically useful way to interpret mutually conditioning relationships: the factors classified as nāmarūpa are conditioned by awareness, and in turn condition the six senses. For reasons that become clear below, for Buddhaghosa, name and form are analytical terms used to discern two sides of human phenomenology, but themselves do not constitute an ontological category.

“Seeing” and the Significance of Not “Resorting to Views”

Buddhaghosa’s exploration of nāmarūpa in Visuddhimagga XVIII casts it as an existential and contemplative practice of “purifying view” (diṭṭhivisuddhi). In the broadest sense, this exercise takes place within the Understanding (paññā) section of the threefold path that is the Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga), a text that articulates a progressive contemplative journey culminating in understanding. Understanding occurs on the foundation of the other two parts of the path, cultivating morality/virtue (sīla) and concentration (samādhi). By this point, Buddhaghosa has already spelled out that “understanding is the act of understanding,” so he is not so much concerned with what one knows (an epistemological state determined by propositional content) but instead with how one knows (a transformation in knowing the world). Paññā involves a set of practices that shift how the practitioner “knows and sees” (nāṇadassana), and it is a matter of insight (vipassana). Buddhaghosa first asserts that the task at hand is a matter of purifying view, and second he enjoins the meditator to engage in correct seeing (yathābhūtadassana).

Purifying view is one of five purifications performed by the advanced meditator, and “purifying view means seeing correctly name and form.” Seeing the working of nāmarūpa is the way one comes to purify view. Buddhaghosa articulates the purification of view not as a matter of adhering to right points of view, but rather as involving a shift in how one sees, that is, how one comes to “see correctly.”

The chapter also signals that it is describing and guiding a transformative exercise of seeing when it draws a contrast between “seeing correctly” (yathābhūtadassana) and “resorting to views” (diṭṭhigata). At XVIII.28, he says that “there comes to be the mere common usage of ‘chariot’” (ratho ti vohāramattam hoti) from its parts but that an “examination” (upaparikkhā) shows that ultimately there is no chariot.

Likewise, when there are the five aggregates of clinging, then there comes to be the mere common usage of “a being,” “person”; but in the further sense, when each dhamma is examined, there is no being that is the foundation for assuming “I am” or “I.” In the further sense, there is only name and form. The vision of one who sees thus is called “seeing correctly.”

Clearly, the “examination” here is reflexive, because it is of the “aggregates of clinging.” “Clinging” is a phenomenological fact, that is, what is
experienced. And seeing correctly is to see through the experience of clinging to how the sense of being a substantial person occurs because of clinging to the aggregates. It is this “seeing correctly” that Buddhaghosa contrasts to the discredit of “resorting to views,” by invoking the Buddha’s criticism, thereby making the contrast between the two clear.

Buddhaghosa quotes the Buddha on this point:

Here the Bhagavan said: “some gods and humans are obsessed by two ways of resorting to views: some hold back, some overreach, and only those with eyes see. And how, monks, do some hold back? Monks, gods and humans delight in being (or becoming), are intent on being, take pleasure in being. When the Dhamma is taught to them for the sake of the cessation of being, their awareness does not take to it, or become calm, settled, or inclined to it. These are those, monks, who hold back. And how, monks, do some overreach? Some are anxious, disaffected, and disgusted by that same being, and they take pleasure in cutting off being, saying “at the breakup of the body, the self is destroyed and perishes, and is nothing further after death—this is peace, this is fulfillment, this is truth.” These are those, monks, who overreach. And how, monks, do those with eyes see? Here, monks, a monk sees what has become as become. Having seen what has become as become, he reaches disenchantment, dispassion, and cessation for what has become. In this way, monks, those with eyes see.43

The passage contrasts those who are, in one way or another, obsessed with views of the world (that either affirm or deny its reality and value) with those who come to see how things are present to their experience. The latter achieve the transformation valued by the teleological ambitions of the text. This suggests that Buddhaghosa’s purpose here (and elsewhere) is to arrive not at views (diṭṭhi) but rather at a shift in ways of seeing (dassana). In his terms, “purifying view” means getting rid of adherence to views so that one might have “eyes that see.” Through his specific invocation of the difference between “diṭṭhi” (“view”) and “dassana” (“seeing” or “viewing”) we are drawn into seeing that “view” (i.e., a point of view) is not the same as “viewing” (i.e., the continual act of purified seeing).

This framing of his inquiry into nāmarūpa as being about seeing is significant because it implies that what is said about this topic is not for the purpose of achieving a point of view or position about reality. The distinction above serves as a propaedeutic to his phenomenological practice—the structured attending to experience. We should remember that the practice is not only not for the purpose of arriving at conclusions about how things ultimately are; it is in fact directed toward developing the capacity to not seek such conclusions. Learning to observe experience in new ways is explicitly a protection against the existential problematic that the Buddha identified as “resorting to views.” It would then be a flat contradiction to see Buddhaghosa as advancing a metaphysics in his treatment of nāmarūpa.
Despite the recognition of the metaphysical intent of the twentieth-century Phenomenological tradition, there is also a contemporary interpretation (in a minor key, to be sure) that, at its most fundamental, phenomenology is a method and not a metaphysics. This is eloquently and pointedly put by David Carr:

\[\text{Contrary to the widely accepted interpretation of Heidegger, transcendental philosophy is not a metaphysical doctrine or theory, but a critique of metaphysics, of science, and of the experience that underlies them. A critique is not a theory but a research program or method, a way of looking at and interrogating experience so as to bring to the surface its deepest-lying, uncritically accepted assumptions.}\]

This account of phenomenology as the interrogation of experience—albeit for a goal radically beyond the reach of philosophical investigation alone—comes closest to our reading of Buddhaghosa, and at least shows that there is nothing conceptually incoherent about a phenomenology without a metaphysical argument.

The fact that metaphysical treatments of abhidhamma/abhidharma include phenomenological practices (as in Sarvāstivāda) does not imply the converse—that Buddhaghosa’s phenomenological practice has to be for a metaphysical purpose. That the two go together is the dominant understanding of phenomenology; that they can be de-linked is the crucial point about phenomenology as critical methodology.

