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Development of the Revolution: First Phase January 10–February 18

By means of the events of January 9/22, 1905, Tsar Nicholas has revealed himself as the enemy and butcher of the people. We will say no more about him, nor shall we speak to him henceforth. . . .

Yesterday there were still divisions and parties. Today the Russian liberation movement must have one body and one soul, one unifying thought: retribution and freedom at all costs. . . .

It is impossible to live thus any longer. The annals of the autocratic oppression . . . must be brought to a close.

—Editorial by Peter Struve (leading member of the Union of Liberation and editor of its organ), *Osvobozhdenie,* January 12/25, 1905.

At present Russia is in a grievous situation, unprecedented in her history, the consequences of which cannot be predicted. Your majesty is the autocratic tsar of the Russian land, and autocracy must be unassailable, resting on a base so firm that no developments can shake it. . . .

—Report by Alexis Ermolov (Minister of Agriculture) to Nicholas II, January 17, 1905.

After January 9, the liberation movement could count on far greater support and more favorable conditions for expansion and action than ever before. While shock and repulsion were fresh, the public readily accepted a distorted interpretation of Bloody Sunday which went beyond fact, that the government had been callous and clumsy in dealing with the St. Petersburg strikers, and accused the government of premeditated cruelty. The Tsar, his uncle the Grand Duke Vladimir, the ministers, the police, and the higher army officers were believed to have deliberately enticed a mass of strikers, led by a Judas goat (Father Gapon), into a murderous trap in order to teach them that organized opposition was futile and suicidal. This version, later known to be based on exaggerations and misstatements, was eagerly accepted by the opposition, for it fitted the antigovernment conception of the nature of autocracy and was consistent with the facts then known to the public. It was a version that proved to be a most useful weapon of propaganda, for the government not only failed to discredit it but also unwittingly reinforced it by subsequent actions that seemed to make it more credible.

Nationwide Protest

The people of St. Petersburg led the reaction to Bloody Sunday for the quite obvious reason that the events had occurred there and for the less obvious, but more important, reasons that the workers of the capital were more restive than those in other cities and that organized opposition was stronger there.

On Monday, January 10, the city had the appearance of an embattled area where hostile forces were between encounters. Everywhere there were troops and police with orders to prevent demonstrations and to protect government property. On horseback, they patrolled the streets, ready and sometimes eager to use *nagaika* or sword; and on foot, they guarded railway terminals, imperial palaces, and government buildings. The usually busy Nevsky Prospekt appeared desolate, for most of the stores were closed and shuttered. Yet on it, as on other streets, many citizens were in evidence, hurrying to meetings, gathering confederates for some undertaking in response to yesterday's events, or simply exchanging rumors, of which there were scores—e.g., that the Tsar was hiding at Gatchina in fear for his life and that Tsarina Alexandra and her children were preparing to flee to safety. Despite the number of

people about, there was little disorder. What there was—jeering at soldiers and police or throwing stones—came mainly from small groups of Putilov men, some mettlesome students, and a scattering of common rowdies.

There were a few instances of alarm caused by sizeable crowds, but no serious trouble developed from them. At the Preobrazhensky Cemetery, where the previous day's dead had been hurriedly buried in a common grave, a hostile crowd of several thousands, attempting to reopen the grave, were driven off by troops. And around the Alexandrovsky Hospital, where the wounded were being treated, a thousand or so persons gathered to wait for bulletins; but this was one crowd that the troops wisely chose to ignore. In the evening, at the Alexandra Theater, a member of the Free Economic Society abetted by two students used the first intermission to remind those present that this was not the time for entertainment, but for mourning. Their sentiments were applauded by the audience who, with little hesitation, donned their wraps and streamed out of the building, leaving the management no alternative but to suspend the performance.

Immediate and spontaneous actions such as these, however, did not indicate the depth to which the people of the capital had been stirred. More truly indicative were the spread of the strike among industrial workers and the simultaneous spread of what may be called a strike among the educated class, both generally peaceful but openly defiant. They represented opposition that was not only increasing but also becoming more receptive to the idea of organized protest.

The original strikers, whose demands were still being stubbornly denied by those in charge of the industrial establishments involved, announced their continued refusal to work after Bloody Sunday. And they were now being joined by workers from many plants and factories that had been operating up to this time—among them, the important gas works and one of the electric power stations.

Soon St. Petersburg was the scene of an unprecedented demonstration of popular protest as thousands of students and members of the professions added strength to the antigovernment forces by declaring their solidarity with the strikers, denouncing the recent official acts, making statements of the incompatibility of their own situations with the existing autocratic regime, and giving united support to demands for change. At the University, some five thousand students, with the support of most of the faculty, went on strike, refusing to participate in any academic work and demanding that the government call a constituent assembly. Students of the Institute of Ways and Communications declared their support of the industrial strikers and collected funds to help them. At both the University and the Polytechnic Institute, professors, hitherto generally aloof from the liberation movement, now spoke up *en masse*, declaring that the continuation of the autocratic regime made normal academic life impossible. Lawyers indicated their cooperation with the opposition by refusing to appear in court and by issuing a formal protest against the "pitiless hand of the government." Medical, legal, pedagogical, and agricultural societies denounced the government and called for a constituent assembly. The Merchants Club barred its doors to guards officers because of the part they had taken in the events of Bloody Sunday. The Manufacturers Association voted to give financial aid to the families of the victims, to refrain from any punitive action against the strikers, and to demand political reforms. An outstanding, and perhaps the most effective, action in stirring the educated to a sense of the urgent need for change was that of sixteen members of the august Academy of Sciences, who made a public declaration of their belief that developments had created the necessity for a change in government. They were joined by 326 eminent university professors and lecturers, and the group circulated the document that came to be called the "Statement of the 342," in which it was affirmed that Russia would enjoy the benefits of education only after "freely elected representatives of the people are given the power to make laws and keep a check on the administration." And that position was immediately endorsed by 1,200 of the country's most noted scholars. By publicizing these activities and declarations of the educated class, the press added to their worth as


MOSCOW IN 1905
SOKOLNIKI PARK
BASMANNY DISTRICT
SURVEYING INSTITUTE
PRESNYA DISTRICT
MOSCOW UNIVERSITY
ROGOZHKO-SIMONOVSKOI DISTRICT
MOSCOW RIVER
MOSCOW RIVER

propaganda for the opposition. In addition, most of the city's newspapers joined editorially in the growing demand for the convocation of an elected national assembly.

The displays of protest initiated in St. Petersburg were duplicated throughout the country. Moscow was the first to follow; strikes began there on the 10th. On the 11th there were strikes in Warsaw, Kharkov, Vilna, Kovno, and Helsingfors; on the 12th, in Riga, Kiev, Voronezh, Mogilev, Libau, and Saratov; on the 13th, in Lodz, Mitau, Perm, Minsk, and Smorgon; on the 14th, on the Moscow-to-Brest Railroad; on the 16th, in Borisov; on the 17th, in Batum, Ekaterinoslav, Brest, Grodno, and Bialystok; on the 18th, in Tiflis and Samara; on the 19th, in Narva and Czestochowa; on the 20th, in Kazan. And so it went—in all, nearly 500,000 workers were out on strike in January—more than the combined number of strikers for the decade from 1894 to 1904.

More difficult to enumerate were the tens of thousands of students, professors, journalists, lawyers, doctors, merchants, and manufacturers who, in one way or another, expressed their oneness with those who had spoken up in St. Petersburg. At the University of Moscow, a move to strike was supported by 2,635 of the students and opposed by only 102. Students of other Moscow higher schools, among them the Engineering School, the Agricultural Institute, the Teachers Institute, and the Women's Higher Courses, voted to strike. And their example was followed throughout Russia as students of universities and other higher schools went on strike, demanding reforms; often they were joined by the entire student bodies of secondary schools. Faculties also, following the St. Petersburg precedent, promptly and without reserve denounced the autocratic regime as an obstacle to normal academic life.

This collective protest from the educated class was both more inclusive and more defiant than the record-setting one of a month earlier. Now their demands were often supplemented by direct and personal denunciations of officials, regardless of the fact that, in many cases, their own freedom of action and their positions were subject to the discretion of the government. Scholars even dared to repudiate such men as the Grand Duke Constantine, President of the Academy of Sciences, who had reminded them that professors were government employees whose duties did not include the fomenting of unrest. In almost every city, such calculated defiance was flaunted openly and given wide dissemination by the press.

In various parts of the country, strong expressions of disapprobation came also from organizations with legally recognized political status. Assemblies of nobility, zemstvos, and municipal dumas now issued forceful statements of protest and added their demands for reforms more thoroughgoing than those they had felt necessary in November and December of the previous year. They were in general agreement that the bureaucracy had so discredited itself and so subverted the people's confidence in the government that it had become imperative to summon a representative assembly through which the people could participate in reforming Russia. A conspicuous exception to this chorus of disapproval was provided by the Moscow provincial assembly of nobles, which had a strong conservative wing including, among other high officials, nearly half of the governors of Russia. After bitter debate over the position the assembly should take in its address to the Tsar concerning the current situation, on January 22 it brought to vote two statements. One, conservative in tone and expressing continued loyalty to the throne but no wish for reform, was supported by such men as the brothers Alexander and Fedor Samarin; the other, liberal in tone and calling for representative government, was supported by prominent liberal figures—among them, Prince P. D. Dolgorukov, Prince Sergei Trubetskoi, Fedor Kokoshkin, and Vasily Maklakov. The conservative statement was adopted by a vote of 219 to 147. But many who voted for it as an expression of loyalty voted also for the liberal statement as an expression of their opinion. Naturally such equivocal indications of progovernment sentiment made little impression on the public mind. This one was unfavorably received even in the conservative press.

Compared to this swell of response, that which had followed the issuance of the Eleven Theses of the zemstvo congress had been a mere ripple. Yet even this, for all its clamor and vituperation, was far from an armed uprising. The strikes and other manifestations were generally peaceful in the interior

provinces because, on the one hand, there was little inclination to violence on the part of the opposition and, on the other, the authorities were under orders to prevent any public mass activity from which violence would be liable to develop.

There were, of course, some exceptions to this rule of nonviolence in the interior. One of them occurred in Saratov, where the potentially strong following of the Socialist Revolutionary Party had been held in check by a strong governor, Peter Stolypin. The strike movement which began there on January 12 was at once recognized as being of a more determined and savage temper than was usual elsewhere. Factory workers, joined by railwaymen, government employees, and professionals, went in throngs from place to place, calling out additional workers and displaying their animus against authority by stoning Cossacks whenever they appeared. They marched through the streets shouting demands for a constituent assembly and the end of the war. At the height of their boldness, they attempted to seize the railroad stations and were deterred only by direct threat of armed force. Their tempestuousness reached even the schools and, within three days, the pupils of several secondary schools had quit their classrooms to add to the general disturbance. Some of them clashed with patrolling Cossacks when their attempts to enter and disrupt schools in session were thwarted. The strikers planned to climax their activity by a major march, on the fourth day, to the center of the city. Believing, from Stolypin's record, that he would stop such a demonstration, a deputation from the Saratov municipal duma and the zemstvo of Saratov province entreated him not to take steps that would inflict on the city a repetition of Bloody Sunday. His answer was both brief and direct—he would not permit revolutionary acts, and he would shed blood if necessary. He at once called in additional troops, and that affirmation of intention served him well. The presence of extra force proved sufficient, on the day of the march, to convince the three thousand participating workers and *intelligents* that the alternatives were battle or retreat; and they chose retreat, though some of them had provided themselves with arms and apparently had intended to use them.

Another display of unruly protest was made at the Kiev Polytechnical Institute, where the student body was known to be under Socialist Revolutionary influence. One of their meetings, at which they had voted to suspend studies in order to participate in the "imminent revolution," was interrupted by the arrival of troops and police to arrest their leaders; and, in defiance, they barred the doors, broke up school furnishings and, from the windows, hurled pieces at the forces of authority. Quickly subdued, they would all have been taken into custody but for the intervention of faculty members, who solicited official intervention on their behalf and arranged permission for them to leave the building unpunished.

Violence as a form of protest was much more common in the Russian borderlands than in the interior. In the Baltic provinces, Finland, Congress Poland, and Transcaucasia, where political dissatisfaction was being added to persistent nationalist feelings and economic discontent, outbursts were particularly easy to provoke.

