Economics 58 Fall 2009

Problem Set # 10

Due 11/20/09

- **1**. Text Problem 14.6
- **2.** Text Problem 14.10

3. Monopolist as a Price Setter

Many of the results from the standard theory of monopoly can be more easily derived by treating the monopoly as a price-setter. This problem illustrates how to develop such a model.

a. Suppose the monopoly faces a demand function of the form q = D(p) where D' < 0, but the sign of D'' may be either positive (convex demand) or negative (concave demand). In this case, the monopolist's profits can be written as $\pi(p) = pD(p) - C[D(p)]$. What is the first order condition for a profit maximum in this case?

b. Manipulate your result from part a to show it is equivalent to the usual MR = MC rule.

c. The second order conditions for a profit maximum are complex but informative in this formulation of the monopoly problem. What are these second order conditions? Show that they depend on the sign of D''(p). Show that, if demand is concave (D'' < 0), these second order conditions are satisfied. But when demand is convex (the way we usually draw demand curves, D'' > 0) the situation is ambiguous.

d. Show that these second order conditions hold for a linear demand function.

e. Show that if demand takes the constant elasticity formulation $D(p) = p^e$ these second order conditions will definitely hold if e < -1 (that is, if demand is elastic).

(Problem 4 on next page)

4. **Subsidizing a Monopoly** (A revision of problem 14.8)

The distortionary effects of a monopoly can be reduced by subsidizing the purchase of its output.

a. Explain in intuitive terms why this might work.

b. Suppose the government instituted a unit subsidy on the monopoly's output of t per unit. Write out the monopolist's profit-maximization problem in this case and solve for the first-order condition for a maximum. (Hint: Use the price-setting model from Problem 3 by setting the price demanders pay to p-t)

c. Suppose that the government wishes this product to be priced efficiently in the sense that p-t = MC. Show that this requires t = -D(p-t)/D'(p-t). (Hint: to show this you will have to add and subtract a term of tD'(p-t) in the first order condition)

d. Use your results from part c to show that this optimal *t* can be computed as $t = -\frac{MC}{e}$ where *e* is the price elasticity of demand evaluated at p - t.