Nāma and Rūpa under the Analysis of the Aggregates: The Phenomenological Case for the Khandhas

While it is in chapter XVIII that Buddhaghosa deals with nāmarūpa as a theme, in typical modular fashion he describes the constituents of each—without focusing on the dyad as such—in chapter XIV. While we want to study XVIII in detail precisely because that is where he thematizes them, it might be useful to clarify that this chapter is not at odds with XIV.

First of all, we have his connection of rūpa to ruppana, which means literally “molested,” “bothered,” or “vexed.” Buddhaghosa does not say here what it is that forms get impinged upon in this way, but gives a small clue (XIV.34): “whatever are the kinds of factors that have the characteristic of being bothered by cold, etc., all of them are to be considered together and understood as the rūpa aggregate.” It is straightaway difficult to see how this more naturally fits an ontological reading of the constituents of the rūpa aggregate as material, when the definition is clearly phenomenological, as those constituents that undergo (are “molested by”) such sensations as cold.

Then he goes on to divide rūpa into two categories: the elemental (bhūta) and what is “clung to” and therefore “derived” (upādāya) (as Nāṇamoli translates it at XIV.34). The latter category intrinsically contains a
spiritual implication that these forms are forms because of the existential desire—the clinging to—from which freedom is sought through the Buddha’s path.

Before we look more closely at some exemplary “derived forms,” let us tackle Buddhaghosa’s description of the “elemental forms,” which goes back to chapter XI. There, XI.87 deals with bhūtas as to their word meaning (vacanattho): “then, undifferentiated, they are components (dhātus), due to bearing their own characteristics, because of grasping (ādāna) suffering, and because of putting out (ādhāna) suffering.” Interestingly, the translator Nānāmoli has “sorting out” for ādhāna, and refers to XV.19, where in a footnote he draws attention to words that have dahāti, “to put” as their root. Although he does not directly mention ādhāna there, the reference to this footnote suggests the link.

Note that the elementals are not presented as objects that cause suffering. Buddhaghosa does not deny that they may be; it is simply not his concern to determine them in that way. He understands them in terms of their being grasped and the way they can be utilized to put out suffering. Even earth, water, and the like engage Buddhaghosa’s attention via their phenomenological role. (To reiterate: this says nothing about whether there is or ought to be a commitment to the ontological status of these entities, only that Buddhaghosa’s deployment of them is within a purely phenomenological methodology.)

Turning to XI.93 as the description of bhūtas according to their characteristics, et cetera (lakkhaṇādīto):

Having adverted to the four elements in this way, the characteristic, etc. should be attended to thus: “What are the characteristic, function, manifestation of the earth elemental?” The earth elemental has the characteristic of hardness. Its function is to act as a foundation. It is manifested as receptivity. The water elemental has the characteristic of flowing. Its function is to spread. It is manifested as accumulating. The fire elemental has the characteristic of heat. Its function is to bring to maturity. It is manifested as a regulation of softness. The air elemental has the characteristic of distending. Its function is to cause motion. It is manifested as acting outward.

What brings out Buddhaghosa’s phenomenological orientation is his standard utilization of description not only by function, but also by characteristic and manifestation. We should resist the temptation to think that this is one side of a subjective-objective divide, because when we turn to how he deals with the characteristic of each elemental, we note in fact that he details the quality of their feel: hardness and the like. So we can be sure that Buddhaghosa is not treating this crucial type of a crucial category of abhidhamma—one which, if anywhere, we might find a robust ontology—as a metaphysical postulate.

From this, let us turn to the “derived forms” that are contingent upon our existential reflex of clinging to an assumed reality. They are of twenty-four
kinds: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, the visible form (rūpa), sound, odor, taste (rasa), the feminine faculty (ittindriya), the masculine faculty (purusin-driya), life faculty (jīvitindriya), the heart-substance (hadayavatthu), bodily intimation (kāyaviṇṇāti), verbal intimation, the spatial component (ākāsad-hātu), the lightness of formation (rūpāsahātu), its malleability (mudutā), pliability (kammaññatā), growth, continuity, ageing, impermanence, and material food (XIV.36). All twenty-four kinds function in phenomenological analysis through the use of the notion of “sensitivity” (pasāda), that is to say, the receptivity of bodily awareness. The list of the functions of the five sensory formations—in terms of sensitivity—is correlated with a list of the structural locations of each sensory sensitivity (note that this means Buddhaghosa has no interest in revising or asserting anything about the ordinary features of body and world). The nose (39) has the characteristic of sensitivity to the impact (abhighāta) of smell, and the desire to smell is the source of the activity by which smelling originates. Then, to correlate with 39, the nose (50) has an inside shaped like a “goat’s hoof,” and is both the substantial basis (vatthu) of, as well as the entrance (dvāra) for, nasal cognition. Similarly, at 41 with the body (and we see a narrow meaning of “body” here as the surface for sensation): it has the characteristic of sensitivity to the impact of the tangible (photthabba), the desire for touch being the source of its activity. And in turn, the location of that bodily sensitivity (52) is to be found throughout the body, so long as there are “formations that are clung-to” (upādiṇṇarūpam), that is, when desire drives the search for sensation. (Phenomenology includes moral phenomenology, where the moral is that which arcs toward perfection, which is freedom from desire.)