Riga was the trouble center in the Baltic area. The strike movement that began there on January 12 rapidly became a general strike so widely supported that, on the second day, the participants confidently undertook a mass demonstration. Nearly fifteen thousand workers and *intelligents*—Letts, Russians, Jews, Estonians, and Germans—many armed with pistols, marched through the streets in defiance of the forces mustered to oppose them. The results were tragic. A few shots fired by the marchers were answered by concerted fire from the police and soldiers, and some of the demonstrators were killed on the spot. The others, fleeing for their lives, dashed onto the ice-covered Dvina River; and there, as the ordinarily safe ice gave way in places, some died by drowning. In all, according to the official record, seventy civilians were killed, and eight soldiers and policemen were wounded. Thus January 13 became, for the Baltic provinces, the counterpart of Bloody Sunday and the beginning of a period of turbulence and violence unmatched in any other part of the country.

In Congress Poland the strike movement spread from Warsaw and Lodz to virtually every city of its ten provinces, accompanied everywhere by fierce nationalism and violence.

Strikers and their supporters not only stoned soldiers and policemen, but also occasionally fired at them. They made forcible entries into stores and defied authorities in various ways, some of them personally threatening (in Lodz, for example, they held the governor captive in a hotel until he could be rescued by armed forces). In secondary and higher schools, pupils demonstratively demanded the restoration of Polish as the language of instruction and the employment of Polish rather than Russian teachers—often reinforcing their demands with the cry "Down with the *Moskaly*!" (a contemptuous denunciation of Muscovites). Though Congress Poland was not in open revolt, it was so evidently near revolt that the authorities, as a precautionary measure, called for substantial additions to the 250,000 troops already immediately available to them.[1]

Tiflis, the administrative and economic center of Transcaucasia, was the focal point of unrest in that area. The railroadmen were the first to go on strike, on the 18th, and they were followed by workers in other occupations. On the 23rd, thousands of strikers, carrying red flags and shouting "Down with autocracy!" marched through the streets and engaged patrols in desultory fighting. Similar demonstrations occurred in Batum, Sukhum, Baku, Kutais, and other Transcaucasian cities as strikes spread and nationalism flared anew. In Baku, barely recovered from the December strike, the revolutionary mood was particularly threatening, and the local police grew steadily more apprehensive about it. One of the most serious disturbances was in a rural area, Ozurgetsky district of Kutaisk province, where the peasantry had for some time been on the verge of rebellion. Now, led by neighbors who had returned from Batum (exiled from the city to their native homes because of participation in factory strikes), the peasants took to arms, destroying administrative offices of the villages and driving panicky officials to flight. So effective was this outburst

[1] It had long been the practice of the Russian military command to maintain a major part of the standing army in Congress Poland for speedy use in the event of war on the western boundary. These troops could, of course, be used also to deal with internal disorders.

that the administration was completely demoralized, and officials did not return to their duties for nearly a year.

Another locality affected by peasant disorder was Eversmuizhskoi volost[2] of Vitebsk province, where there was a distinctly agrarian incident of some note, brief but important as an indication of what concerned the peasantry at this time. It took place at the volost offices, where the entire male peasant population (about five hundred in number) appeared, many of them with weapons, on January 15 to demand 1) the dismissal of the local officials, 2) an auditing of the moneys the officials had handled, and 3) the publication of the real Emancipation Manifesto of 1861 (many peasants believed that the real manifesto had been kept from them), which would prove their right to cut the landlords' timber without payment. They supplemented their demands by the declaration that, whether or not the manifesto were produced, they would begin to cut the timber within two days. The reply of authority to their daring was the usual one—troops arrived to prevent the threatened act and remained until all was quiet again.

These displays of rebelliousness by the peasants in the Kutaisk and Vitebsk provinces were among the very few of their kind during January. Throughout the country, most of the peasantry remained—or seemed to remain—immune to the effects of urban disturbances. Occasionally governors reported that peasants, influenced by rumors, were becoming edgy; but generally they reported nothing untoward in their behavior.

While the movement initiated by the industrial strikers was gaining wide and enthusiastic support from other disaffected groups and even a bit of notice from some of the peasants, the original strikers were finding their personal situations worsening. Industrial management, on the whole, flatly refused to agree to labor's demands. And since the strikers had hardly any funds of their own and had been spreading very thin the amount collected for them by Liberationists and others, they were forced to limit the term of their refusal to work. In St. Petersburg, the return to work began on the 14th and by the

[2] Volost: an administrative unit consisting of a number of villages.

18th was almost complete. Elsewhere the end of the industrial strike came a week or so later. Nevertheless, from the point of view of the opposition, the strikes had not been in vain. The spirit of resentment endured among the workers, and they remained ready to go on strike again when they could afford to do so.

The few revolutionaries who had reacted to Bloody Sunday with the expectation of an immediate armed uprising that would topple the regime were disappointed. But the majority of the Liberationists understood that, in this test of positions, the opposition had gained strength despite the fact that the old regime was still in power (only in Ozurgetsky district was authority broken) and continued to function: the government had not capitulated, but it had been frightened; the revolution had not been realized, but it had undoubtedly begun.

Enduring Effects of Bloody Sunday

Bloody Sunday served as a powerful catalyst that speeded up the tempo of psychological change. It heightened animosity, strengthened faith in the possibility of change, encouraged greater daring in the conception of what could be changed. And the explosion of discontent and anger that it had touched off had a cumulative effect: strikes among workers of one occupation or in one plant encouraged strikes among workers of other occupations or in other plants; mass labor strikes encouraged the liberation movement to greater boldness against the government; and, in time, the knowledge that the government had been challenged and had shown some weakness would encourage peasants to take a strong stand against the landlords. In a country as seriously beset by problems as Russia was in 1905, a loss of faith in the good will of the government and a decline in fear or respect for its authority could not be regarded lightly.

One of the most prominent changes taking place at this time was to be observed among the workers. Russian labor did not become revolutionary overnight; but after January, 1905,

it was no longer an unorganized mass, restive but irresolute, and hostile to all ideas of political change. Now it began to organize, to show less reticence about striking, and to move—albeit slowly—toward support of the liberation movement. What happened among the Putilov workers of St. Petersburg after January 9 was, in many ways, typical of what was happening among all workers. Some of them continued to adhere to the Gapon ideal of a kind of Christian monarchist trade-unionism, but their number gradually decreased; some—and their number increased—became receptive to socialist (particularly Social Democratic) propaganda, which placed the revolutionary establishment of a democratic republic ahead of the achievement of economic benefits; and others—by far the largest number—were primarily concerned with continuing the fight for economic betterment, indifferent to the form that the struggle should take but determined that it not be abandoned. Putilov workers were perhaps more militant than other St. Petersburg workers; and the city as a whole was certainly more militant than other cities, with the exception of Warsaw and Lodz. But, generally speaking, developments in the capital were a rough pattern for the rest of the country. Labor was primarily concerned with economic improvement: achievement of the eight-hour day, improvement in sanitary and medical facilities, higher wages, abolition of overtime and the system of fines, recognition of the right to bargain collectively, pensions, and free primary schooling for their children. And to the extent that their aims were economic in nature, they were engaged in a struggle with their employers, not with the government.

The position of management in its relation to labor was one of the peculiar anomalies of 1905: though it resisted as long as possible the workers' economic demands, it supported their political demands. And, as labor manifested increasingly political tendencies, factory owners often found themselves having to oppose one phase of a strike while supporting another. This split-sympathy had developed from the belief common among industrialists that the government too often tried to solve the labor problem and win good will among the workers at the direct expense of management by requiring, on

occasion, wage increases and shorter working hours, or at the indirect expense of management by unfortunate experiments in "police socialism"—of which the Gapon Assembly had been the most unfortunate. The industrialists took the position that both they and labor would benefit from expanded political and civil rights: they would have a greater voice in government, and labor would be less given to agitation. Insofar as the workers sought political change, therefore, management wanted to help them. Yet labor, for all its new-found boldness, hesitated to trust the good will of employers in any respect, just as it hesitated to give up all of its hostility toward the intelligentsia.

Among all those to whom Bloody Sunday brought a change in outlook, the educated class was the most outspoken and, hence, apparently the most active. Though deploring the manner in which confirmation had come to their point of view, they could not but be enthusiastic about the improved prospects. Their worst suspicions of government had been sustained, and the imperative need for the political reforms they had urged in the Eleven Theses and in the program of the Union of Liberation had been made clearer than ever. And now their cause was deluged with openly active champions. In January almost every institution of higher learning was on strike or had been closed by the authorities as a precautionary measure. During the remainder of 1905 higher education was almost totally neglected; and, while the majority of professors remained firmly liberal but far from radical in their expressions of opposition, the students threw themselves wholeheartedly into the thick of demonstrative activity for the liberation movement. They prepared illegal political literature and distributed it, and they became the most energetic of agitators—among workers, soldiers, and occasionally peasants.

As might be expected, the atmosphere of the January days was maintained among the national minorities with very little effort. On the whole, they needed less convincing of the need for change than did the people of European Russia, and they reacted eagerly to the opportunity for activity conducive to change. Most of the minority groups were still willing to make common cause with the liberation movement in the belief

that the first aim of all should be the achievement of political liberty—without which, they knew, it would be impossible to improve their own positions. Consequently they tended to cooperate among themselves and with their Russian counterparts. In many cities joint action and common tactics were adopted—as in Vilna, where the Social Democrats, the PPS, the Polish Social Democratic Party, and the Bund worked together quite effectively. Not all association, however, either within or among minority parties was agreeable. Internal discord, such as that between the right and left wings of the PPS and that between the so-called "old" and "new" factions of the Armenian Dashnyak Party, expressed itself now and again. Also there were some instances of jurisdictional disputes; for instance, the PPS claimed to represent all the workers of Congress Poland and resented the Bund activities in that area, while the Bund in turn resented the activities of the recently formed Socialist Zionist Party in its sphere. Nevertheless the feeling for a common front was stronger than any divisive feeling.

At the same time there was a steady increase in the number affected by nationalistic sentiments within the minority groups having a traditionally strong national consciousness, notably the Poles, Armenians, Jews, Finns, and Georgians. Though there were still many Russified persons in these groups (particularly among the Jews, Georgians, and Armenians) who were indifferent or antipathetic to nationalistic ideas, their positions were being more frequently challenged than ever before. Those peoples who had hitherto given little evidence of a sense of national identity (Letts, Estonians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, White Russians, and Moslems of various ethnic groups) now began gradually to become nationality-conscious also, and soon they were establishing separate organizations and using their own language in publications.

Whether or not these various changes in moods, opinions, and attitudes would effect any change in the basic social and political structure of the country had yet to be determined. Much, of course, depended on what the opposition could and would do in order to compel change and on what the government could or would do to stop the further growth of the

opposition. Furthermore, events as yet unforeseeable might tip the balance: another event like Bloody Sunday might be sufficient to topple the government, and a decisive victory in Manchuria might disconcert the opposition.

On the face of it, the opposition now had a heaven-sent opportunity to take the initiative. The socialists, in particular, had been given just what they had sought for years: an aroused working class. Yet they were not prepared to take the lead and direct the opposition. They lacked adequate organization, being divided over tactics and goals as in the past, and they were still far from having the confidence of the masses. Bloody Sunday and the subsequent strikes found the major socialist leaders abroad, most of them in Geneva. They were exhilarated by the news from Russia, feeling that they were on the eve of the long-awaited revolution. They sang revolutionary songs and talked glowingly of a coming armed rising against autocracy. Lenin even began an intensive study of street fighting methods. But, with few exceptions, they remained where they were (Trotsky, with a false passport, was one of the small number to leave at once for Russia), continuing to argue politics but supplying little leadership. It was impossible to lead from abroad; yet they understood that, even if they chose to return to Russia, it was unlikely that many of them, as well known to the police as they were, could remain at liberty very long in Russia or that they could even maintain a well-organized underground organization there. Moreover, in the final analysis, the heads of the socialist movement did not realize the nearness of the revolution and therefore saw no reason to divert their most serious attention from internal party problems. Many months passed before either the SR's or the SD's produced clear statements of their immediate plans.

For these reasons the socialist movement within Russia in January, 1905 operated, not as a unified army with a defined strategy, but as a number of isolated guerilla detachments acting in accordance with their own understanding of the program and aims of their parties. Most of them felt that, at this time, they could function best as part of the liberation movement, dedicating themselves to the overthrow of the regime

and the convocation of a constituent assembly; after that, they would pursue a policy aimed at the development of a socialist society. Recognizing the strike movement as a major weapon, they attempted to organize socialist circles in factories, tried to win over leading workers, and called for more strikes. They quadrupled the output of their illegal printing presses and distributed thousands of leaflets asserting their militancy:

> Down with the Tsar-murderer!
> Down with autocracy!
> Long live social democracy!
> Long live the constituent assembly!
> Long live the revolution!

