

Schedule v. 5.0

Week 1 (T 9/07 & Th 9/9) Two routes to doubt.

Sher, G. [2001] "But I Could Be Wrong" in *Social Philosophy and Policy*, Summer volume.

Week 2 (T 9/14 & Th 9/16) First Route: Disagreement.

van Inwagen, P. [1996] "It is Wrong, Always, Everywhere, and for Anyone, to Believe Anything, Upon Insufficient Evidence" in *Faith, Freedom, and Rationality*, Jordan and Howard Snyder (eds.), Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD

Feldman, R. [2006] "Epistemological puzzles about disagreement" in S. Hetherington (ed.) *Epistemology Futures*, Oxford University Press.

Week 3 (T 9/21 & Th 9/23) Reasonable Disagreements?

Feldman continued.

White, R. [2005] "Epistemic Permissiveness" in *Philosophical Perspectives*, Vol. 19, 445–459.

Week 4 (T 9/28 & Th 9/30)

White continued.

Kelly, T. [2005] "The epistemic significance of disagreement" in J. Hawthorne and T. Gendler (eds.), *Oxford Studies in Epistemology*, vol. 1. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Week 5 (T 10/05 & Th 10/07) Conciliationism vs. Non-Conciliationism

Elga, A. [2007] "Reflection and Disagreement" in *Nous*, 41(3): 478–502.

*****Topic proposals due the night before your Tuesday or Wednesday meeting*****

Week 6 (T 10/12—No Class & Th 10/14)

*****Complete draft of first paper due Thursday 10/14*****

Week 7 (T 10/19 & Th 10/21)

Christensen, D. [2007] "Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News", *Philosophical Review* 116, 187–217

*****First paper due Thursday 10/21*****

Week 8 (T 10/26 & Th 10/28) Moral Expertise and Moral Deference (Guest Lecturer P. Sliwa)

McGrath, S. [forthcoming] "Skepticism about Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for Moral Realism" in *The Journal of Philosophy*.

Week 9 (T 11/02 & Th 11/04)

Jones, K. [1999] "Second-Hand Moral Knowledge" in *The Journal of Philosophy*, 96(2), 55-78.

Week 10 (T 11/09 & Th 11/11) Metaphysical v. Epistemological Attacks on Moral Realism

McGrath, S. [2007] "Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise" in *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, 3: 87-108. *****Read only pp. 87-91*****

Shafer-Landau, R. [2003] *Moral Realism: A Defence*, Oxford University Press: New York, Chapter 11, pp. 261-265.

Week 11 (T 11/16 & Th 11/18)

Street, S. [2006] "A Darwinian Dilemma For Realist Theories of Value" in *Philosophical Studies*, 127(1): 109-166.

*** **No Classes (Thanksgiving)** ***

Week 12 (T 11/30 & Th 12/02)

White, R. [ms.] "You just believe that because..."

Week 13 (T 12/07 & Th 12/09)

Vavova, E. [ms.] "What to believe when you believe that if things had been different you wouldn't have believed what you now believe" in *Rational Humility and Other Epistemic Killjoys*, Ph.D. dissertation, MIT, 2010.

Week 14 (T 12/14)

TBD