A more abstract entity is the faculty of life (jīvitindriya) (59) whose “characteristic is the maintenance of conascent formations” (sahajarūpānu-pālalakkhanam). Its function is to make these formations that are born together to occur (pavatta) at all. Here, too, one finds the advantage of Buddhaghosa’s discerning restriction of analysis to the functional:

And although it has the capacity characterized as maintenance and so on, it only maintains conascent formations at that present moment, as water does lotuses, etc. Though factors (dhamma) arise due to their own conditions, it maintains them, as a wet-nurse does a prince. And it occurs itself only through its connection with the occurrent factors, like a ship’s captain; it does not cause occurrence after dissolution. . . . Yet it must not be regarded as devoid of the power to maintain, bring about, and make present, because it does accomplish each of these functions at a stated moment.48 (59)

On the one hand, it is important to associate phenomena with life, in the formal terms that distinguish body from corpse; so we have what life means for contemplative analysis. On the other hand, since that is all that is needed for the path, we need not expect either a scientific or a metaphysical drilling down to what life “is.”
These are some of the examples from Buddhaghosa’s extended analysis of the derived forms/ formations. His treatment of them evidently points to a subtle approach that does not betoken the compilation of an ontological list. It is self-evident to all but a pathological (rather than methodological) skeptic that the physical is present in the phenomenological; so we are not at all making the claim that Buddhaghosa denies how the world is present in experience (that would simply make him a metaphysical idealist). Since even defenders of an ontological construal of nāma and rūpa would more likely want to be sure that it is rūpa whose phenomenological construal in Buddhaghosa is clear, rather than nāma or what he also calls arūpa, we can spend less time on nāma. The cognition aggregate—viññāna—is the lead among the nāma aggregates. The remaining three follow the same pattern, as Buddhaghosa himself says: “Here, once the cognition aggregate is understood, the rest are easily understood, too” (XIV.81). It has a richer, more complex typology in the abhidhamma than the formation aggregate. But despite the analytic distinction between the “body” formations and the “mental” aggregates, the abhidhamma aggregates altogether contain within them a constant percolation of causal references between each other, destabilizing any intuitions we moderns may have about a body-mind divide. They thereby provide a fluid account of how the body occurs in phenomenology.

His primary concern is with contemplative practice, rather than laying out a mind-body ontology, as is clear in how Buddhaghosa deals with two critical components of the cognition aggregate, “mind” (manas) and “mind-cognition” (manoviññāna). The “mind” has the function of “reception” (sampaticchana) and “mental cognition,” the function of “investigation” (santarāṇa):

The mind component has the characteristic of taking cognizance of the visible, etc. [the data of the sense organs], immediately after visual cognition, etc., itself.49 The component of mental cognition, with the operation of investigation, has the characteristic of taking cognizance of the six [types of] objects (i.e., including the mental).50 (p. 97)

What is demonstrated here is that, yet again, given an opportunity to define what a mind is, we have Buddhaghosa dealing with the category only in terms of how it functions: more precisely, its phenomenological function.

Having now looked at the leading nāma or arūpa aggregate, we can set aside the other aggregates, which obviously follow this same pattern of analysis, and finally turn to the thematization of nāma and rūpa directly in chapter XVIII.

Seeing Nāma and Rūpa

The way in which Buddhaghosa uses “name” and “form” emerges through a study of his description of contemplative practices with and on them. The
exercises described by chapter XVIII can be structured into three main parts. First, the meditator engages in techniques of discernment and definition in order to attend to the nāma and rūpa of experience. Second, having developed these techniques, the meditator engages in the dismantling of the tendency to see some essence, a personhood, over and above the observed processes of nāma and rūpa. Finally, the meditator comes to see the inextricable interdependence of nāma and rūpa.

We begin here to consider the contemplation of “name” and “form,” which itself can be divided into three types: (1) starting with awareness focused on (a) name, one moves to form, and (b) vice versa; (2) contemplation of the mutual enfolding of name and form of experiences as taxonomized variously through (a) the eighteen “elements” (dhātus), (b) the twelve “actuating bases” (āyatanas) or (c) the five “aggregates” (khandhas); and (3) working on forms through one of three aspects of “name”—contact (phassa), feeling (vedanā), or directed cognition (viññāṇa)—if the naming does not directly arise in contemplative focus. In each of these exercises one is coming to identify factors under name or form.

Under (1), Buddhaghosa starts with exercises aimed at advanced meditators who are proficient in either calming (samatha) practices or insight (vipassana). The task is to discern (pariggaheti) and define (vavatthapeti) the workings of nāma and rūpa. One should start from one of them to come gradually to observe the workings of the other. “One should discern, according to characteristic, function, etc. the constituents of ‘absorption’ that consist of applied thought, etc. and the factors (dhammas) associated with them.”51 The “constituents of absorption” (jhānāṅgas) are: the initial application of thought (vitakka), sustained inquiry (vicāra), delight (pīti), pleasure (sukha), and concentration (samādhi). At least some of these dhammas occur in every moment of awareness. With these come the phenomenal factors associated with (sampayutta) them, like feeling and conception. Discernment is through the standard fourfold definitional practice that Buddhaghosa relies on heavily throughout his work and which we have already seen in action: the definition of an entity is through identifying its characteristic, function, proximate cause, and manifestation.52

This exercise of noticing the presence of, in our example, “application of thought” in awareness, leads to discerning that it is nāma. Buddhaghosa now defines nāma with a description that is etymologically dubious but no less informative for that:

Having [so] discerned, all of this should be defined as “name” because of the sense of “bending” [or applying, inclining to] (namana), from its bending toward the object.53

What, then, is it to conceive of the act of thinking, concentrating, feeling, or finding pleasure, as “bending toward” (or, more fully, bending to “face” toward) its object?54 Buddhaghosa is getting at some version of the
phenomenological conception of intentionality in modern Western thought: the “bending to face” its object is that act’s being “about” or “of” its object.\textsuperscript{55} To think is to think of the object; to feel is to feel about something, and so on. “Aboutness” seems to be part of the “bending toward” that characterizes the category of factors called “name,” or perhaps also “naming” in the extended sense that the thought names its object. At the same time, intentionality in modern Phenomenology is also a property that subjective states have in themselves; but this is not a part of what Buddhaghosa means by “nāma.” This later feature, which requires the idea of a constructive subjectivity that can be independent of objects, already requires that metaphysical concern about the epistemological divide between subject and object that is not shared by Buddhaghosa. In fact, we can see that “bending toward” implies, if anything, a receptivity by which nāma inclines toward its object. So, with the nāma factors of experience, Buddhaghosa includes both intentional and affective dimensions on one side of his phenomenological account. (When considering intentionality, we can take nāma as “naming,” and when considering as that which is determined by the affectivity\textsuperscript{56} of its objects, we take nāma as “name.”) As we go through the details of the subsequent discussion of practices, we will see more of how nāma functions as the one side of the phenomenological whole.