They made an extensive effort to propagandize among the armed forces. More often than not their representatives (usually students) among the soldiers would be set upon with cries of "Traitor!" or "*Zhidy*!" (*Kikes*, a term of insult to Jews). But here and there—among the personnel of units in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Odessa, and Kiev, on some ships of the Black Sea Fleet, and at various naval bases—they found men who were willing to accept and read their leaflets and, among them, some who could be persuaded to accept their views. They tried also to organize street demonstrations but, during the disturbed January days, the police were usually too alert for them. Some busied themselves with collecting revolvers for the hoped-for armed rising. A few, chiefly among the SR's and the PPS's, planned and committed acts of terror. But at every point, the going was slow, and it was clear that the socialists would not have a commanding status in the opposition until their influence had grown and their present efforts had been given time to bear fruit.

The liberals, on the other hand, were in a good tactical position. They were better organized to take advantage of the growing mood of disaffection, and they were in the midst of a political campaign that was definitely accelerated by recent events. January 9 provided them—as well as others of the opposition—with a gory shirt to wave, a specific indictment of tsarism with which to vivify and dramatize their struggle. They could now argue that they had been proved right in

their diagnosis of what ailed Russia, and they could expect therefore greater confidence in their ability to achieve for the country what it needed. The theme of the liberation movement from now on was well expressed in part of the statement issued, shortly before their arrest on January 10, by the ten men who had sought to persuade the government to permit the Sunday march:

> We can no longer be patient with such a state of affairs; We invite all the citizens of Russia to an immediate and relentless and peaceful struggle with autocracy.[3]

This was not a new theme, to be sure. But that fact, in itself, is noteworthy: it is evidence that the liberals were not straying thoughtlessly from previous positions nor being stampeded into revolutionary actions. What was new—and noteworthy—was the mood in which the liberation movement was now working. It was a mood of intransigent defiance that benefited the Liberationists at the expense of the Shipov liberals. It was encouraged by the rapid growth of the liberal following, the growing support for liberal political aims, the mass labor strikes with political implications, and the immediate and bitter international revulsion expressed through antitsarist demonstrations and protests in England, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Sweden, France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, United States, Argentina, and Uruguay. In addition, the strong feeling of camaraderie and unity now evident throughout the opposition strengthened the Liberationists, for they were the most nearly prepared to give the needed leadership.

That this "oneness" of feeling affected so many was of major advantage to the opposition, keeping its forces in line with the theme of the liberation movement when its strength might otherwise have been dissipated. A participant in the events of 1905, the liberal leader Vasily Maklakov, later made this analysis of the general situation:

> Thus there was organized in the year 1905 a common front, from the revolutionary to the conservative strata of our society. There could be no common point of view in this camp. But on one point they all agreed: *that to continue as before was impossible.*[4]

[3] Akademiya Nauk, SSSR, *Nachalo Pervoi Russkoi Revolyutsii,* p. 88.

It was this common point of agreement, extending both to the right of the Liberationists (among erstwhile conservatives) and to their left (among revolutionaries) that, at this time, led workers increasingly to support the Liberationist call for a constituent assembly, industrialists to support the workers' political strikes, liberals to support the eight-hour day and collect funds for strikers, socialists to appear on the same platform as liberals and the two groups often to work in the same organization. "Divisions and parties" continued to exist, but Russians in greater numbers than ever before imaginable were admitting comradeship in a common struggle. "Liberty and representative government" was their unifying slogan, the *Marseillaise* their marching song. By the end of January, even the doggedly monarchist and conservative *Novoe Vremya* was impelled to call for a *zemsky sobor* (an elected assembly).

Regardless of their fraternization with groups of basically differing views, the liberals continued to emphasize peaceful struggle—political banquets, petitions, and nonviolent acts of defiance. They approved the methods of lawyers who displayed their contempt for the government by refusing to participate in court proceedings; of professors who made public declarations of their beliefs in the need for political change; of students who protested by refusing to attend lectures or take examinations, even by desisting from "all cultural work" (as did University of Moscow students); of any group that undertook to protest or demonstrate against the regime without intent to injure either persons or property.

Official Measures of Reaction

The advantages that could be claimed by the opposition at this time, numerous as they were, stopped short of the ability to compel the government to make any of the demanded changes. Power was still in the hands of the Tsar, and the de-

[4] V. Maklakov, *Vlast i Obshchestvennost* (Paris, 1936), II, 352.

cision about immediately succeeding courses of action would be his. What he decided would depend on his interpretation of the causes and consequences of Bloody Sunday and his judgment of the relative importance of the various steps to be taken in the readjustment now required. It went without saying that he would continue to give priority to the reestablishment and preservation of order, that being the first business of any state and having exceptional importance in the Russian autocracy, the embodiment of absolute power. Concern for order at this time, however, did not imply fear of revolution, only normal sensitivity about the prestige of throne and country. Russian prestige had just been subjected to severe impairment, first by the setbacks at the hands of the Japanese, then by the continuing pressure at the hands of the Tsar's own subjects.

It might have occurred to some rulers, in a situation of this kind, that the most direct method of restoring order could be determined by giving immediate attention to some of the current demands of his people. But Russian tsars were no more accustomed to recognizing impertinent demands for reform than to negotiating with strikers. Nicholas' grandfather, Tsar Alexander II, had imprisoned a group of nobles who had called for a national legislative assembly and directed that they be sentenced to confinement in an insane asylum. Nicholas himself, less than a month before Bloody Sunday, had instructed his subjects (in connection with his ukase) to mind their own affairs. At this time, however, he could not overlook the fact that his instruction had failed to prevent illegal strikes among the workers and verbal abuse from almost every direction. Since he believed that most of these acts of disobedience and all of the violence had been provoked by the revolutionaries, he decided that the first task of the government was to reassert its control with such firmness that the revolutionaries would be warned off. His understanding of the revolutionaries was as fuzzy and distorted as was the opposition's understanding of what went on in his mind.

The regimen of firmness was begun on the day after Bloody Sunday, when General Dmitri Trepov was given the assignment to restore order in St. Petersburg and its environs, using

the special power vested in him as governor-general of the city and province of St. Petersburg (a newly created and temporary post). Trepov had been Chief of Police in Moscow for the past nine years, serving under the Grand Duke Sergei, who was then governor-general of the Moscow province. He was known as an uncompromising and exacting man, quite unlike Prefect Fullon, who was now being relegated to an undemanding military command. And he was nowise intimidated by the oppositional abuse heaped upon him when he was given unusual imperial favors, including quarters in the Winter Palace, or when, two days after his selection, the capital was placed under martial law and he was given extraordinary powers. He began promptly his task of restoring order according to the plan approved by the Tsar, putting under arrest those who were known to be agitating for revolution as well as many suspected of connection with such activity. In and about the city, troops and police, by his order, broke up all known attempts to hold public meetings or demonstrations. Within a few days there was no question that his steps had been effective and that the government was in physical control of the city and the surrounding area. Military patrols were removed and, as the strikes came to an end, the local situation seemed to be normal again.

Official Efforts at Conciliation

The Tsar was aware that police and military action were not enough to remove the effects of January 9. But the public could not know his mind and were predisposed to be suspicious of whatever he did. On January 15, he replaced Svyatopolk-Mirsky, long anxious to escape from his post, by Alexander Bulygin; and the public's interpretation of this appointment agreed with that of the French Ambassador, M. Bompard: "The era of liberalism that had barely opened is already closed."[5] In fact, there was much to support the idea that the inclinations of Bulygin would be directly opposed

[5] Bompard to Delcassé, January 15/28, 1905, French Foreign Office Archives, Russie, Politique Intérieure, I.

to those of Svyatopolk-Mirsky, the harbinger of the political "spring." He was a conservative nobleman who, like Trepov, had served in Moscow under the Grand Duke Sergei, and he had only recently been elevated to the governor-generalship that Sergei had resigned. Though not given to authoritarian manners, he was likely to be judged by members of the liberation movement as a representative of inimical authority, for he had consistently opposed their activities. Politically he represented nothing but blind devotion to the throne. But he was not another Plehve, nor did he have instructions to follow Plehve's policies.

What Bulygin's appointment meant was not so much the end of the "era of liberalism" as the end of efforts to give "society" a role in making policy. The Tsar had grown weary of Svyatopolk-Mirsky and his methods and probably felt, as did many others, that the Gaponovshchina was the ultimate result of his bungling efforts to establish relations with "society." The appointment of the new minister could be taken to imply that henceforth reliable bureaucrats were to counsel among themselves. But it was clear that, even within the highest levels of government, hardly anyone would counsel a return to the days of Plehve. (Pobedonostsev was an exception, but he was of little consequence at this time—though the public believed that he was still a power behind the throne.) The majority of the Tsar's ministers were agreed that the effects of the strikes could not be obliterated and the confidence of the people could not be regained by police measures alone. It was necessary, they felt, for the Tsar to make some impressive and emphatic announcement including certain conciliatory features: his shock at the bloodshed on January 9, his awareness that workers had some legitimate grievances, his recognition that there were some imperfections in the political system, and his intention to improve the state of affairs.

Though the consensus was clear thus far, there remained the difficulty of deciding what improvements should be made, how far to go with them, and when to set about them. The Tsar, as usual, found it difficult to judge any situation more pressing than the war in the Far East. Just now he had hopes that the Russian forces under Kuropatkin, readying an offensive south of Mukden, would soon be able to achieve a final victory. Yet he could not ignore the fact that his hopes were not well supported: a number of officers, both at the front and at home, judged Kuropatkin to be no longer capable of effective leadership, and many civilian officials agreed with them. Nor could he overlook the fact that to postpone dealing with the domestic situation would not only weaken military morale in the long run but also invite further trouble among the disaffected.

On one thing the Tsar and his ministers were in accord: whatever the form of official response to the current domestic troubles, it must serve two functions—to placate the workers in the center of unrest, St. Petersburg, and to conciliate the country at large. The first was generally believed to be the more urgent.

Kokovtsev, reporting to the Tsar two days after Bloody Sunday, argued that since the turn of events had not only impaired morale at home but also lowered Russia's financial credit abroad, it was imperative that something be done at once to regain public confidence. He suggested that a few simple, direct words from the Tsar to the St. Petersburg workers, assuring them that he had their best interests at heart, would serve the purpose. The majority of the workers, he believed, had not wanted to strike, had been misled into the act, and would welcome any show of understanding and assurance that he might give them. Witte wanted the Tsar to go further. He feared that the "aureole of the ruler would be destroyed" if he did not somehow publicly dissociate himself from Bloody Sunday—perhaps by declaring that the troops had acted without his orders. This suggestion, made at a meeting of the Committee of Ministers, died there when Count Solsky declared the suggested cure to be worse than the disease: to assert that troops could act without orders from the Tsar was tantamount to repudiating autocracy. Nicholas did not think the troops had been at fault, nor would he have deigned, in any case, to evade responsibility for what had happened.

It was the Kokovtsev suggestion that was finally accepted and turned over to Trepov for development and implementation. The latter arranged for the election of thirty-four loyal

workers from St. Petersburg factories and sent them by special train to Tsarskoe Selo, on January 19, to meet the Tsar. This was Nicholas' first extended face-to-face encounter with factory workers. What he said to them, guided by the text of a prepared speech, indicated his limited conception of the problems facing the government. He explained to them, as a patient father to children, that the workers had been deceived by wicked men, who treacherously led them into taking part in "sedition" and quitting their "honest toil" at a time when they should have been working relentlessly to do their part in conquering the foreign enemy. He pointed out that, in consequence of what they had done, it had been necessary to use force against the evildoers and thus sacrifice the lives of innocent people. But, he assured them, he forgave these unfortunate mistakes and still trusted the workers as true supporters of the Russian Orthodox faith, the Tsar, and the fatherland. Moreover, understanding their plight as he did, he intended to do everything possible to make conditions better for them. He asked that the thirty-four return with "God's blessing" to their places of work and report to their comrades what he had said.[6]

The speech was remarkably ineffective. If the workers of the capital were moved by it, they failed to give any confirming evidence in their subsequent activities. The public was apparently unimpressed by it. The newspapers barely mentioned it. All told, the Tsar's effort proved worthless as an antidote to the impression created by Bloody Sunday. Trepov, however, was convinced that it was a great success; and Nicholas, flattered by his ministers, continued to believe that his words were cherished by the simple Russian with his innate sense of loyalty to the throne.

