On Venezuela's Succession Crisis 2013
C-SPAN Video: Presentation on “What’s in Store for Venezuela,” at the Inter-American Dialogue, Washington, DC (August 7, 2013). On Maduro's more militaristic cabinet. http://www.c-spanvideo.org/event/222775.
"Un Maduro más duro: Venezuela after Chávez" Berkeley Review of Latin American Studies, Spring 2013. On Why the Maduro administration might be tempted to turn more autocratic than Chávez, at least for now.
Interview in La Tercera (Chile) on Maduro's first months in office, June 8, 2013.
"The Venezuelan Earthquake" The Huffington Post, April 15, 2013. Chavistas spent 14 years building a cult of personality around Chávez. Now that the personality is gone, there is less cult. That's why they lost so many votes and so much hope in the April 14 elections.
"Electoral Irregularities under Chavismo: A Tally." Americas Quarterly Web Exclusive (April 11, 2013). Venezuela under Chávez was famous for the frequency of elections and Chávez's impressive wins. It was also famous for irregularities committed during electoral campaigns. Here's a tally.
Video: "Venezuela's 2013 Presidential Elections and the United States: The Three Key Numbers to Keep in Mind," Remarks at the Eighth Annual Latin American Symposium, Center for Hemispheric Policy, University of Miami (April 5, 2013). A discussion of the eight laws in Venezuela that could cause trouble after the elections.
Interview for "Siete Claves para entender las elecciones en Venezuela," by Abraham Zamorano, BBC Mundo (April 2, 2013), and for "Capriles y Maduro, frente a frente," by Gaspar Ramírez, El Mercurio (Chile, March 23, 2013).
The House that Chávez Built, Foreign Policy online, March 7, 2013. Hugo Chávez created what could be called "Venezuelan Disease:" inflation, scarcity, plummeting productivity, and capital flight. Now the job of mending the economy falls to his successor.
On Chávez's Death and Funeral, Interview
, "Newshour," BBC World Service News (March 8, 2013); Teleconference Call, Americas Society and Council of the Americas (March 7, 2013); Interview, Marketplace, NPR, March 6, 2013.
"Venezuela's Succession Crisis." Current History 112, 751, February 2013. A review of what's at stake politically. Chávez's electoral coalition is too costly to maintain, and there are too many factions within Chavismo. This means trouble.
"Who Wins and Who Loses from Chávez's Absence (In Spanish), TV interview, "Efecto Naím," NTN24, January 14, 2013. The big losers are Populism in general, Maduro, and Cuba, and a possible win for the opposition.
"¿Un nuevo régimen para Venezuela? [A New Regime for Venezuela?]" Americas Quarterly Blog, January 10, 2013. On January 10, Venezuela became a two-headed regime, with no clear authority to adjudicate potential conflicts among the regime's caretakers. This means trouble.
"Chavismo After Chávez," Foreign Affairs Online, January 4, 2013. How to remember Chávez? As a conservative anti-imperialist--a seller of ideas and, more importantly, oil.
An extract in Spanish, La Tercera (Chile).
Audio Conference Call, America's Society/Council of the Americas, December 19, 2012. Chávez won re-election. His party won 20 of 23 gubernatorial seats. And a new successor has been named now that Chávez's health has taken a turn for the worse. Here are some scenarios.
"The Incumbent's Advantage in Latin America, LACEA blog, December 14, 2012. In Latin America, incumbent presidents running for office tend to always win, and to win by large margins. This makes Chávez's 2012 re-election a bit less impressive than one would think.
"Maduro is no Chávez, for Now." Americas Quarterly Web Exclusive, December 10, 2012. A profile of the mystery man chosen by Chávez to be his successor.
"Venezuela's Succession," Radio Interview, Background Briefing with Ian Masters, KPFK-FM in Los Angeles, December 10. We discuss Venezuela’s foreign policy that is unpopular at home for its support of Qaddafi, Ahmadinejad and the Assad regime in Syria.
"How Chávez Does Business," Foreign Affairs Online, October 4, 2012. Chávez's electoral advantage is often thought to hinge on his spending side. I argue it stems mostly from how he handles the private sector--allowing it to be profitable, yet small, overregulated, and dependent on the state.
"Conclusion" in my book with Carlos A. Romero, U.S.-Venezuela Relations Since the 1990s (Routledge 2013). How oil import trends in the United States (declining) and crime trends in Venezuela (increasing) might affect U.S.-Venezuela relations after Chávez.