Once he discerns nāma factors, the practitioner proceeds to discern and define form, and thus comes to distinguish the workings of both:

Then, like a man following a snake that he has seen at his home, sees its lair, so, too, one familiar with meditation (yoga) ascertains “name” and then looks for the support by which this name occurs. He sees that the “heart form” is its support. From this he discerns that the elementals support the heart form, and that the remaining contingent elements support the elementals—[these are what] he discerns as “form.” All of this should be defined as “form” because of their being “molested.”\textsuperscript{57}

One comes to see that one’s various practices of naming are supported in their occurrence by something that is “formed,” starting with one’s own heart (the anatomically identifiable locus of thinking and feeling).

We now have both sides of our phenomenology—the “name/naming” side that inclines toward objects of experience in a large set of processes (as we are starting to see) that conceptualize and affectively grasp experience, and the “form/formation” side of phenomenal objects that are shaped in experience. This is a fruitful contrast to how intentionality and affectivity are worked up as the metaphysical structure of experience in the Western Phenomenological tradition. Consider this exemplary description:

Intentionality . . . describes my part in the experience—my need for completeness, for knowledge, for the satisfaction of my curiosity; affectivity, on the other hand, describes the object’s play in this situation—how the object for its own part can attract my attention because it broadcasts certain features or has some
special meaning. Thus these two terms, “intentionality” and “affectivity,” describe two sides of the same subject-object relation. In fact, Husserl notes this relation: “For the object, we can also define affection as the awakening of an intention directed toward it.”

We are clear that a phenomenology must find within it the notions of both intentionality and affectivity. However, the Phenomenological tradition, with its metaphysical presupposition that the purpose of interrogating experience is to go to the things themselves and arrive at the transcendental subject of the experience of those things, sees the “two sides” of experience as the subject’s intentionality toward objects and the affectivity of objects upon the subject. With his interrogative purpose only being to become purified of the lure of metaphysical views altogether, Buddhaghosa’s mapping of experience as nāma and rūpa cuts at 90 degrees across intentionality and affectivity. As we will see, he says that the entirety of experience consists in and is animated by the dhammas classified by this dyad; so these are the two sides of his phenomenological method. But his deployment of them is profoundly anti-metaphysical, just as his analysis is fundamentally contemplative (rather than remaining merely analytic).

Multiple Methods: Contemplative Analysis through Nāma and Rūpa

Nāma and rūpa are hermeneutic terms for the two sides of experience, on the one side the reception and constitution that is the naming of what the meditator undergoes, and on the other the form of the occurrent content of experience and the formation of the experience as something that happens to the meditator. This general identification of how every experience has such doubleness is far from any implication of a twofold ontology of the person who has the experience. That the terms are hermeneutical is evident from how the constituents of each term vary according to the formula of analysis (vavatthāna) through which the detail (vitthāra) of experience is contemplated.

Now, whereas the first exercise had begun with observing name and led to observing form, the subsequent ones do the opposite. The first of these is structured through discernment of the four elementals. As he has previously explained (XI.27 ff.), in this, the meditator, who had hitherto viewed his bodily presence as a being (satta), man (posa), or person (puggala), forensically takes apart the whole in contemplative review (pacchavekkhana)—as a butcher cuts a carcass so that a cow is no longer seen but only slices of meat—and ceases to have the conception of being (sattasaññā) and establishes his attention on the four elementals. His experience of himself is thus reworked. In the present chapter, Buddhaghosa sketches out the complex tabulation by which the meditator successively discerns an elaborated and extended listing of the thirty-two parts of the body (head hairs, body hairs, etc.) (XVIII.5). When attention has been worked through
all the instances of form as present in experience, the formless factors (arūpadhammā) at work in phenomena become manifest in attention, too, in all their diversity (he gives eighty-one kinds of awareness). These together he sees as “name.”

This distinction between the formed and the named aspects of the attentive experience of bodiliness is not due to an ontological divide in that body between its materiality and its mind, for two reasons. The first is that nāma and rūpa can hardly be considered the basis for individualizing the person when analytic discernment by the person of himself through the dyad is exactly what is meant to deconstruct the intuitive presupposition of an essential personhood.

The second will become evident as we continue to look at the exercises: a variety of classificatory formulae can be used, and while each exercise starts with those factors in phenomena that Buddhaghosa directs the meditator to see as “form” (before proceeding to those that are to be discerned as “name”), the precise cut between name and form varies in each instance, demonstrating the role of the dyad as only a hermeneutic for the analysis of any phenomenal moment in contemplative experience. These exercises utilize different formulae by which the phenomenal presentation of a human being to himself (i.e., the meditating monk) can be analyzed. In a telling instance, while describing how to exercise contemplation through the eighteen components, Buddhaghosa says “ten and a half components” are rūpa and seven and a half are nāma; but while defining the twelve actuations, then one and a half are nāma and ten and a half are rūpa. The line is drawn through the dhammadhātu or dhammāyatana, the factor component or factor actuation that is the field of the mind (manas). That is, just as the ear has sounds as its field (more technically the ear component and the ear actuation have sound components and sound actuations as their field), so, too, the mind has factors (whether as components or actuations) as the field of its functioning. (So the dhammadhātus are objects of mind, not mental objects.) And factors are classified as either name or form. In point of detail, rather more than half are nāma factors, and fewer are rūpa factors, and Buddhaghosa simplifies it. But the point is made that the dyadic classification follows the objects of mind according to whichever formula is being used in the exercise.