Ten days later, the Tsar took another step expected to ease the local tension. He appointed Nicholas V. Shidlovsky, a member of the State Council and the Senate, to the chairmanship of a commission that was to investigate the causes of unrest in the capital. The commission would include not only

[6] The text of the speech will be found in *Pravitelstvennyi Vestnik*, January 20, 1905. For an English translation, *see* R. W. Postgate, *Revolution from 1789–1906* (New York, 1962), pp. 368-69.

representatives of government and industrial management but also elected representatives of the workers. The results were not what had been expected. The workers' representatives on the commission were to be chosen by nine groups of electors, whom the workers designated by vote on February 13. Twenty percent of them were aligned with the SD's; 40 percent were radicals not identified with any party; the rest represented no particular position or were interested only in supporting economic goals for labor. The advantage was clearly with the SD's and radicals, who quickly assumed leadership and declared that they would not participate in the election of deputies unless the government agreed in advance to grant civil liberties and to throw the proceedings of the commission open to the public. Some of them went further and privately agreed to call new strikes as a prelude to armed uprising if their demands were not met. When convened to elect deputies, on February 18, they were informed that their demands would not be met, and seven of the groups refused to go on with the election. That day a new wave of strikes began in the city. Confronted thus by the perseverance of willfulness, the Tsar agreed to Shidlovsky's recommendation that the commission be dissolved. It had become clearly evident that the government was making no progress toward mollifying the labor force in St. Petersburg.

Preparation of Reforms

Meanwhile, work on the second part of the official program, aimed at bringing about a reconciliation between the government and the general public, had been going ahead—but very slowly. The Committee of Ministers was continuing its efforts to work out means of putting into effect the reforms promised in the ukase of December 12, by which the government hoped to eradicate some of the deep-seated causes of discontent. And, the Tsar having agreed to issue a manifesto informing the people of the government's position with respect to the recent happenings and explaining what it proposed to do, much attention was being devoted to the preparation of that document. Though the Tsar had approved the idea of it just after

Bloody Sunday, he had acquiesced to the advice that the details of its contents should be carefully considered before being made final and publicly proclaimed. Now the Committee of Ministers was undertaking to devise the overall plan for it, and the Tsar himself was carrying on private discussions about it, having summoned Pobedonostsev—whom he often employed for editorial work, but for little else—to help on the text. Unfortunately this multiform consideration proved excessively slow, and no individual minister or group of ministers seemed willing to advise greater speed. Kokovtsev was at first too occupied with the question of Russia's financial credit abroad and his quarrels with the Ministry of Interior. Witte, the ablest of them all, was busily mending political fences, making himself seen and felt in government circles and the diplomatic corps, taking care to sustain the impression that he was so indispensable that sooner or later the Tsar would have to call him to a position of authority. There were some officials in the government who interpreted the situation as immediately dangerous to the regime and grew daily more impatient with this temporizing by the ministers, but it behooved them to respect the ministerial priority in the matter.

The first to point out to the Tsar the seriousness of procrastination was Alexis Ermolov, Minister of Agriculture, hitherto noted for his inaction and apparent insignificance. When he delivered his regular report to the Tsar on January 17, he took what some would have considered a desperate chance, speaking openly and at length about conditions in Russia and making suggestions that reflected his somewhat liberal viewpoint.

The burden of his words was indeed a *cri de coeur*: much was amiss in Russia; though much had been promised in the ukase of December 12, the Committee of Ministers was not only working too slowly on means of activating the projected program but also neglecting to keep the people informed of what it was doing; the country had no real government, only a collection of ministers pursuing separate and often disparate ends; the clergy was without influence on the people; the nobility was split between liberals and conservatives; Bloody Sunday was a disaster, a blot on the honor of the government;

the army had obeyed orders on January 9, but there was no assurance of how it would respond if disorder should spread to the countryside and the men, most of them peasants, were required to shoot other peasants; even if the army remained loyal, there was a question as to whether or not it would be large enough to deal with an uprising in the countryside. His summation was equally specific, pointing out that the strength of the throne was dependent on the support of the people; that the people must therefore be told what the government was planning; that there must be forged a direct link between people and government; and that the government must act in a coordinated and energetic fashion.[7]

Though Ermolov's words were rather strong, even intemperate, the Tsar did not take them unkindly. He had, in fact, already thought of doing some of the things suggested, and he was willing to accept others that had not occurred to him before. But he could not feel the urgency that the minister indicated. Considering what was already under way, it seemed to him that the government was acting with unusual energy (as indeed it was—for his government). Apparently he did not recognize the fact that, with the recent digressions from routine, lines of authority had become thoroughly confused, most ministers were far from informed about all that was going on, and only delay and ineptness of procedure were to be expected.

Moreover, he and his ministers were now accepting or having thrust upon them conceptions and duties completely foreign to their customary thinking and acting. Just after the Ermolov report, he himself acceded to a suggestion that he had stubbornly refused before, that there be created a body of elected representatives to advise him. It was understood among officials that the announcement of this important concession would either be included in the manifesto or made public simultaneously with the manifesto. The alternatives were debated at length. Meanwhile, some of the protracted considerations were gradually being speeded up, new undertakings were being proposed, and different approaches were

[7] A. S. Ermolov, "Zapiski A. S. Ermolova," *Krasnyi Arkhiv,* VIII (1925), 49-69.

being tried. The Committee of Ministers increased the frequency of its meetings under Witte to deal with the promises made in the ukase of December 12. Nicholas empowered the seventy-two-year-old Count Dmitri Solsky, now Chairman of the State Council (the ailing Grand Duke Michael having retired), to convene and preside over the Council of Ministers—the prerogative of the Tsar, regularly exercised in the past—while it dealt with broad questions that he would present. He appointed Dmitri Kobeko, Director of the Imperial Library, to head a new commission to review legislation on censorship. He authorized Witte to publish the current minutes of the Committee of Ministers in order that the public might be thereby informed about some of the reforms under consideration. The last was an unprecedented act for a Russian autocrat, but unfortunately it served little purpose since the minutes suggested only that piddling bureaucrats were employed in discussing less than major changes. Though the Tsar worked with rare vigor on these operations, the results, being poorly coordinated and on the whole inadequately publicized, were as ineffectual in dealing with the general unrest as his speech to the St. Petersburg workers and Shidlovsky's commission had been in dealing with local unrest.

On February 3, the Tsar presided over an all-day discussion of the proposed manifesto by the Council of Ministers. Ermolov argued earnestly for the inclusion in the manifesto of the Tsar's promise to allow the election of an advisory assembly, but he received only limited support from his colleagues. No agreement was reached on the point, but Nicholas directed that a rescript be drafted, instructing the Minister of Interior to make the legal provisions for such an assembly and that the draft be submitted to the Council at a later date.

The next day, the SR's in Moscow, who had made repeated attempts to assassinate the Grand Duke Sergei, found their target open to attack; and Ivan Kalyaev, a former student and a member of the SR's Fighting Organization, threw a bomb that killed him instantly. This was the first assassination of a member of the imperial family since 1881 and the SR's first major act of terrorism since its murder of Plehve.

For the Tsar the death of his uncle was a double shock. It

not only meant that he had lost a friend and confidant, but also indicated that he and other members of his family might be in personal danger. Officials responsible for the protection of his person, chief of whom was Palace Commandant P. P. Hesse, advised against the risk of his attending the funeral; and with that instance of restraint, he began a period of what amounted to voluntary imprisonment at Tsarskoe Selo, able to travel with a feeling of safety only between Tsarskoe Selo and Peterhof or on short, well guarded trips on the imperial yacht. Even the capital of his empire was now outside the bounds of safety for him.

The death of the unpopular Sergei was both a victory for the opposition and a setback to governmental efforts at winning good will. As at the time of Plehve's death, the people were now reminded afresh of their hatred for officialdom and given the chance to acclaim an assassin as a public champion. The Fighting Organization[8] received little disapproval when it announced that it had executed Sergei "for a crime against the people." And the death was followed at once by renewed demands from the opposition for civil and political liberty. Small wonder that Nicholas wrote to the Kaiser on the day of Sergei's funeral that what was happening in Russia was a "downright shame and disgrace before the whole world."[9]

On the same day, attention was drawn again to a critical situation in the Far East, where the main forces of the Russian and Japanese armies were engaged at Mukden. Although it was general knowledge that, among men of respected judgment, there was a lack of confidence in Kuropatkin's ability as a commander, his popularity in the country was so great that it had seemed politically unwise to remove him. Now, as many

[8] The Fighting Organization was headed by Evno Azef, an agent of the Ministry of Interior (a fact unknown to the Tsar at that time), loyal to neither the SR's nor the government. Since this agent bore the ultimate responsibility for the killing of both Plehve and Sergei, and since another one (Gapon) bore at least some responsibility for Bloody Sunday, the Ministry of Interior might properly be held liable for three incidents of the utmost importance at this time.

[9] Nicholas II to William II, February 10 (OS), 1905, German Foreign Office Archives, Russland No. 82.1, V-VI (Geheim).

government officials were beginning to see it, Russia was indeed beset: faced by domestic violence, renewed alarums, and the imminence of defeat by Japan. They felt that conditions called for some kind of immediate action or grand gesture by the Tsar—perhaps, some suggested, a public announcement of broad political reforms and the Tsar's assuming personal command of the forces in Manchuria. Soon the spirit of urgency began to spread and, in view of the buildup of emotional pressure, many observers felt that the regime was breaking down. French Ambassador Bompard wrote to his foreign minister, "It looks as if the bureaucracy . . . has capitulated in the face of general reprobation."[10]

In the belief that only the Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna could persuade Nicholas to take the necessary steps quickly enough to save the country, a complicated stratagem was devised. Apparently within hours after the news of Sergei's death, Baron Osten-Sacken, the Russian Ambassador to Berlin, saw the Kaiser and enlisted his aid in persuading the Dowager Empress to urge the Tsar into action. Vain though he was, the Kaiser did not overestimate his influence on Maria Feodorovna and therefore attempted to increase his chance of success by writing nearly identical letters, some twenty-two pages long, to both mother and son. In the one he sent to Nicholas, he affected to be passing on information, not offering advice, while he made a good summary of the case as it had been presented to him: there was a common feeling that the Tsar had lost a certain amount of public support by omitting the traditional pilgrimage to the Kremlin cathedrals at the beginning of the war and by failing to address his people from the Winter Palace on January 9; he could regain popular support and, in fact, fire public enthusiasm by going now to Manchuria as warlord (but keeping Kuropatkin as chief of staff), stopping en route at the Moscow Kremlin to proclaim the establishment of habeas corpus and the expansion of the State Council and, standing with the clergy, to address the assembled crowds; then, with the Russian people firmly behind him, he would be easily able to inspire

[10] Bompard to Delcassé, February 12/25, 1905. French Foreign Office Archives, Russie, Politique Intérieure, I.

the troops to victory and restore strength and dignity to his government.[11]

Nicholas shared his cousin's faith in the psycholgoical influence of the Russian autocrat, but he disdained what he considered theatrical gestures, particularly when directed by William. His reply took up less than a line: "Your long letter interested me greatly."[12] Maria Feodorovna answered in the same vein. And that was that.

Imperial Acts of February 18

Nicholas had set his course and meant to follow it. He was going to issue a manifesto that should pacify the country; but, in the light of Sergei's death and the reactions to it, he felt more keenly than ever before that precedence should be given to a strong admonition to his people regarding their conduct. Without keeping his ministers properly informed, he hurried forward the work on the three documents that he had decided were now called for: the long-gestating manifesto, a ukase, and the rescript to the Minister of Interior. And on February 18, he issued the manifesto and the ukase without having asked for a final discussion of them by his ministers. The manifesto was the Tsar's reproof to those who had participated in the disturbances that had been afflicting the country for more than a month and a reaffirmation of the principle of autocracy. The ukase was his decree that his Russian subjects had the right to send him proposals "for improving the public well being," which he would turn over to the Council of Ministers for consideration (in short, the right of petition). It was an extreme measure for a ruler whose ukase of two months earlier had charged the people to mind their own affairs and not to presume to petition the government for change. The rescript was issued later on the same day, after it had been discussed and approved by the ministers. It ordered that Min-

[11] William II to Nicholas II, February 21 (NS), 1905, German Foreign Office Archives, Russland, No. 82.1, V-VI (Geheim). A reprint of this letter will be found in *Letters from the Kaiser to the Tsar* (New York, 1920), pp. 156-70.

[12] Nicholas II to William II, February 12 (OS), 1905, German Foreign Office Archives, Russland, No. 82.1, V-VI (Geheim).

ister of Interior Bulygin prepare legislation that would put into effect the Tsar's resolve "to assemble the most trustworthy men, having the confidence of the people and elected by them, to undertake the preliminary examination and consideration of legislative measures." This also was an extreme measure for a ruler who, on his accession a decade earlier, had labeled the hope for such a thing (a consultative legislative body) "a senseless dream."

