

(Tentative [and revised]) schedule.**Week 1 (T 9/07 & Th 9/9) Two routes to doubt.**

Sher, G. [2001] "But I Could Be Wrong" in *Social Philosophy and Policy*, Summer volume.

Week 2 (T 9/14 & Th 9/16) First Route: Disagreement.

van Inwagen, P. [1996] "It is Wrong, Always, Everywhere, and for Anyone, to Believe Anything, Upon Insufficient Evidence" in *Faith, Freedom, and Rationality*, Jordan and Howard-Snyder (eds.), Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD

Feldman, R. [2006] "Epistemological puzzles about disagreement" in S. Hetherington (ed.) *Epistemology Futures*, Oxford University Press.

Week 3 (T 9/21& Th 9/23) Reasonable Disagreements?

Feldman continued.

White, R. [2005] "Epistemic Permissiveness" in *Philosophical Perspectives*, Vol. 19, 445-459.

Week 4 (T 9/28 & Th 9/30)

Kelly, T. [2005] "The epistemic significance of disagreement" in J. Hawthorne and T. Gendler (eds.), *Oxford Studies in Epistemology*, vol. 1. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Week 5 (T 10/05 & Th 10/07) Conciliationism vs. Non-Conciliationism

Elga, A. [2007] "Reflection and Disagreement" in *Nous*, 41(3): 478–502.

Christensen, D. [2007] "Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News", *Philosophical Review* 116, 187-217

Week 6 (T 10/12—No Class & Th 10/14)

Christensen & Elga continued.

Week 7 (T 10/19 & Th 10/21)

Kelly, T. [forthcoming] "Peer disagreement and higher order evidence" in R. Feldman and F. Warfield (eds.), *Disagreement*, Oxford University Press.