In any case, the meditator intensifies the focus on the body part (say, a head hair in XVIII.5 or sensory component or actuation, say, the eye in XVIII.9–12), and discerns the form of its phenomenal factors (its rūpadhammas). Close examination of rūpa factors will lead to noticing any of the eighty-one types of awareness that attend our observation of all objects.

Learning from the Subtlety of Nāma, or How to Purify without Theorizing

Now an interesting difference in phenomenological accessibility between nāma and rūpa is brought out. Buddhaghosa suggests that even with careful
observation of form, name might still not arise (na upatṭhāti) in the discernment of the meditator due to its “subtlety” (sukhumattā).\(^{59}\) If this is the case, the meditator should not give up, but again and again contemplate, attend to, discern, and define just the form. To the extent that form becomes cleansed, disentangled, and highly purified, then to that extent the formless factors which have [form] as their object (ārammaṇa) themselves become evident.\(^{60}\)

He offers a series of metaphors for this process, which urge evocative and phenomenologically instructive descriptions of the attention required. When one looks into a dirty mirror and cannot see one’s reflection, one needs to polish it again and again until the image of oneself looking back becomes clear. (Polish the object so that it shines back one’s reflexivity.) Alternatively, a man trying to get oil from pressing sesame needs to prepare repeatedly the sesame and press with the oil press to make it work. (Keep pressing until the processes of naming emerge.)\(^{61}\) There is an acknowledgment that the naming dimension of phenomenality can be more difficult to realize in attention, and that sharper attention to form must eventually yield the cognizing activities (“naming”) that grasp it. It may be easier to notice what is in our experience rather than how we are experiencing it.

What is the “subtlety” or “refinement” in the manifestation of the formless (i.e., “name”) that makes it more difficult to discern? The answer emerges through what Buddhaghosa offers as the ways through which this difficulty may be overcome. He suggests, it seems paradoxically, that three aspects (ākāras) of the phenomenal factors that are formless (arūpadhammā) —contact (phassa), feeling (vedanā), or directed cognition (viññāṇa)—themselves become the modes of discerning the formless dimension of phenomena. The specificity of the practices he enjoins starts to clear up the difficulty. The first example he gives concerns using contact:

When he discerns the elementals in the way beginning, “the earth elemental has the characteristic of hardness,” touch arises for him as the first close contact. Then feeling associated with that as the feeling aggregate arises . . . [and similarly, the other factors through conceptualization (saññā), intention (cetanā), and directed cognition (viññāṇa)].\(^{62}\)

Since the meditator knows that the characteristic of earth is hardness or resistance, he can ascertain a slight resistance in the instance of a head hair by touching it. He thus notices his own contact (phassa) with it, and has thus identified a naming factor (nāmadhamma). He may then notice a feeling (vedanā) that arises, such as touch being pleasant, as a way of progressively discerning the remaining phenomenal factors that are formless (XVIII.20). We may provide a more obvious example to show how intuitive this is. If, say, I am not sure my hand is numb—that is, if I do not feel confident that I can discern the haptic aspect of experience—the thing to do
is to press my hand against a hard object to concentrate my attention on contact.

Does a consideration of these exercises offer a clue for why nāma/arūpa might be the more difficult to discern? For Buddhaghosa, the naming, formless side of phenomenality is what performs the function of reflexivity, which is a constituent and intrinsic feature of experience. In contrast, the phenomenal factors that are classified as form/formation are unidirectional in their function—they are the content of the intentional and the source of the affective. That is to say, a rūpa factor does not act on itself in phenomena. But those classified as name/naming/formlessness function upon themselves. In their case, intentionality and affectivity are both reflexive.

It is entirely in keeping with Buddhaghosa’s practical program of purification that we see no theorization of the nature of experience, including the issue of reflexivity that so occupies many philosophical systems contemporary to him. Instead, he focuses on teaching the monk to sharpen the functioning of his contemplative practices. Attend to how you experience, study your practices even as they occur, because that study is itself part of the practice. Practice is sufficient for dismantling the reflex by which the untutored take reflexivity and the objects of experience to be marks of a pre-given subject clinging to what it is aware of. That is how we must approach the practices in the rest of the chapter.

Doing without a Subject: The Interdependent Workings of Nāma and Rūpa

Once one has achieved awareness of the processes of both form and name, the meditator is enjoined to observe that there is nothing apart from these processes such as a “being,” “person,” “deity,” or “Brahmā”:

Thus one should define, in a double way, name and form in all phenomena of the three realms, the eight components, the twelve actualities, the five aggregates, as if one were splitting the top of the double palmyra fan or slicing open a box with a knife. One concludes that there is only name and form and nothing beyond them such as a being, person, deity, or Brahмā.63

This kind of analysis of dhammas yields “in a double way” a categorization of all dhammas into name and form. In all phenomena wherever they appear, both sides of our phenomenology are present and can be noticed.

Further, beyond the twofold phenomenological analysis, there is no composite entity of “being” or “person.” Here he offers the famous logic of the chariot: when analyzing its parts, the conventional usage of language that describes a composite entity of “chariot” is not used. An analytical exercise with a chariot breaks it up into its functional parts: wheel, axle, et cetera. He elaborates the well-known distinction between, on the one hand, the conventional (sammuti) and transactional (vohāra) language that identifies grosser entities—chariots, houses, armies, for example—and, on the
other, the precise analytic language of a further, deeper meaning (*paramattha*) that breaks these down and identifies their constituent parts.