The ukase and the rescript indicated a major retreat from policies stubbornly adhered to by Nicholas II and his father, Alexander III, in whose footsteps he had vowed to walk. What would be their effect at this time of crisis? The Tsar hoped that, without infringing upon the principles expressed in the manifesto, they would bring Russia both benefit and calm—as expressed in his diary, *polza i preusplenie*.

5

Development of the Revolution: Second Phase February–August

> Disturbances have broken out in Our country, to the gratification of Our enemies and Our own profound sorrow. Blinded by arrogance, the ill-intentioned leaders of this insurgence are brazenly attacking the foundations of the Russian Empire, sanctioned by the Orthodox Church and based on law. They are seeking to sever Our bonds with the past, to break down the present state structure, and to replace it by another form of government, alien to Our country.
>
> —Imperial manifesto, February 18, 1905.

> Russia is passing through a crisis: she is sick; and her sickness is so grave as to demand immediate and radical cure. Palliatives can be of no use; rather, they but increase the gravity of the situation. To pretend that all is right in Russia, except for a few "ill-intentioned" persons who are making all the fuss, is no longer ridiculous, it is criminal.
>
> —Paul Milyukov, *Russia and Its Crisis,* 1905.

THE RESULTS of the Tsar's declarations and proposals of February did not sustain his hopes. What he had intended as evidence of magnaminity was taken—to use the words of *Liberation*—as "a white flag . . . a symbol of cowardice and weakness." Instead of calming the populace, he seemed to have spurred them to greater boldness and more ambitious counteraction.

Miscarriage of the February Acts

The ukase permitting petitions was interpreted as an invitation to legalized mobilization of dissent, and the words of the manifesto regarding the proper attitude toward the war-burdened government were almost wholly disregarded. The manifesto proved to be, in fact, yet another of the Tsar's ill-timed efforts, coming as it did only four days before the end of the battle of Mukden, when the Russian ranks were broken and forced into retreat after ninety thousand of their men had been killed, wounded, or taken prisoner. Antiwar sentiment, which flared up again after the news from Mukden, continued to spread, unaffected by the official assurance that the defeat had not been a rout and that, with the additional reservists being rushed to Kuropatkin, the Russians would have numerical superiority by summer.

Emboldened and stimulated by the public recalcitrance, the antigovernment groups stepped up their activities, encouraging unrest wherever it was to be found; and after the news from Mukden had been added to that from the capital, their field of operation was wide indeed. Not only was there unrest among the educated class, labor, and the national minorities but also, to a perceptible degree, among the clergy, the peasants, and the armed forces.

Zemstvos, municipal dumas, organizations of the nobility, university faculty councils, and professional organizations—groups that had not always been willing to pull together—were now coming to fairly close agreement on at least one aim: to work for either a constituent assembly or a *zemsky sobor*. And they were expanding their efforts in every part of the country, meeting more openly and more frequently than they had in the past. Often, without government authorization, they used school buildings for meeting places as public interest grew. Many men of wealth threw open their homes to political gatherings. In the space of a few months, the Russian mentality had undergone a decided change: to be against the government was now more nearly an act of conformity than of daring. And gradually both prestige and range were added

to oppositional efforts as elements of society hitherto withdrawn from politics or excluded from participation began to take part.

The Academy of Sciences was one of them—a very prominent one. While some of its members had helped to initiate the "Statement of the 342," the body as a whole had remained aloof from political matters. But it broke tradition on February 18, when in answer to a request from the Committee of Ministers for an opinion concerning existing restrictions on the printed use of the Ukrainian language,[1] it declared its opposition to such restrictions (thus, inadvertently perhaps, helping to promote the cause of Ukrainian nationalism). Even more important was the Academy's reaction to a request made by the Committee of Ministers a few weeks later, that it help to revise the existing censorship laws in such a way as to permit the Academy to cooperate in their application; the academicians declared that they favored freedom of the press and were more interested in removing censorship than in acting as censors.

Further support came to the opposition with the growing popularity of a sympathetic attitude toward equality of rights for women. There had been no specifically feminist movement in Russia before this time, but there were obvious feminist implications in the idea of four-tail suffrage, universal suffrage being understood to include the right of women to vote. And they had encouraged the faint beginnings of a movement that now began to pick up a following.

The unrelieved restiveness among workers was quickened when it became evident, after the collapse of the Shidlovsky Commission, that the government had no further plans for dealing with their needs. Thereafter they showed little hesitancy in using their only weapon—the strike. There was no pattern to their strikes, usually spontaneous and unorganized as before, but each one helped to impress the "strike habit" more firmly on Russian workers. And the habit was spreading. By the last week of February, strikes were commonplace.

[1] Minister of Interior Peter Valuev had asserted in 1863 that "there never was, is not, and never will be a Ukrainian language." This opinion had long been held the official one in Russia.

Within one work week, streetcar workers in Astrakhan went on a one-day strike; workers in the factories of the country's richest industrialists, the Morozovs, stopped work, defied and attacked infantry patrols; strikers in Ekaterinoslav province became so disorderly that troops were called to quell them; the railroad shops of Tashkent and other Central Asian cities were beset by strikes; work was stopped in the South Russian Machine-Construction factory in Kiev; in Perm, Minsk, Baku, Poltava, St. Petersburg, Revel, Rostov-on-Don, and numerous smaller cities, there were strikes by factory workers, railroadmen, bakers, salesmen, and streetcar conductors, all demanding improvements in working conditions and wages. In some instances, their demands brought results; in the South railroad workers were granted the nine-hour day, and others were allowed some of the less important changes they sought.

But the most outstanding feature of these strikes was that, as they continued, the idea of trade-unionism began to receive some attention among the groups involved. It was a relatively novel idea to Russian workers, who lacked not only the tradition of trade-unionism but also any real knowledge of developments along this line in Western Europe. Before 1905 there had been rudimentary efforts to organize trade unions in Moscow, Kharkov, Vilna, and a few other industrial cities, but they had not led to permanent organizations; so in 1905 it was necessary to make an essentially new beginning. The printers of St. Petersburg led the way. Having participated in the Gaponovshchina, they continued to strike after it had run its course, but in the end they won no concessions beyond the willingness of their employers to negotiate with their representatives. In another strike, at the end of February, some of them won wage increases, others did not; and from those results grew the notion that all would have a better chance of success if they organized and consolidated their strength. But it was not until April, following a lecture on typographical unions in the West, that the first organizational efforts were made. What happened in St. Petersburg was repeated in other trades and other cities—but somewhat later in most cases. In the first months of 1905, Russian trade-unionism was just being born, but mass strikes were already an ever-present and powerful force.

Other areas where the opposition could always look for support, the borderlands, were responding according to form and adding some features to their programs of disaffection. In Congress Poland, the Baltic provinces, Transcaucasia, Lithuania, Little Russia, and Finland, the concessions of February 18 fanned rather than quenched antipathy toward the government and stimulated nationalistic aspirations. Evidence of governmental weakening on the one hand and the opening of legal opportunity to petition on the other encouraged demands for restoration of suspended rights and privileges and for the complete removal of disabilities imposed on national and religious minorities. And usually the efforts aimed at the removal of disabilities was accompanied by demands for the concurrent recognition of legal equality among peoples. The urge toward improved status was particularly strong among the Jews. Only a few days after the right of petition was granted, Jewish religious congregations of thirty-two cities sent to the government a petition for "freedom and equality" with the rest of Russia's peoples.[2] The sentiment of that petition, taken up by other congregations, led to the establishment, at the end of March, of a full-fledged political organization, the Union for the Attainment of Full Rights for the Jewish People of Russia. Among the Transcaucasian Moslems a similar movement began, and on March 25 they submitted to the government a petition asking that they be given equal treatment in government service, that no more Russians be permitted to settle among them (it was imperial policy to encourage Russian settlement), and that the organization of zemstvos be allowed in Transcaucasia. And another voice was added to the dissonant response when the Buryat Mongols in Siberia, hitherto hardly vocal in political affairs, began to demand the right to use their own language in their schools.

Supplementing the intensified dissidence from the usual sources of widely shared discontent, some stirrings were be-

[2] *Voskhod,* March 4, 1905.

coming evident elsewhere. In March the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church made a cautious but significant move. Established as the governing body of the Church by Peter the Great in 1721, after he had abolished the office of patriarch, it had functioned during all the intervening years as little more than a branch of the government, for few churchmen had dared to ask for autonomy—and they had been denied. Now the thought of impending reforms encouraged the members of the Synod to frame and send to the Tsar a resolution favoring the reestablishment of the office of patriarch and the calling of a Church Council, no meeting of which had been called since the seventeenth century, to select a man to assume patriarchal duties. To be sure, it was a small voice in which the Church spoke, implying no disloyalty to the state, and having no immediate effect. But that it spoke at all was an indication of the depth to which the movement against the *status quo* was reaching.

It was reaching peasants very slowly in the late spring and early summer of 1905, but there was unrest among them that would in time be turned to advantage by the opposition. There had been practically no interruption in the disorders that had begun in the Kutaisk province of Georgia in January. And now sporadic troubles broke out among the peasants in several provinces of European Russia—chiefly in Vitebsk, Kursk, Orlov, Chernigov, and Voronezh—as well as in Tiflis, Warsaw, and the Baltic provinces. The peasants involved in these outbursts, however, rarely had any direct ties with organized opposition in the cities. Among the exceptions were the several SR-organized brotherhoods in the provinces of Saratov and Penza. Membership in them ranged from 20 to 100, and they were reinforced by auxiliary armed detachments of 8 to 12 peasants. In these brotherhoods there was a tendency toward violence (not entirely welcome to the revolutionaries, who were not yet ready to call for agrarian revolution) and much talk of "black partition," the forcible seizure and distribution of landlord estates. In other provinces there was occasional reference to "black partition," but more often the rebellious peasants sought only reforms to meet their more

immediate needs: lower rents, the right to cut timber freely in the landlords' forests, and an increase in agricultural wages.

The peasants, of course, soon became aware of what was happening in the cities, and thereafter it was up to the organizers to heighten their unrest and to utilize their response, if possible, on behalf of the opposition. Though there was at first little contact between the peasants (the "dark people") and urban dwellers, the conditions prevailing in 1904 and 1905 opened important channels of communication and began to build up a common sentiment among them. Peasants who worked in urban factories returned home with news of the strikes and often brought with them antigovernment leaflets for their literate comrades, some of whom read them, ignoring instructions to turn over such papers to the police. Others who had worked in the city and acquired a bit of education might come back indoctrinated as socialists and become leaders of influence among their neighbors. The village teachers or the zemstvo statisticians might help their peasant charges to bridge the gap between city and village. And the continued call-up of reservists and the news of repeated defeats in Manchuria built up an antiwar sentiment closely akin to that found in the cities.

An intimation of how such things, added to routine grievances, could accumulate and transform a commonly peaceful peasant group occurred in Orlov province on the Dolbenkino estate of the Grand Duke Sergei. The estate manager, the notoriously severe Filatev, was able to rent most of the land to local peasants at prices much higher than the market warranted because of their desperate need for land. And their burdens were multiplied by the fact that Filatev, who retained the preemancipation outlook common among contemporary estate managers, laid numerous fines on them—for such offenses as failing to remove their hats in his presence, picking berries or smoking on seignorial land, and letting their cattle stray. About two weeks after the death of Sergei, it was rumored that the local peasants were planning an attack on the estate; but responsible officials, knowing how the peasants had endured their lot in the past, refused to credit the rumors.

Provinces of EUROPEAN RUSSIA in 1905



And when the peasants sent their representatives to require concessions of Filatev, he was confident that his soft words and hard liquor had mollified them. On the following day, however, peasants from nearby villages arrived at the estate to join the local ones, their manner so disorderly and belligerent that neither the manager nor local police could handle them; and, having struck down Filatev and routed the police, they turned to looting and burning the estate buildings. The damage they did before troops could arrive and put an end to their outburst, amounted to about a quarter of a million rubles. Similar peasant raids, on a smaller scale, occurred on a number of estates. Usually there was a long history of tension and distress in the area where trouble broke out—as in the Voronezh province, where the estate of the multimillionaire Yusupov family in the village of Veseloi was subjected to pillage and torch. The course of the outbreaks became almost routine: peasants would meet quietly at night to make plans, a pole to which was fastened a bundle of straw would be put up near the estate designated for attack, and when the time for action came, entire villages of peasants would take part. These agrarian disorders, though increasing in number, were not extensive enough or well enough organized and led to produce any serious alarm in the first half of the year. But their threat was recognized. In Voronezh, the news of the attack on the Yusupov estate led landlords to ask the governor to station more troops and rural police near the trouble spots, and here and there others were following their example.