It is not obvious how accurate it would be to take Buddhaghosa’s heuristic usage of “conventional” and “further” (thinking of “*parama*” as “beyond”) to refer to two different “levels” of truth or reality. Unlike some Indian Buddhist traditions that take these to refer to truths or “levels” of truth, Buddhaghosa takes *sammuti* and *paramattha* to refer to two modes of teaching (*katha*) or language (*bhāsa*);\(^{64}\) he does not rank them in their descriptive accuracy. Rather they are used pragmatically by the Buddha according to subject matter and audience. When the Buddha speaks in “such terms as impermanence, suffering, not-self, aggregates, elements, bases, and the foundations of mindfulness [he is giving] teachings in the further sense.”\(^ {65}\) Conventional language is deployed to talk on such subjects as rebirth and karma, shame and apprehension, the four divine abidings, giving people gifts, and other conventions of the world.\(^ {66}\) And they are used according also to audience, as he makes clear with this analogy:

> It is just as a teacher skillful in regional languages commenting on the meaning of the three Vedas ascertains that they [i.e., his audience] know the meaning when spoken in the Tamil language, then speaks to them in the Tamil language. In the case of another language such as the Andhra language, [he speaks] in this or that language. . . . The Lord Buddha is like the teacher, the three established *piṭakas* are like the three Vedas when they are to be discussed, being skilled in conventional and further sense is like being skilled in regional languages.\(^ {67}\)

The distinction is pedagogical. One can indeed proceed from conventional to further meaning (rather than the other way around), but that does not make the conventional erroneous or less true.

With this we can return to the chariot example. Buddhaghosa then says that “seeing correctly is the seeing of one who sees in this way, that from the standpoint of further sense, there is only name and form.”\(^ {68}\) Here the analytically useful language described as *paramattha* is useful for discerning name and form. It is vital for our purpose to note that Buddhaghosa uses the chariot example to then talk of the continuing dynamic of “seeing.” It is all too easy to think that what is going on is that the totalizing metaphysics of which the whole chariot is a metaphor (a unitary self) is dismantled to leave in its place a decomposed metaphysics of chariot parts—whereupon *nāma* and *rūpa* become the labels for those parts. Buddhaghosa’s concern is to sensitize the meditator to the existentially problematic nature of the metaphysical urge. Resist looking for a theory of who you are. What you need is a way of seeing how to not theorize—that is to say, not become “obsessed” (*pariyutt hai*) with “views” (XVIII.30, from the Buddha’s words quoted earlier). In other words, it is not Buddhaghosa’s concern to define the parts but to practice the taking apart, and for that further purpose, the chariot metaphor has its limitations.
Buddhaghosa then goes on to offer a simile: nāmarūpa is like a marionette, a mere “wooden machine, empty, lifeless, motionless, that walks or stands only through the combination of wood and string though it seems to have movement and purpose.” In the context of this analytical exercise described as the paramattha use of language, there is no agentive “person” or “being,” but instead only the complex phenomena described through name and form.

The final exercise in this chapter is to discern how name and form are mutually interdependent. They support one another, and when one falls, the other does, too, like two sheaves of reeds propped up against each other. They can only operate together: name and form are like the cripple and the blind man, who only together have the power to go anywhere. Or, they are like a man in a boat such that both man and boat can cross the sea.

Lastly, the exercise resists assigning any independent status or agency to either name or form, as they are just designations of the mutually supporting dhammas that comprise them:

They do not come to be by their own power
Nor do they stand by their own power
Relying for support on other dhammas
They come to be constructed, powerless in themselves.

Having crafted the meditator’s vision to see the operations of name and form, the chapter’s final tasks are to show their interdependence and to avoid a reification of either of them beyond the phenomena they classify.

Some Comparative Thoughts on the Phenomenology of Nāmarūpa

A well-known line of criticism directed at the Phenomenological tradition accuses it of being in thrall to the search for a transcendental subject, a unitary being that emerges out of the details of experience. This line is well stated in the work of Gilles Deleuze:

In relation to Husserl specifically, Deleuze’s claim is that without the transcendental privilege accorded to the subject . . . there would be no unity. . . . He suggests that phenomenology is a philosophy that conserves a certain essential form, in that “the entire dimension of manifestation is given ready-made, in the position of a transcendental subject, which retains the form of the person, of consciousness, and of subjective identity, and which is satisfied with creating the transcendental out of the characteristics of the empirical.”

Of course, we are not interested in either endorsing or defending the tradition that Deleuze criticizes here. But we can use it to drive home the idea that this cannot be a criticism of the phenomenological methodology tout court. As we have tried to show in this essay, not only is Buddhaghosa’s
interrogation of experience not meant to find a transcendental subject, it is meant precisely to therapeutize the contemplative interrogator from undertaking such a futile search.

If phenomenology is the exploration of the conditions for the possibility of manifestation (how experience shows itself), and those conditions point—one way or another, whether through transcendental reduction (Edmund Husserl) or through radical immanence (Michel Henry)—to the Ego, the transcendental subject, then Buddhaghosa’s methodology of course cannot be phenomenology. Buddhaghosa, in fact, is committed, to take up Zahavi’s phrase about what a phenomenologist supposedly does not do, to “describe the objects as precisely and meticulously as possible,” which he does just in order to come to the conclusion that there is no transcendental subject required (or possible). But Buddhaghosa’s practices are eminently phenomenological. “Phenomenology espouses a rejection of, or at least a withdrawal from, the so-called ‘natural attitude,’ which assumes that there is an outside world and other people. In its place, phenomenology argues that philosophy must attend to experience, and do away with theoretical presuppositions.”

Buddhaghosa’s contemplative practice does indeed suspend the “natural attitude.” But it does so not in order to reject the implicit ontological commitment of that attitude and discover the conditions that permit such attitudes to occur at all; his is not a dialectical relationship with the attitude that is suspended. Instead, his suspension is such as to attain an attitude from which no ontological commitments need be made at all. We could say that he suspends the “unnatural attitude,” too.

Conclusion

When is phenomenology not a Phenomenology? When it folds intentionality and affectivity across each other; when it progresses with an examination of experience that suspends the natural attitude due to a contemplative program, and not due to a thematic concern to determine ontology, and for these reasons arrives at precisely the opposite conclusion to Phenomenology: whereas Phenomenology seeks to determine the transcendental subject through the study of experience, our reading of Buddhaghosa concludes that the study of experience leaves no need for such a subject. And this path, a phenomenological method “all the way down” that Buddhaghosa teaches, requires us to see his utilization of the celebrated classical Indian dyad of nāma and rūpa in his own way.