One of the chief reasons authority could be maintained with such relative ease in the face of the aggressive discontent in the country was that the armed forces were, so far, little affected by civil unrest. Ermolov's fears that the peasants in uniform would refuse to fire on peasants in mufti were not realized for many years. Though the soldiers were earnestly urged by both liberals and socialists to refrain from acts of "fratricide," they continued to obey whatever orders were given them—except, sometimes, orders that they restrain themselves when taunted or attacked by civilians. In fact, they usually interpreted attacks by civilians as acts of hostility toward themselves, not toward the regime. This was especially true of

the Cossacks; more than any other part of the armed forces, they dissociated themselves contemptuously from the mass of the population. It was quite common for Cossack patrols, acting against orders, to ride down civilians who whistled, jeered, or threw stones at them.

While all members of the armed forces remained submissive to military discipline, some were being reached individually and influenced by subversive propaganda. That fact was recognized by the government, and cautionary steps were taken to prevent untoward results from it. Enlisted men were ordered not to read any leaflets handed to them, but to turn them over at once to their officers. Nevertheless, spot-checks of barracks showed many a leaflet hidden in enlisted men's belongings. And the officers themselves were not always beyond suspicion: some guards officers, even, were known to have accepted and read forbidden literature. These preliminary gains, though small, were cherished by the opposition, and the socialists made special plans to increase them through military committees organized and trained for concentrated work among soldiers and sailors.

Liberation Movement Strengthened

All these new or renewed stirrings among educated Russians, the national minorities, and labor—and becoming recognizable now also among the clergy, the peasantry, and the armed forces—were, of course, reinforcing the liberation movement. The liberals saw in them the awakening of the "real Russia" to the defects of "official Russia," a situation that would ultimately bring about the capitulation of the latter. But they all recognized that the tendencies toward opposition had to be encouraged and that the pressure against the government had to be organized in order to achieve that end. The Liberationists were particularly hopeful that what had been done and was being done would serve the purpose. They thought of the Paris conference of the previous year as the guarantee of a common front against autocracy. And they depended upon a nationwide organization of professional

unions, now in the planning stage, to serve as the organizational hub for it. When achieved, the common front they foresaw would be an alliance of all groups—liberal or socialist, Russian or non-Russian—that opposed autocracy.

During the spring months, there was much activity in political organization and negotiation among all opposition groups. The liberals, operating virtually in the open, were the most vocal and the most prominent. They became widely known through the speeches, writings, and organizational work of men such as Fedor Rodichev, Vasily Maklakov, the Princes Peter and Paul Dolgorukov, Fedor Kokoshkin, Fedor Golovin, Ivan Petrunkevich, and (on his return from the United States in April) Paul Milyukov. In Moscow the zemstvo office and the homes of many wealthy nobles became the liberal assembly centers, and in St. Petersburg the premises of the Free Economic Society and the offices of *Pravo* and other newspapers served. Inevitably the general acceleration led to much waste motion and unproductive talk, but in it all there was a persistent consciousness of urgency and purpose.

The liberals—particularly the Liberationists—pushed energetically for an agreement on common aims: those of the Liberationists. At its Third Congress, in March, the Union of Liberation adopted a program based, as usual, on the demand for a constituent assembly. And the program specified what the Union intended to require of that assembly: a government both democratic and decentralized, founded on universal suffrage (defined so as to include women as well as men) and recognizing the separation of church and state; the restoration of Finnish autonomy; the granting of limited autonomous rights to Poland, Lithuania, Little Russia (Ukraine), and Transcaucasia; the transfer of state, crown, and some noble lands to the peasants; and the concession to labor of the right to strike, the eight-hour day, and government-provided insurance (health, old-age, and life). It was a broad program, offering something for almost every dissident group. It was also far more radical than the program represented by the Eleven Theses of the November Zemstvo Congress—and it would surely have been rejected by that congress.

But the Second Zemstvo Congress, held in April, displaying

a more radical bent than the first, accepted the Liberationist position in part. It did not adopt the slogan calling for a "constituent assembly elected by four-tail suffrage" in that exact phrasing; but by the use of somewhat roundabout terms, it adopted the substance, calling on the government to permit the election of a "representative assembly" chosen by universal, equal, secret, and direct suffrage to "establish the political law and order of the Russian Empire"—a euphemistic phrasing of "imperial constitution." This was too much for Shipov, who led his followers, a minority, from the congress in protest (though he later agreed to a temporary truce with his opponents). This incident revealed two significant aspects of the zemstvo movement at this time: the extent to which many of the formerly moderate zemstvo leaders had moved to the left and into closer ties with the Liberationists, and the serious rift that had developed among its supporters.

Another step toward cooperation among oppositional groups was taken in April, when some Liberationists and other liberals came to an agreement with a gathering of Polish nationalist liberals whereby the Russians would support autonomy for Congress Poland within the Russian empire, and the Poles would support the common aim to establish a constitutional order. As for the Jewish liberals, their participation was practically assured, for Maxim Vinaver, highly influential in the Union for the Achievement of Full Rights for the Jews, and many of his associates were closely connected with the Liberationists. And still further support was anticipated after an April agrarian congress attended by zemstvo leaders, agronomists, and economists; for the program adopted by that body, under the leadership of such liberals as Ivan Petrunkevich, Michael Herzenstein, and Alexander Manuilov, was highly acceptable to those in the liberation movement.

Important as all these activities were for the opposition, they were soon overshadowed by one that had been in process since January: the organization, throughout the country, of political unions with the hope of their eventual unification into a "union of unions," strong enough to achieve results. Work on the project had begun slowly but quickened after the publication of the ukase of February 18, which the liberals

interpreted as giving the populace the right to hold meetings for formulating petitions. This interpretation, which the police reluctantly accepted, provided the organizers of political unions with a degree of legal protection, and they used it to the full. The organizers were for the most part Liberationists, but there were among them some liberals a bit to the right of the Liberationists—yet sympathetic to their aims—and a few SR's and Mensheviks. The original intention, to organize only professions, was at first respected as unions were formed by lawyers, engineers, primary and secondary school teachers, professors, doctors, pharmacists, veterinarians, journalists, and agronomists. But the planners soon agreed that any union, professional or not, accepting the proposed aims and methods should be included in the scheme. The organizing groups, usually holding their meetings with some semblance of secrecy (an unnecessary precaution, since the police were generally neither deceived by their ruses nor particularly responsive to their doings), found that people were anxious to pledge themselves to the achievement of a "democratic constitution" by peaceful means and liked the idea of joining others in a union dedicated to that end.

By May, fourteen of these unions had been organized and were considered stable enough to constitute the foundation of the proposed larger body. Accordingly their representatives met in Moscow and entered them upon the next phase of the plan by forming the Union of Unions, devoted to the liberation of Russia by means of a constituent assembly, for which all were pledged to work. The new organization selected as its president Paul Milyukov, now the leading figure in the Union of Liberation. It was to operate through its Central Bureau, which was to consist of two representatives from each union.

Among the fourteen unions represented at the founding meeting were nine political unions of professionals; two—the Union of Clerks and Bookkeepers and the Union of Railroad Employees and Workers—combining political and economic aims; the Union for the Achievement of Full Rights for the Jews; the Union of Equal Rights for Women; and the Union of Zemstvo-Constitutionalists (close in position to the Union of Liberation), a small group organized in 1903 to exert liberal

influences on zemstvo leaders. The Union of Unions invited others to join whenever they were ready. And many others were being planned or were in process of organization. Among them was one that could add great strength to the Union: a politically oriented peasants union, for the formation of which preparations were being made by some liberal *intelligents* connected with the zemstvo movement.

In the late spring and the summer of 1905, the Union of Unions was the embodiment of the liberation movement and, in a sense, provided the much-talked-of common front. In addition, it was the support, either directly or indirectly, of the current program of the Union of Liberation.

The Liberationists, telling themselves that there were "no enemies to the left," were now confident that they could count on peaceful partnership with the socialists as they continued the drive toward a constituent assembly. The socialists, however, were beginning to get out of step with the Liberationists at some points. Though they were still agreeable so far as aspirations for the immediate future were concerned and admired some of the leading Liberationists personally (Milyukov had been invited to become a member of the SR Central Committee), they were, in final analysis, only friendly opponents. There were real and ultimately significant differences between them and the liberals with whom they were currently cooperating.

Socialists agreed that a constituent assembly was the immediate essential, but they disagreed sharply with the liberals as to the means to be used in achieving it. Moreover, they were quite far from the liberals in their interpretations of the historical process they were witnessing and would witness as events proceeded. In the spring of 1905 most of them felt that they were experiencing the first stages of the expected "bourgeois" revolution that would overthrow the autocracy; and most of them believed that the revolution would be completed only through an armed uprising. The liberal program of peaceful pressure was clearly not enough in their view. On these issues, most socialists were in agreement among themselves. But on many others they disagreed.

By April the differences among socialists were becoming

quite evident. In the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks were openly demonstrating their rivalry. The Bolsheviks had summoned a congress of the whole RSDLP, announcing that the "revolution had already begun," but the Mensheviks had denied the authority of the Bolsheviks to call the congress and had chosen to meet separately. Gathering in London, the Bolsheviks declared that, since they represented the larger portion of the party, their meeting was officially the party's third congress; in Geneva, the Mensheviks modestly called their meeting a conference. The two factions agreed on basic questions but disagreed materially on tactics. The Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, saw an armed uprising as the only means of overthrowing autocracy, while the Mensheviks, led by Julius Martov, recognized alternative means—for instance, a revolutionary assumption of power by some popular representative body. The latter expressed less apprehension than the Bolsheviks about cooperation with the liberals, being inclined toward the belief that, after the overthrow of autocracy, the bourgeoisie could safely be permitted to dominate the new democratic state while the proletariat would struggle for its own interests and prepare for the inevitable, but somewhat distant, decisive conflict with the bourgeoisie. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, while recognizing that the revolution would put the bourgeoisie into power, intended that, upon the overthrow of the tsarist regime, a provisional revolutionary government dominated by the proletariat should act as a check on the bourgeoisie.

The Socialist Revolutionary Party was not yet ready to call a congress, but its position had become fairly well defined and publicly understood. Its members placed more emphasis on preparation for an armed uprising than did the Mensheviks; and, in contrast to both factions of the SD's, they continued to believe in political assassinations, terror, as a useful tactic. Though in theory as suspicious of the liberals as the Bolsheviks were, in practice the SR's were more cooperative than they were. Perhaps the most significant position of the SR's was that taken on the agrarian question. They favored the transfer of all land—that of the landlords, the church, and the government—to the peasant village communes. But they expected the transfer to follow the overthrow of the regime and therefore did not seek an immediate agrarian revolution aiming at "black partition."

Among them, the Mensheviks, Bolsheviks, and SR's represented all the major positions held by Russian socialists in the spring of 1905. But most of their controversy was, for the moment, factitious because they were not yet prepared to implement policies of any kind. Many of their leaders recognized the fact that their problem at this time was not to make a definite decision about the means by which to bring about the ultimate overthrow of the regime, which might or might not come in the near future, but how to deal with the current reality of growing antigovernment sentiment, which might be harnessed to their program. Therefore the immediate need was to give more energy to organizing, propagandizing, and training for action. And they set about it as if determined to make up for lost time. They recruited members. They operated their illegal presses without letup. They held meetings and gave lectures wherever they could: in theaters they were sometimes able to convert audiences into political meetings; in the Jewish Pale, Bundists often interrupted religious rites to harangue the captive assemblage on politics; and in Moscow and other large cities, they used the homes of wealthy men such as the Morozovs (who themselves were frequently under attack as employers) as meeting places. They organized students. They held secret meetings with sympathetic soldiers and sailors. And they gave especial attention to workers, organizing the sympathetic ones into study groups (sometimes placing socialists at their head), urging them to consider political demands as important as economic demands, and always urging them toward short political strikes—which, in socialist opinion, were the most effective of immediate weapons to be used against the regime.

Looking toward a future aspect of their program, the socialists joined in an accelerated effort to provide sufficient arms and training for their military action. Wherever there was a sizeable socialist group there was some kind of quasi-military preparation or planning, much of it more nearly in the manner of comic opera than of serious undertaking. For many,

especially students, this part of socialist activity was romantically appealing and they were zealous in its pursuit, collecting funds for arms at almost every meeting. But the actual accumulation of arms seemed quite incommensurate with the effort and time spent. Most of the arms were purchased abroad and smuggled in, but within Russia there were a few illegal sources from which pistols and revolvers might be bought. To supplement these, workers in metallurgical plants—the Putilov Ironworks, for example—sometimes made "cold arms" (knives, bludgeons, and the like) with company materials and on company time. To use these assorted weapons when they were available, almost every socialist group had its "fighting detachment" of a dozen or so, which practiced marksmanship and engaged in some form of training for street fighting. In keeping with this part of the program, the Bund, which had begun organizing "self-defense units" for use against anti-Semitic attacks before 1905, now increased their number. All together, the armed and trained socialists in Russia would have made up no more than a regiment or two, a rather inadequate nucleus for a successful insurrection. Yet they had their value: they served to promote the state of mind conducive to violence and armed rising, and they provided cadres capable of leading and organizing local revolutionary efforts.

Whereas the socialist factions were fairly agreeable in organizational and preparatory operations, they took differing stands on other activities. Some SR's, while admitting the importance of mass agitation and organization, contended that individual acts of terror should not be neglected, and they continued such acts, particularly the assassination of odious officials. And some of them—a much smaller number—believed in "agrarian terror," and encouraged peasant violence. Though the SR's worked among the peasantry more than did any other party, their influence was quite limited (largely confined to the Volga region), and the violence they stirred up was generally insignificant. Social Democrats gave only little attention to the peasantry—and that, not to the land-holding peasants, but to the agricultural laborers in a few places close to such urban centers as Moscow. On the evaluation of the Union of Unions there was wide diversity. The

Mensheviks and SR's usually cooperated with the liberals in it, while the Bundists and the Bolsheviks opposed it. The Bolsheviks tried, with limited success, to form organizations to rival it or, failing at that, to work within some of its components—the Union of Pharmacists, for one—in an effort to convert them to the idea of a general political strike and armed rising.

Though socialist activities differed sharply in many respects from those of the liberals, they were on the whole condoned by the latter since they were directed at the regime. Some liberals—among them, Milyukov and other Liberationists—welcomed them; others—those of the right wing—were censorious of the Milyukov attitude and actually fearful that the socialist emphasis on armed action might lead to civil war. But as long as the possibility of peaceful political change remained in sight, as long as it seemed possible to defer the threat of revolution, the weakly united front of liberals and socialists continued.

So numerous, prominent, and articulate were the liberals that, for a time, interest was concentrated on them both in Russia and abroad, where the liberation movement was being followed closely. But their center-stage position should not be allowed to detract from two significant developments, neither of which fitted directly into the framework of the liberation movement. The government, of its own accord, though thoroughly discredited, was still seriously struggling with problems and plans, trying to activate important reforms. In addition, among the masses throughout the country, there were beginning new or newly enlarged movements not led by liberals, and their forms and proportions indicated that important changes might be in the making.

May Day, 1905

One new aspect of unrest was introduced on the first day of May, a labor holiday (having been designated as such by the Second Socialist International in 1889), which fell on a Sunday. The socialists had let it be widely known that, unlike past celebrations of the day, which had been indoor and secret, this

year's would be held openly and complemented by political strikes. Forewarned, the authorities reinforced military and police units in the cities and arrested numerous socialist leaders who had been under surveillance. But the plans were carried out, with somewhat irregular success, in scores of places throughout the country. In St. Petersburg only a few hundred demonstrators gathered and quickly dispersed. In Moscow some street meetings were held; and outside the city, in Sokolniki Park, popular for Sunday outings, thousands who gathered to hear socialist speakers were scattered by mounted troops. As for the strikes that were called, they were variously scheduled (since May 1 was a nonworking day) and variously handled. In a number of Baltic cities, they started on April 30 and continued until the beginning of June. In most places the workers responded by striking on the first working day after the holiday. In St. Petersburg, the men of the Neva Shipbuilding Works reported to work on that day but immediately marched out singing revolutionary songs. In Saratov, Samara, and Ekaterinburg, on the same day, the strikes were virtually general ones. And in Kharkov and a number of other cities, the demonstrators clashed with soldiers. The chief importance of all this activity lay in the fact that these demonstrations and strikes, though geographically separated, were relatively concerted operations, each with frankly political overtones, each responsive to socialist leadership.

Emergence of the Black Hundreds

Another display of feelings roused by events—this, a form of counteraction not new but appearing for the first time with appreciable strength—came from militant supporters of the regime who engaged in or encouraged physical reprisals against non-Russians and nonmonarchists. Though now most active in the Pale of Settlement and in Transcaucasia, they were increasing in number and aggressiveness in central Russia as well. Generally known by the loose designation "Black Hundreds," they were members of various groups with ideas planted deep in Russian tradition and reflecting two sentiments common to many Great Russians: opposition to those who made open attacks on the monarchy (especially in the time of war), and bitter resentment of all members of despised minorities who "insolently" displayed their antipathy for the government. As their popularity grew, they received aid and abetment from the police in some places and indirect encouragement from the Russian Orthodox Church. The former sometimes organized and promoted "patriotic" attacks or demonstrations against the *kramolniki* (seditionists), as the opposition was officially known. And since the Church denounced *kramola* (sedition) as treason, it was not unusual for priests to add their voices to those of laymen who, claiming to have the endorsement of the Church, spread hatred in the guise of patriotism. Those who suffered the consequences were any who might be charged by the Black Hundreds with offense, according to their interpretation, against the fatherland —particularly the intelligentsia, Poles, Jews, Finns, and Armenians. Economic considerations also led to provocation in some instances; workers or storekeepers, for example, who were unsympathetic to the opposition often reacted to the economic burden of strikes by attacking those who fomented them or were responsible for unrest in general. Thus supported, this movement growing freely among the masses was to affect thousands and lead to violent acts that, in some instances, would make changes necessary in well-laid plans.

The Tsushima Straits Disaster

The opposition had barely remarked this growing counteractivity when Russia received news of the greatest naval disaster in her history, the destruction of her fleet at Tsushima Straits, on May 14. The succeeding wave of antigovernment feeling was grist to the opposition's mill; criticism of the regime mounted once more, and the demand for peace became more insistent. The Tsar and his advisers faced a dilemma; to make peace now would lower the government's prestige; to continue building up the land forces (War Minister Sakharov anticipated that Russia could have five hundred thousand men to Japan's three hundred thousand in Manchuria by

July) might give Russia a chance for one more major victory to redeem her honor—but troop morale was reportedly so low that the result might instead be defeat, which would both increase domestic unrest and decrease Russian bargaining power in peace negotiations. After a meeting on the 24th with Sakharov, the Grand Dukes Vladimir and Alexis, and several ranking generals, who gave their evaluations of the situation, the Tsar chose an indeterminate course. He would continue to build up Russian strength in Manchuria, meanwhile entering upon secret negotiations for peace, the United States' President Theodore Roosevelt acting as intermediary.

The Burgeoning Strike Movement

The public, unaware of the secret conferences or negotiations, knew only that reservists were still being dispatched at the behest of what appeared to be incompetent and blundering leadership. The result was hostility and unease, which, though not producing strikes, affected the general temper in such a way that workers were responsive when it was suggested that strikes be begun or continued. The number of strikers grew from eighty thousand in April to two hundred and twenty thousand in May.[3]

Of these, the one in Ivanovo-Voznesensk was outstanding, being the one of longest duration in 1905 as well as the one most nearly revolutionary in nature. Begun two days before the news of the Tsushima Straits defeat was received and lasting ten weeks, it involved seventy thousand men and women, virtually the whole labor force of the "twin cities." Ivanovo-Voznesensk, a major textile center of Vladimir province, located some two hundred miles northeast of Moscow and known as the "cotton kingdom," had experienced strikes in the past but had no history of political disaffection. Unlike the workers of Moscow or St. Petersburg, the workers here had been little affected by the liberal or socialist movements and, in the four months following the Gaponovshchina, had taken no active part in the general turbulence except for staging a small strike in protest against Bloody Sunday. There was, however, a tradition of tension in the area, understandable in view of the difficult labor conditions—of which an average work day of fourteen hours, including overtime, was the most aggravating. In the early spring of 1905, when SD agitators (among them the future Soviet War Commissar Michael Frunze) tried to explain to the workers the need to end autocracy, they were rebuffed with cries of "No politics!" By May, however, a strike sentiment was developing in Ivanovo-Voznesensk and being taken up with enthusiasm by these same workers—just why, it was difficult to determine. Perhaps economic distress had made them susceptible to political propaganda; perhaps growing awareness of the regime's weakening had encouraged them to take action for economic improvement. Their first demands of the factory managers were for concessions to improve their general conditions as workers: an eight-hour day, a minium monthly wage of twenty rubles, factory nurseries, the right to sit while working, the right to read newspapers during free periods, old-age pensions, abolition of factory police, freedom of assembly to discuss labor conditions, and full pay for the period of the strike. As the strike went on, certain of the demands they added were definitely political in nature: holidays on February 19 (anniversary of the liberation of the serfs) and on May Day, as well as the calling of a constituent assembly.

When the strike began, the troops available were insufficient to prevent the workers from meeting openly in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, where their number and temper induced such fear that most of the factory owners and managers hurriedly left the area. But soon, provincial governor I. M. Leontiev sent additional troops, and the strikers were forced to move their meetings to the banks of the nearby Talka River. There

[3] These figures are based on reports made by members of the government's factory inspection service. A study made by A. S. Amalrik ("K Voprosu o Chislennost i Geograficheskom Razmeshchenii Stachechnikov v Evropeiskoi Rossii v 1905 Godu," *Istoricheskie Zapiski,* LII [1955], 142-85) argues that official figures are too low because the inspection service did not report on establishments with less than fifteen employees, those under the Ministry of War, those in the Northern Caucasus, or those in Transcaucasia. He would, by estimation, raise the official figures by 50 percent.

they worked out a rudimentary organization for bargaining collectively and directing the strike. Their strike committee of 150 (a quarter of whom were SD's) began, about the middle of May, to call itself a *soviet* (council) of deputies. And gradually the soviet began to assume political powers in local affairs, prohibiting storekeepers from raising prices, even organizing a workers' militia. This was the first Russian soviet of the type that was later to become a powerful revolutionary institution: a body of workers', peasants', or soldiers' deputies that arrogated political power. It was a spontaneous phenomenon, but it corresponded to the Menshevik notion of the revolutionary body ultimately to take over power from the autocracy.

As their activities continued, the strikers' sympathy for political ideas increased. They listened with interest to lectures on the history of the *Marseillaise*, on Saint-Simon, and on the works of Nekrasov, a favorite poet of the intelligentsia. Their attitudes were by no means completely changed, nor was the partial change enduring in all individuals. The fact that they showed any political interest, however, was significant. It was a kind of interest that was now becoming widespread among workers in other industrial centers.

Because the nature and duration of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk strike suggested the danger of violence and its possible spread to other parts of the province, Governor Leontiev urged the employers to deal with the soviet and meet some of its demands. At the same time, he put pressure on the strikers by increasing the number of troops in the area. The soviet was willing to compromise, for it was evident that morale could not be sustained much longer among the workers: they were near starvation after weeks of unemployment, and some had begun to loot food stores. So, when the employers reluctantly offered slight wage increases, the soviet declared the strike at an end and dissolved itself.

The extent of this great strike's influence would be difficult to assess; but many strikes in many parts of the country were displaying the same characteristics at the same time or soon thereafter, and some of them were certainly influenced by it. There was a growing tendency toward radicalism and the use

of force among strikers, more sympathy for the notion of a constituent assembly, and an increasing—but by no means uniform—willingness to accept socialists as leaders.

In Lodz, where the workers had not lost the fiery spirit built up during the January days, fighting between workers and government forces began in May and continued sporadically until June 5, when it settled down to serious conflict. On that day soldiers fired on a socialist-led demonstration, killing ten of the participants, and thereby touched off a general strike in the city. Led by the PPS, the Polish SD, and the Bund, the workers built barricades and challenged the government troops. The fighting lasted three days, and fair estimates indicate that during that time about three hundred men were killed and a thousand wounded. The "June Days of Lodz," as they were called, affected industrial centers throughout the country, and the revolutionary threat reached such proportions in Warsaw and other cities of Congress Poland that the government increased the number of troops in the area from two hundred fifty thousand to three hundred thousand.

In the troubled spring and summer of 1905, railroad workers added complications with a rash of strikes, some stopping train movements, others limited to work in railroad shops. The most ominous of them were the several on the Trans-Siberian line, over which thousands of troops were being moved to the front. The railroad strikers often included with their demands for increased wages and better working conditions two additional ones: cessation of the war and the calling of a constituent assembly. And, as further evidence of their sympathy with the mood now becoming common among workers, they sometimes resorted to violence. An instance of this type of response developed in the course of their strike in Novorossiisk, where, having stopped all but mail trains, they were joined by all other workers in the city. When the government attempted to restore railroad operations under troop protection, the combined forces of the strikers protested with violence, overturning a coach, throwing stones, and firing some shots. The troops responded, and the skirmish resulted in the death of thirteen workers.