This argument is not only about how to think of phenomenology as a method for analyzing experience and not as the quest for an ontology of the subject. We have also sought to show that, perhaps more than in much of twentieth-century Western theorization, in Buddhaghosa we find the practical utilization of such a method. This claim is based on a close reading of Buddhaghosa, something that has rarely been attempted in
competing views of him, as we have noted. It would be a welcome
development in the study of Buddhaghosa if other scholars were to offer
further or contrasting interpretations—for example, as that he engaged in
constructing a metaphysical dualism—based on such textual analysis rather
than on an a priori commitment to a picture of abhidhamma and its
interpreters.

Notes

1 – We use the neutral translation of “factor” as a development that
captures better A. K. Warder’s cautious suggestion, “principle,” which
he offers as something that escapes the essentialist implications of
“data,” “elements,” etc., and indicative that dhammā are interrelated,
empty, without self, impermanent. See A. K. Warder, “Dharmas and

2 – Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Introduction,

3 – Dan Zahavi, “Phenomenology and Metaphysics,” in Metaphysics,
Facticity, Interpretation: Phenomenology in the Nordic Countries,
edited by Dan Zahavi, Sara Heinämäa, and Hans Ruin, Contributions
to Phenomenology (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003),
pp. 1–20, at pp. 1–3.

4 – Dan Zahavi, “Michel Henry and the Phenomenology of the Invisible,”

5 – Ibid., p. 224.

6 – Ibid., p. 236. We deploy Henry to express a certain perspective as our
comparative starting point; it would be a different task to debate
Henry’s position. We thank William Edelglass for raising this and other
questions about the Western Phenomenological tradition. We are also
grateful to the Five College Buddhist Studies Seminar for discussing an
earlier version of this essay with us, and to Jay Garfield for his
supportive words.

7 – Ibid., p. 223.

8 – References are in the standardized modern form of “chapter.paragraph.” The text of the Visuddhimagga is from the Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana
collection published by the Vipassana Research Institute, Dhamma
Giri, Igatpuri, India, and available at www.tripitaka.org. Bhikkhu Ṛṣa-
namuḷi’s translation, The Path of Purification (Kandy: Buddhist Publication
Society, 2010 edition) is standard, and we are guided to some extent by
it.


13 – Ibid., p. 50.


16 – Ibid., p. 11.

17 – Ibid., p. 22.


19 – Ibid.

20 – Ibid., pp. 118–119.

21 – Ibid.

22 – Ibid., p. 119.

23 – Ibid., p. 40.

24 – Ibid., p. 117.

25 – Ibid., p. 112, on As 39.

26 – Visuddhimagga VI.19; VI.35; Ronkin, Early Buddhist Metaphysics, pp. 116–117.


29 – See, e.g., the Bahuvedanīya Sutta (M i.396–400).

31 – The entry for “Abhidharma” in The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), p. 4 (there is no separate entry for Abhidhamma as it is included under “Abhidharma”), is typical of the received view: “the abhidharma provided an objective, impersonal, and highly technical description of the specific characteristics of reality and the causal processes governing production and cessation.”

32 – Buddhaghosa says of Abhidhamma that “this is a teaching on distinguishing name and form, for here is taught the distinguishing of name and form that is the opposing of the passions, etc.” (rāgādiṭṭhakhabhūto nāmarūpaparicchdeo ettha kathitoti nāmarūpaparicchedakathāti vuccati) (Smp 22; Sv 1.19; As 21).


36 – Yasmā cassa tena tena kāraṇena tathā tathā pavattetabbattā desanāpi gambhīrā, na tathā sabbāmūtaniññānato añña añnaṃ patiṭṭhāmi labhati (Visuddhimagga XVII.307).

37 – Tattha paṭisandhi viṁñṇāpanti yaṃ bhavantarapaṭisandhānavasena uppannattā paṭisandhīti vuccati, taṃ viṁñṇānaṃ. Okkanti nāmarūpanti ya gabbhe rūpāraṇappadhammānaṃ okkanti āgantvā pavīsanaṃ viya,
idam nāmarūpaṃ. Pasādo āyatanaṇti idam cakkhādipāñcāyatanavasena (Visuddhimagga XVII.295).

38 – Collins, Selfless Persons, p. 212. See also Hamilton, Identity and Experience, p. 128.

39 – pajānanaṭṭhena paññā (Visuddhimagga XIV.3).

40 – tattha nāmarūpaṃ yathāvadassanaṃ diṭṭhisuddhi nāma (Visuddhimagga XVIII.2). The five purifications are: purifying view (diṭṭhisuddhi), purifying by overcoming doubt (kaṅkhāvitarāṇavisuddhi), purifying by knowing and seeing what is and is not the path (maggāmaggaṇānaddassanavisuddhi), purifying by knowing and seeing the way (paṭipadānāṇaddassanavisuddhi), and purifying of knowing and seeing (nāṇādassanavisuddhi) (Visuddhimagga XVIII.2).


43 – Visuddhimagga XVIII.30. Tenāha bhagavā—

Dvīhi, bhikkhave, diṭṭhigatehi pariyoṭṭhitā devamanussā olīyanti eke, atidhāvantī eke, cakkhumanto ca passanti.


“Kathānca, bhikkhave, cakkhumanto passanti? Idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu bhūtam bhūtato passati, bhūtam bhūtato disvā bhūtassa nibbidāya virāgāya nirodīha paṭipanno hoti. Evaṃ kho, bhikkhave, cakkhumanto passantī ti.”


45 – yaṃ kiñci sītādhi ruppanalakkhaṇaṃ dhammājātaṃ sabban taṃ ekato katvā rūpakhandho ti veditabbaṃ.

46 – Avisesena pana salakkhaṇadhāraṇato dukkhādānato dukkhādhānato ca dhātūti.