Among other centers marked by violence at this time were

Kharkov, the industrial center of Little Russia; Baku, where, despite the fact that martial law had been in effect for months, fighting erupted repeatedly between troops and workers as well as between Moslems and Armenians; and Odessa, where the current wave of turbulence reached its peak.

Strikes had first become serious in Odessa in April, affecting butchers, bakers, tailors, shoemakers, printers, and textile workers. And they continued (under close watch by military detachments) without any untoward incidents into the middle of June, by which time tempers on both sides were keyed for trouble. It came quickly when one of a group of demonstrating workers outside a plow factory fired at a Cossack officer and retaliation followed. For two days the city was the scene of nightmarish street fighting: on one side the police, soldiers, and Black Hundreds; on the other, strikers and sympathizers, led by SR's, Bundists, Mensheviks, and Bolsheviks. There were scores of deaths on each side, and dozens of buildings were fired before the governor, in desperation, asked the Tsar to place the city under martial law. The Tsar's order was published on June 15.

The *Potemkin* Mutiny

On that day Odessa's disquiet was aggravated by the arrival in her harbor of the mutinous battleship *Potemkin*. Its crew, under orders to test gun linings at a distance from the other ships of the Black Sea Fleet, had risen against their officers after an incident involving a meat ration that they believed to be tainted, and had shot, thrown overboard, or imprisoned all of them. Now, a group of maverick sailors with the fleet's finest battleship in their power, they might have been quite a threat. But since their mutiny lacked the support of other sailors in the fleet (among some of whom mutinous plans were in the making nevertheless), since most of them had no personal revolutionary feelings, and since only a pitifully small number of them could qualify in any respect as leaders, their presence at Odessa was more of a problem than a threat. Their foremost spokesman, a twenty-five-year-old Ukrainian, Panas Matyushenko, and some of the other leading mutineers

thought of themselves as SD's and soon therefore were in consultation with local socialists. Among them, they set up two plans: to give the support of the *Potemkin*'s guns and crew to the antigovernment forces in the city and to call the rest of the Black Sea Fleet into mutiny. A few indulged in the bold hope that the fusion of the *Potemkin* mutiny with the Odessa street fighting would mark the beginning of the longed-for armed uprising that would spread through all of Russia.

At first, it appeared that the presence of the *Potemkin* in the harbor had raised the temperature in the city both literally and figuratively. What happened on the night of June 15/16 marked it as perhaps the bloodiest of the 1905 revolution: by morning much of the city was ablaze, and nearly two thousand persons had died. The *Potemkin* sailors, however, had been only spectators. Their first shore venture came on the following day, when they were given authorization to bury in a local cemetery one of their number who had been killed during the fighting with the ship's officers. The funeral procession was fired upon by troops, and in retaliation the ship's gunners opened fire on a theater where a meeting of military authorities was in session. Their aim was defective, the damage small; and the plan to bombard the city was thereafter abandoned. But there remained the second plan, to call the other ships of the fleet into mutiny. And when, on the second day after their defection, the fleet arrived, under command of Vice-Admiral Krieger, the *Potemkin* refused the order to surrender and signaled the call for fleet-wide mutiny. One ship, the *Georgy Pobedonostsev,* came over to the *Potemkin*; and Admiral Krieger, uncertain of the morale of the remaining crews and aware that the guns of the *Potemkin* outranged any that he had at his command, withdrew the others. The crew of the *Georgy Pobedonostsev*, lacking the courage to sustain their temerity, started back to the fleet, ran their vessel aground, and had to be rescued. Meanwhile the *Potemkin* fled to Constanza, in Rumania, where her crew, after sinking the ship by opening the seacocks, sought refuge inland.

Though it ended thus ignobly and futilely, the *Potemkin* mutiny, worst so far in Russian naval history, aroused some apprehension in the government—and, of course, hopefulness

in the opposition. The whole Black Sea Fleet was temporarily inactivated as a result of it; the commander, now distrustful of his men's loyalty, sent about five thousand of them on extended leave, hoping to replace them with more reliable sailors. The prestige of the Russian navy could hardly have been lower. And, even with strict screening of those who were brought in to man the ships again, it was years before the fleet was considered worthy of renewed confidence.

While the government recognized the condition of the Black Sea Fleet as a serious state of protest, underlined by the general turbulence in the industrial centers and the intimations of unrest elsewhere, it still assumed that it had the advantage in both time and strength. And it continued to move with caution and deliberation in the matter of fulfilling the promises made on December 12 and February 18.

Further Concessions by the Government

Some of the December promises had been met in March and April, when the Tsar, acting on the recommendations of the Committee of Ministers and other governmental bodies, had approved a series of measures lifting certain restrictions on national and religious bodies. These measures affected the Finns, Poles, Armenians, Ukrainians, Old Believers,[4] and Uniats.[5] But while representing serious concessions from the government's viewpoint, they removed only some of the disabilities under which these groups lived, and none of those under which the Jews lived. Moreover, some of the important

[4] Old Believers, a religious group (numbering at least 15 million in 1905), had refused to accept the slight modifications in the rites of the Orthodox Church as imposed by the Council of 1666–67, had been anathematized, and thereafter subjected to persecution.

[5] Uniats, adhering to the agreement (Union of Brest, 1596) of certain Orthodox bishops to unite with the Roman Catholic Church in Eastern Europe on the condition that they be allowed to retain the Byzantine rite (instead of accepting the Latin rite), had been under compulsion by the government to worship as regular communicants of the established Church or to suffer penalties as heretics.

concessions promised in December—for example, the mitigation of censorship rules and of the exceptional laws—were still lacking because of the inability of the Tsar's responsible advisers to reach agreement on how to effect them.

The project on which the Tsar placed greatest hope as a means of conciliation—the consultative assembly (Duma, in official parlance), arrangements for which had been ordered in the February rescript to Minister of Interior Bulygin—was developing very slowly. Bulygin, Solsky, and others conferring on the problem of drafting the legislation necessary for its establishment were giving more attention to insuring that the projected body be in harmony with established tradition than to hurrying the work on it. One of the snags in their deliberations was the question of what basis to use in providing representation in the body. And they finally overcame it by deciding to follow the example of zemstvo elections—that is, to provide for a type of indirect election in which voting would be by class, with preference given to the peasants and landed nobility. Then there was the question of whether or not Jews should be allowed to vote, since they were legally barred from voting in zemstvo and municipal duma elections; it was answered by the decision to continue their disability.

While the government was following its time-consuming course, the populace had only hearsay for consolation—or disturbance. There were rumors that the government had given no consideration to the provision of four-tail suffrage, that traditional and unfairly representative schemes were being considered, even that the whole idea of a national Duma had been abandoned. It was under the impact of such rumors as well as the disagreeable news of the defeat at Tsushima Straits that the Third Zemstvo Congress met in Moscow for a three-day session beginning on May 24. What the assembled zemstvo leaders wanted was what had been made clear by the majority vote of the April congress, and that was obviously more than could be expected from the Bulygin Duma (as the projected representative body was now commonly called). Unlike the Union of Unions, just getting under way on a program of denunciation of the government, the Zemstvo Congress wanted to follow the path of persuasion and conciliation. Accordingly

the delegates adopted the text of an address to the Tsar, in which they stated their views, and selected from among themselves a number of distinguished men to present it. To their representatives several members of the St. Petersburg municipal duma were later added, making a total of fourteen men; among them were such leaders as Dmitri Shipov, Ivan Petrunkevich, Prince George Lvov, Count Peter Heyden, and Prince Sergei Trubetskoi.

On June 6, the Tsar received the delegation at Peterhof and, in so doing, made history: this was the first time that he had ever agreed to meet such a group. Prince Trubetskoi read the address. Its theme was that Russia had been brought close to an abyss by the irresponsible actions of bureaucrats that had forced her into disastrous war and dangerous domestic turmoil; and the only chance of saving her was through the Tsar's granting the promised assembly, which would present the true voice of the people and help in deciding questions of war and peace. And it added a poignant plea:

> [It is] necessary that your subjects feel themselves to be Russian citizens, equal and without differences . . . , that all your subjects, even though they be of a different faith or race from you, see in Russia their fatherland, and in you, their sovereign. Just as the Russian Tsar is not a tsar of the nobility, nor of the peasantry, nor of the merchants, nor of classes, but the Tsar of All the Russias, so the persons elected by the entire population should serve the interests of the entire polity and not of classes. Sire, return to the formula of Svyatopolk-Mirsky, that the renewal of Russia must be based on confidence.[6]

Though the occasion was historic, the results were trivial. The Tsar was polite and attentive, he assured the delegation that he would summon a Duma, but he was not moved from the course he had been following. This was the last time that the zemstvos spoke with one voice. The address in the name of all zemstvos, however, received wide currency despite the attempts of the government to deprecate it and those of the leftist leaders in the opposition to solicit public disapproval of its conciliatory tone. And Prince Trubetskoi himself was popularly acclaimed as a spokesman for the conscience of Russia—an indication that public opinion was still liberal in temper.

[6] *Pravitelstvennyi Vestnik,* June 8, 1905.

Attempts by political groups to counteract the spirit of the zemstvo address came not only from the left but from the right also. The Patriotic Union and the Union of Russian Men—small rightist groups of nobles organized in the spring of 1905, the former in St. Petersburg and the latter in Moscow—sent a combined delegation of their own to the Tsar with an address designed to neutralize that of the zemstvos. The Tsar received them on June 21 and heard their appeal to maintain the class principle in the organization of the new Duma. In contrast to the zemstvo address, this one received little public notice; but its delivery marked the coming into prominence of such men as Count Alexis Bobrinsky and Senator A. A. Naryshkin, leaders of the delegation, who were to become outstanding and effective leaders of the right wing of the nobility.

Neither the zemstvo address nor the counteraddress had any direct effect on the shaping of the Bulygin Duma. Its development proceeded as planned, except that the decision to deny the franchise to the Jews was rescinded, not as a direct result of the liberal pleas but of the insistence by several bureaucrats that exclusion would be unwise. This matter and others that had been left for a final review were settled at a secret conference held at Peterhof near the end of July. The personnel and tenor of this conference, at which the Tsar himself presided, was almost wholly bureaucratic: in attendance were five grand dukes, all the ministers, and many other high officials. Only one outsider was present, the conservative historian Vasily Klyuchevsky, and he was a man quite close to the imperial family.[7] In short, this was not an instance of society's talking to the government, but of the government's talking to itself, attempting to decide how the opposition could be placated without the sacrifice of any autocratic power.

Finally, on August 6, the Tsar issued the long-awaited legislation establishing a State Duma; he did not then set the

[7] Apparently without intending to be disloyal, Klyuchevsky privately acquainted his former pupil Paul Milyukov with the happenings at the conference, thus enabling him to publish some rather severe attacks on the Bulygin Duma.

election date, but ordered that elections be held in time to permit the new body to meet before January 15, 1906. Since it followed the instructions given to Bulygin in the rescript of February 18, the legislation contained no surprises; to most of the opposition groups it was an entirely inadequate measure, a bitter disappointment. They had asked for a legislature: the law specified a Duma "to provide preliminary consideration and discussion of legislative proposals, to be transmitted through the State Council up to the supreme autocratic authority. . . ."[8] They had asked for universal suffrage: it was strictly limited by the law; most of non-European Russia was excluded from representation, the franchise being denied to all the inhabitants of Congress Poland, Siberia, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia except for those in the cities of Baku, Warsaw, Irkutsk, Lodz, Tashkent, and Tiflis; and in all areas to be represented, the franchise was to be restricted to males twenty-five years of age and older who could meet stipulated property qualifications, which were so much higher for the cities than for the rural areas that they disfranchised not only most wage earners but also most urban property owners of limited means. They had asked for direct elections: the law provided instead that Duma deputies were to be elected by provincial or city electoral assemblies, which were to be chosen by a cumbersome method similar to that followed in zemstvo elections. They had asked for equal suffrage: the law assigned electors to each class of voters—peasants, landlords, and city property owners—according to a complex formula that weighted votes on the basis of class and, occasionally, nationality.

The intention of the Tsar was clear: to have a Duma with the right to speak but not to act, a Duma that would be predominantly Russian and rural. He did not believe that it would have anything worthwhile to say; but if such a public forum would placate the opposition, he was resigned to it—providing that it spoke in Russian (the law restricted membership in the Duma to those who spoke that language) and that it spoke softly.

[8] Russia, *Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov*, 3rd series, Vol. XXV, Sect. 1, No. 26661.