47 – pathavīdhātu kim lakkhaṇā, kim rasā, kim paccutaṭṭhānāti evam catassopi dhātuyo āvajjetvā pathavīdhātu cakkhaḷattalakkhaṇā, patiṭṭh-


49 – cakkhuviññāṇādīnaṃ anantaraṃ rūpādivijānaṇalakkhaṇā manodhātu.

50 – saḷārmanāṇavijānaṇalakkhaṇā . . . samudiriṇādīkiccā manoviññāṇad-hātū.

51 – vitakkādīni jhānaṅgāni, taṃsampayuttā ca dhammadā lakkhaṇarasādīva-sena pariggahetabbā (Visuddhimagga XVIII.3).

52 – This standard definitional practice is used throughout Buddhaghosa’s work to define dhāmas. Buddhaghosa describes it in Visuddhimagga I.20–22 (and Atthasāliaṃ 84): characteristic (lakkhaṇa), function (rasa), proximate cause (or, more cautiously, immediate occurrence) (padattāhāna), and manifestation (paccupaṭṭhāna); rasa has a specialized sense here to mean work (kicca) or accomplishment (sampatti).

53 – pariggahetvā sabbampetāṃ ārammanābhimukhaṃ namanato namanatṭhena nāmanti vavatthapetabbaṃ (Visuddhimagga XVIII.3).

54 – “Object” for Buddhaghosa is usually “ārammaṇa,” which has the implication of phenomenal object, because its root meaning is support or that which is expedient, i.e., support for the experience of it; he tends not to use less inflected and more common words like “visaya.”


56 – There is a complex range of usages across his writing in Husserl’s use of affectivity. There is a sense in which, since affectivity also contains aboutness, it, too, is intentional. However, insofar as he also has a sense of affectivity as receptivity, as the “being for” or being “open to” incitement, it is not clear to us whether this might not be the “other side” of his account of intentionality. On Husserl’s usages of “affectivity,” see Elizabeth A. Behnke, “Husserl’s Protean Concept of Affectivity: From the Texts to the Phenomena Themselves,” Philosophy
Today, suppl. 52 (2008): 46–53. At any rate, Husserl’s developed notion of affectivity is independent of the notion of objective (or objectivating) intentionality with which we are concerned here. See Matt Bower, “The Affective Revolution in Husserl’s Phenomenology,” https://www.academia.edu/4243965/The_Affective_Revolution_in_Husserl’s_Phenomenology (2013).

57 – Tato yathā nāma puriso antogehe sappāṃ disvā tām anubandhamāno tassa’ āsayaṃ passati, evameva ayampi yogāvacaro tām nāmaṃ upaparikkhanto “idaṃ nāmaṃ kiṃ nissāya pavattatīti pariyesamāno tassa nissayaṃ hadayarūpaṃ passati. Tato hadayarūpassa nissayabhūtāni, bhūtanissitāni ca sesupādāyārupāṇī rūpaṃ pariggaṅhāti. So sabbampetaṃ ruppanato rūpanti vavatthapeti (Visuddhimagga XVIII.4).


59 – Visuddhimagga XVIII.15.

60 – tena dhuranikkhepaṃ akatvā rūpameva punappunām sammasitabbām manasikātabbām pariggaḥetabbāṃ vavatthapetabbāṃ. Yathā yathā hissa rūpaṃ suvikkhālitam hoti nijjaṭham suparisuddham, tathā tathā tadārammaṇā arūpadhammā sayameva pakaṭā honti (Visuddhimagga XVIII.15).

61 – Visuddhimagga XVIII.16.

62 – Ekassa tāva “pathavīdhātu kakkhaḷalakkhanaḥ”tiādinā nayena dhātuyo pariggaḥantassa pathamābhinipāto phasso, taṃsampayuttā vedanā vedanākkhandho . . . upaṭṭhāti (XVIII.19).

63 – Iti atṭhārasa dhātuyo dvādasāyatanāni pañcakkhandhāti sabbepi tehhūmake dhamme khaṅgena samuggaṃ vivaramāno viya yamakatālakan-daṃ phālayamāno viya ca nāmaṇca rūpaṅcāti dvedhā vavatthapeti. Nāmarūpaṃattato uddhaṃ aṅño satto vā puggalo vā devo vā brahmā vā nāttītī niṭṭhāṃ gacchati (Visuddhimagga XVIII.24).

64 – Mp i.94–95; Ps i.137 (cf. Spk ii.77).

65 – Mp i.94–95; Ps i.137 (Cf. Spk ii.77; ItiA 82; KvA 34): aniccaṃ dukkhaṃ anattā khandhā dhātū āyatanāṇi satipaṭṭhānaṃ ti evarūpā paramatthadesanā.

66 – Mp i.95; Ps i.137 (cf. Spk ii.77).

67 – Mp i.95; Ps i.137: yathā hi desabhāsākusalo tiṇṇam vedānaṃ atthasaṃvaṇṇanako ācariyo ye damilabhāsāya ye vutte attham jānanti, tesam damilabhāsāya ācikkhati. Ye andhabhāsādisu aṅnatarāya bhāsāya,
tesaṃ tāya tāya bhāsāya. . . Ācariyo viya buddho bhagavā, tayo vedā viya kathetabbabhāve ōhitāni tīni piṭakāni, desabhāsākosallamiva sammutiparamatthakosallam.

68 – Paramatthato pana nāmarūpamattameva attihīti. Evam passato hi dassanam yathābhūtadassananāma hotī (Visuddhimagga XVIII.28).

69 – Tasmā yathā dāruuyantaṃ suññamāni nījīvaṃ nīrīhakaṃ, atha ca pana dāruurajjukasamāyogavasena gacchatipī tiṭṭhatipī. Sāhakaṃ sabyā-pāraṃ viya khāyati (Visuddhimagga XVIII.31).

70 – Visuddhimagga XVIII.32.

71 – Visuddhimagga XVIII.34.

72 – Na sakena balena jāyare, Nopi sakena balena tiaṃ, atha ca pana dāruurajjukasamāyogavasena gacchatipī tiṭṭha (Visuddhimagga XVIII.36).


74 – Ibid., p. 227.